🧵A thread discussing the troubled development history of the PMT-100 and PMT-150 series of field pipelines: The Soviet Union's initial large-scale operational experience in supplying military units with fuel under combat conditions was acquired during the engagements near Lake Khasan (July–August 1938) and along the Khalkhin Gol River (May–September 1939). During these campaigns, logistical support for the 1st Army Group extended across a supply route of approximately 515 kilometers. Of this total distance, 260 kilometers were serviced by rail transport, 95 kilometers by motor vehicles, and 86.7 kilometers by horse-drawn carts. The final leg of the supply chain required fuel to be transported in specialized containers via pack animals and manual labor.

As military activity in the region intensified, the throughput capacity of the supply system grew to between 500 and 750 tons of fuel per day, delivered using a combination of transport modalities. The rising demand for fuel, particularly by armored units, emerged as a critical logistical concern. The concentration of tanks in the theater of operations increased markedly, resulting in fuel requirements measured in tons and millions of liters. This placed substantial strain on logistical capabilities and exposed significant operational vulnerabilities. These experiences were not only retained in institutional memory but were also subjected to detailed analysis by the Soviet military leadership.

The lessons derived from these campaigns played a decisive role in shaping the USSR’s approach to logistical support and directly influenced the conceptualization of field pipeline systems.

In December 1940, a meeting of the senior leadership of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA) was held. It was devoted to ways of further developing the military and conducting operations, taking into account the exercises and experiences of the war between Germany and France. Participating in the meeting was the head of the Red Army Fuel Supply Directorate, Major General of Tank Forces P.V. Kotov. By that time, information had already been obtained that the logistical services of the German armed forces, especially their tank and motorized units in the campaign in France, had used field pipelines to deliver fuel.

After the war began, engineers D.Ya. Shinberg and T.E. Khromov sent a letter to the People’s Commissar of the Oil Industry, I.K. Sedin, proposing the creation of a front-line collapsible gasoline pipeline 100 km in length, and longer if needed. For use in a fuel supply system, it was assumed that mobile pump stations mounted on truck chassis would be used.

Commissar I.K. Sedin approved the idea and, with the support of the leadership, allocated funding and authorized the design and development of the field pipeline. The proposal was adopted and approved in record time. The pipeline was planned to deliver fuel to the troops conducting defensive operations west of Moscow, in the area of the town of Khokhloma.
However, the front line in these areas in the fall of 1941 was quite unstable; the German forces, although suffering heavy losses, continued to advance. Plans to create and use a collapsible pipeline were not realized.

Over time, renewed attempts to supply fuel to troops using collapsible pipelines became more successful. For example, in April 1943, field fuel pipeline operations were launched. However, their broader use remained limited due to the lack of necessary equipment (pipes and pumping units) and, most importantly, due to a lack of practical experience.
During the war, significant experience was accumulated in building and using both permanent and field pipelines. One example studied by the USSR was the American fuel pipeline system laid along the Ploiești–Rhine route.

Modern (for the time) tanks, motorized vehicles, and field electrical generators, powered by gasoline or diesel, entering service in the Red Army, significantly increased the demand for fuel. To support an uninterrupted fuel supply, new approaches had to be found.

A short history of the Il-76 concerning its role in the delivery of paratroopers: The early Cold War proved to be a favorable period for the VTA (Military Transport Aviation). After just a decade of existence, they had seen the complete integration of equipment designed with the express purpose of meeting their needs and operated an impressive 650 aircraft. By the 1960s, 80% of VTA regiments were equipped with the An-12, which arrived in batches of 100 each year. Despite this, even with the introduction of the An-22, the VTAs' lift requirements had not been met. For all of the advantages offered by turboprop designs, the limitations experienced in speed were becoming a problem, especially when delivering paratroopers (an endeavor that favored expediency).

This was recognized internationally, and with the introduction of the C-141 Starlifter, the USSR were properly motivated to respond with their own jet-powered airlift. Furthermore, Ilyushin, after the failure of their Il-60 proposal, needed to get a new aircraft into military service, which led to unique importance being placed on innovative design solutions.

A short thread discussing the individual parachute technology of the Soviet airborne forces: The D-1 family of parachutes, initially developed in 1955, was an important step in the modernization of the airborne forces. Before the introduction of this system, significant skepticism surrounded the concept of a parachute with a round canopy. This configuration was believed to be unstable when compared to the traditional square canopy design employed by earlier models. Of course, after tests were conducted involving the D-1, it was found that this was indeed the superior layout, which led to its adoption shortly thereafter.

A thread comparing the BMD-1 to the M551 Sheridan:
In regards to armament the M551 and BMD-1 are difficult to effectively compare, and present challenges unique to their respective designs.

BMD-1 has a clear disadvantage when speaking to the volume of missiles offered to each vehicle. Prior to receiving the more advanced 9M111 and 9M113 (of which 3 were carried), BMD-1 carried four 9M14 missiles, two of which were placed on a ready rack within the turret. The other two missiles were located in the troop compartment. Loading these missiles was rather easy and did not force the gunner to expose himself to enemy fire. To do this, the gun is placed at a 30-degree angle, which allows the gunner to access the launch rail. Here the 9M14 is mounted, the fins are deployed, and the missile is ready to fire. The location of the ready racks is convenient and allows the gunner to engage these actions from his seat. To prepare the 9M14 for firing, a 50 to 55-second period is expected, which includes preparing associated elements like the guidance equipment. It is possible for an exceptionally competent gunner to engage this process in 40 seconds. This is a rather long period, which could prove problematic in combat conditions, but is offset by the ability for BMD-1 to exploit reverse slopes via the use of its hydropneumatic suspension and exceedingly small size. An additional advantage presented by this configuration is found in the event of an ambush, where the BMD-1 can quickly re-engage the enemy with its main gun after a missile has been expended. In the first two minutes of an engagement, a gunner is expected to be capable of achieving two successful loading, launching, and guiding cycles before replenishing the ready rack. If the BMD-1 is employed in a prepared defensive position, three missiles within the first two minutes is possible if the turret is turned to the left to allow the gunner to access his reserve ammunition. The speed at which one can load the 9M111 and 9M113, later supplied to BMD-1 and BMD-2, is similar when compared to the prior figures. The issue presented with this upgrade was that the gunner had to expose himself when loading the missile.

🧵A thread discussing the history of Maneuver (automated command and control system):
Overview:

In May of 1964, by decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, development began on the possibility of automating troop control systems within the Soviet military. Immediately, as a result of this request, a research group led by Colonel Fedotov at the Frunze Military Academy was established, aimed at determining if such systems would be functional from an operational + tactical standpoint. These studies concluded that if such an endeavor was to be seriously considered, automated systems and communication complexes could not exist separately. If Maneuver was to achieve complete superiority over enemy command and control, it had to be integrated alongside serious revisions to the entire C&C matrix of the Soviet Military. Work on a system that would harmonize Communications between strategic, operational, and tactical formations began at OKB-864 in Minsk. Due to the importance of Minsk Electromechanical Plant Number 864, the OKB soon became a part of the Research and Development Institute of Automatic Equipment in 1969, and in 1972, all of its efforts would shift towards R&D related to Maneuver. Yuri Dmitrievich Podrezov was appointed director of the Design Bureau and later Chief Designer of Maneuver.

🧵A thread discussing the theoretical foundation of Soviet small-unit tactics: The Soviet platoon is organized around the senior lieutenant, who commands the unit, and is relegated to an integrated control element, where he is assisted by a deputy platoon commander who serves to relieve certain duties. Each platoon has a sniper/marksman, who provides precision and limited reconnaissance to the unit, he is not attached directly to the control element. A medic is present within each platoon, he operates as apart of the control element. Three motorized rifle squads totaling 24 in strength round out the formation. In the late 1980s/early 1990s the platoon would be expanded to 30 with the introduction of a machine gun which was attached to the control element. Each BMP or BTR has a crew consisting of a commander, who serves as the squad leader, a gunner (deputy commander), and a driver, who is the vehicles mechanic. These individuals will remain mounted throughout the course of an engagement. Those who dismount to fight on foot include a senior rifleman, a machine gunner, a marksman, a rifleman, a grenadier (RPG), and the assistant grenadier (RPG).

A thread discussing the theoretical framework of Soviet night fighting tactics (part 1) 🧵: The foundation of Soviet night fighting tactics (similar to previously discussed concepts) center around predetermined "rules" for success. These include efficient light support, effective application of artillery/air attacks (fire support), sudden + decisive action, the use of varying "night conditions" to improve the actualization of surprise/stealthy maneuver, continuous cooperation between sub-units throughout the duration of the offensive, and increased tactical flexibility. These norms were defined as a result of studies involving both international and domestic experience, which demonstrated the advantages of engagements at night against an unprepared defensive force. Generally speaking units were capable of accomplishing their objectives with fewer losses when compared to similar endeavors at day, and could defeat significantly stronger enemy forces that would otherwise be impossible to reliably defeat. For this reason, night conditions were to be exploited to achieve the destruction of defensive forces, units advancing to conduct a counter offensive, or retreating formations (in a pursuit).

A thread discussing the theoretical framework of Soviet urban combat doctrine at the sub-unit level: The organization and conduct of an offensive to capture a city or parts of a city are radically opposed to the means in which one conducts offensive maneuvers under normal conditions, and become increasingly unconventional if nuclear weapons have been employed prior to the battles transpiration. In Soviet writing about this concept, nuclear munitions are seen as the most efficient means to achieve a decisive victory over forces defending a besieged settlement, and allow for the location to be almost immediately occupied in the shortest period of time with the least manpower employed to do so, as defensive structures and resources which could aid the enemy in repulsing an incursion would be ablated. This does not mean Soviet units would be without resistance in this hypothetical, large zones of contamination, debris and other factors would create problems for advancing forces, though it must be noted that fighting within a city is generally regarded to be exponentially harder than preparing motorized rifles for fighting within a post nuclear battlefield. Tactical nuclear weapons may be used on the outskirts of a city, where the flank of advancing forces could be exposed to the enemy, as well as the epicenter of the city as to destroy reserves and units in depth. Before nuclear munitions are to be employed it is extremely important that the cities administrative, military, political and economic value be assessed, and that the attitude of its denizens to the Soviet Military be determined.

A thread discussing the involvement of the Soviet Chemical Defense Troops in the CNPP liquidation efforts: The accident at the CNPP (Chernobyl nuclear power plant) transpired while Colonel-General of the Chemical Troops, V.K. Pikalov, and his Chief of Staff, Major-General V.S. Kavunov, were at a training camp in Lviv. At 10:00 AM, Pikalov was ordered by Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev to fly to Chernobyl immediately. They landed in Kiev and traveled by car to Pripyat. The group arrived on April 27th, where a mobile detachment of Chemical Troops was authorized for airlift to the area of the accident. As they approached the plant, they observed the distinctive glow of Cherenkov radiation, raising concerns about the severity of the situation.

By the time Pikalov reached Pripyat, the mobile detachment had also arrived and immediately began identifying radiation levels in the area of operation and mapping safe routes for troop entry and civilian evacuation. At this time, Pikalov had access to only four patrols: one assigned to operations within the zone and another designated as a reserve. To minimize exposure for those working in contaminated areas, Pikalov personally set out in an RHM alongside a Kazakh mechanic-driver.

The safest route to Reactor 4 was from the eastern side, where radiation levels were as low as 5 R/h, compared to the dangerous southern and western sides, which reached up to 2,300 R/h. Therefore, all equipment and personnel were introduced from this axis. The northern side, with radiation levels between 13 and 140 R/h, was designated as a secondary ingress point for worst-case scenarios.

A thread discussing the history of Soviet NBC defense: The conclusion of the Second World War marked a period of great change within the Soviet military, as it began the herculean task of peacetime restructuring. An often forgotten element of this period was the complete reorganization of the Chemical Troops and Chemical Service Management bodies, which would leave only a small number of units in its wake. Those that survived the reduction were spared as they were required to fulfill important duties such as destroying huge stockpiles of chemical weapons and other hazardous material left over from now occupied German territory. Though the emergence of threats such as nuclear and bacterial weapons became ever present it was obvious that a solution was required and therefore the Chemical Troops saw renewed investment. In the early postwar years the primary task of such units was radiological and bacteriological reconnaissance, treatment, decontamination, disinfection of uniforms/PPE, disinfection/contamination of roads as well as terrain, ensuring that contamination is controlled and reduced as much as possible, handling weapons/equipment which was radioactive or chemical in nature, alongside ensuring that contamination remains local to the affected area and is not spread through environmental conditions.

A thread discussing Soviet air defense: Soviet Air Defense doctrine (like many elements of the Soviet Army) has its roots in the failings of the Red Army throughout World War 2 to integrate and effectively actualize its principles. Defending multiple axes and maintaining complete coverage over the area of operation being the most notable/costly of these failures. As a result the need for a highly mobile, long range, and insurmountable network was required, especially against an enemy such as the United States, which sought to conduct air operations in simultaneous fashion across a wide front.

A thread discussing the history of the Strategic Airborne Forces within the USSR: Following the Second World War, a decision was made concerning the subordination of the Strategic Airborne Forces. Initially, and during WW2, airborne troops were underneath the Supreme High Command of the USSR, though were still considered a part of the air force, this would be forgone in favor of reorganization underneath the Ministry of Defense, at this time titles such as Commander of the Airborne Forces were being reestablished. In April of 1946 Colonel-General B.V Glagolev would assume the position. Alongside these organizational shifts, the Airborne Forces of the USSR would see extensive rearmament initiatives, with the purpose of giving these units a greater capability for independent operations within enemy depth, which was severely lacking as experienced in WW2. They began to receive systems increasing their ability to engage both indirect, and direct fire, the operation of artillery and mortars within these units improved their efficacy substantially, in 1953 this ideal was fully actualized. Following this an effort to adopt improved anti-armor capabilities was pushed, seeing as this was an element which was similarly absent in WW2, which was one of the defining requirements surrounding the expedient development and integration of the 3M6 Shmel ATGM.

A thread discussing the history and technical characteristics of the BMD-1/2 airborne fighting vehicles: The BMD-1 was first conceptualized due to the lack of an amphibious vehicle which could be supplied to airborne troops. Volgograd Tractor Plant was chosen to design and produce the system, this is due to their experience in the production of light armored vehicles. Astrov Design Bureau wished to usurp the contract, seeing as they had spearheaded the previous generation of ASU-57 and ASU-85. At this time Volgograd was in the process of updating the aging PT-76, and found that the strict requirements which were demanded by both programs shared many facets, and therefore, BMDs distant ancestry is tied closer to PT-76 than BMP-1. The BMDs unique requirements were that it had to be light enough for AN-12 to carry two of them, be capable of employing the P-7 + MKS-760 multiple parachute system, and to share its armament with BMP-1, (which was a contract Volgograd competed for years prior).

A thread discussing Soviet naval infantry doctrine and tactics: Soviet naval infantry may be employed for both operational and strategic maneuvers. When concerning the strategic level of warfare, naval infantry would be seen as the primary vector for the creation of a new front within enemy depth, which would often involve the seizure and destruction of both governmental and military command and control, as well as the sabotage of industrial assets, if successful, smaller powers may be driven out of a large scale conflict, and a new avenue of advance for land forces may be established. At the operational level, naval infantry is employed to ensure a decisive conclusion on land through capturing straits and islands of regional importance, they may also be deployed to disrupt the enemies rear if their flank rests along a coastline fit for assault. Naval infantry, akin to air assault forces, are seen as an ideal means of delaying enemy reserves, cutting off lines of retreat, and harassing raids, which may break the enemies will to fight and scatter their intelligence. Naval infantry will also see application if coastal installations and C2 elements of high operational value are capable of being contested, they may also perform deep reconnaissance raids in decentralized fashion. The application of naval infantry places great emphasis on the actualization of surprise, especially considering the increased vulnerability of their transportation to missile and air attacks. If the enemy is not caught at a significant disadvantage, they may be capable of launching a counter attack which would severely diminish the efficacy of the landing operation. Due to this, a secondary axis with the goal of deception and limited disruption will accompany the main force, often times delivered towards the more defended of the two locations, landings will almost always be conducted at night to preserve a degree of concealment.

A thread discussing the history, functionality, and organization of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces: Being roughly 300,000 strong in regards to personnel, the SRF seek to, as their primary objective, effectively ablate the strategic capabilities of an adversary. This is accomplished through the destruction of command and control at the governmental level, industry which may aid their wartime production, and nuclear armament. These aims are to be accomplished via the application of 3 subtypes of missile, firstly is the intercontinental class which encompasses anything with ranges from 2500 to 7500 nautical miles, this is followed by the intermediate class which has a maximum range of 2500 nautical miles, lastly missiles considered medium range operate with a maximum of 1000 miles.

A thread discussing Soviet helicopter doctrine and tactics: Following the shift in mindset from nuclear to conventional superiority, the Soviet military has placed great importance on the support provided by the helicopter on the modern battlefield, especially one where allies and opposition alike possess great capabilities for expedient maneuverability. Due to this helicopters (since 1978) have been integrated into independent regiments subordinate to both combined arms and tank armies, this is only furthered by the fact that at the divisional level, motorized and tank units are home to an organic helicopter squadron. The decentralization of the rotary wing aircraft below the front level offered commanders a great degree of flexibility in the application of these systems. The regiment employed at the army level operates two squadrons of twenty Mi-24s each, and a single squadron of twenty Mi-8s, while the division often employs 6 Mi-24s and 6 Mi-8s.

A thread discussing Soviet tank tactics and doctrine: Before one can discuss Soviet armored doctrine as it applies to tank divisions, one must understand the fact that tanks are generally considered to be a basic requirement in a given units offensive capabilities, it is ultimately an extension of any units ability to maneuver, especially within enemy depth to a considerable degree, and therefore tanks are integrated into almost every arm of the Soviet ground forces. Furthermore it is understood that the tank is at its most efficient in offensive environments, where their ability to exploit varied terrain, weather, and adverse nuclear conditions is quite high. Therefore tanks are primarily employed for breakthroughs and pursuits. Defense through the application of armor is often considered secondary, or to be avoided, and is generally seen as a preliminary measure to a counter attack. Due to this, unlike the infantry arm of the Soviet ground forces, the tank commander is expected to display great initiative.

A thread discussing Soviet combat engineers and river crossing tactics: Organized underneath the control of the Front Chief of Engineers, these units are an integral facet of the Soviet combat support system. Interestingly, akin to artillery, these units are by no means static in their formation, and will disintegrate and regroup as the mission requires.

A thread discussing Soviet artillery doctrine and tactics: Before one can understand the key principles of Soviet artillery doctrine, one must be aware of the understanding Soviet Commanders hold towards the concept of control and flexibility. Generally speaking, the Soviet Commander wishes to enact the highest possible degree of control upon his units as to ensure they can be employed flexibly in an operational sense. This level of control varies greatly and descends a hierarchical command structure.

A thread discussing Soviet reconnaissance tactics and principles as well as the importance of this subject in an operational and tactical sense: The Soviets believe that generally, one's ability to reconnoiter and observe is one of if not the most important supporting capability to an offensive or defensive operation. It is understood that if one fails to properly actualize this vital and wholly essential endeavor than combat actions will suffer significantly as a result. Therefore, Soviet Commanders believe it to be imperative that at a minimum 75% of the capabilities and axis the enemy may employ in opposition to these aims be identified prior to an actions conduct. This results in the means of engaging said reconnaissance being placed at a level of prestige and elite operation which is gleaned from the view their success is essential to the effective use of the wider body of forces.

A thread detailing the organization and functionality of the KGB: To discuss the KGB is difficult, as we have very little information on their operation in regards to specifics, firstly, we are unaware of their manpower, especially at their peak in the 1980s (it can be assumed they were nearing 700,000 personnel at this time), we also have very little information on their budget, given it was split between the military and other entities within the USSR, as it stands there will be many holes in this analysis for that reason.