Documenting the Soviet military system.
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Soviet Air Defense doctrine (like many elements of the Soviet Army) has its roots in the failings of the Red Army throughout World War 2 to integrate and effectively actualize its principles. Defending multiple axes and maintaining complete coverage over the area of operation being the most notable/costly of these failures. As a result the need for a highly mobile, long range, and insurmountable network was required, especially against an enemy such as the United States, which sought to conduct air operations in simultaneous fashion across a wide front.
Following the Second World War, a decision was made concerning the subordination of the Strategic Airborne Forces. Initially, and during WW2, airborne troops were underneath the Supreme High Command of the USSR, though were still considered a part of the air force, this would be forgone in favor of reorganization underneath the Ministry of Defense, at this time titles such as Commander of the Airborne Forces were being reestablished. In April of 1946 Colonel-General B.V Glagolev would assume the position. Alongside these organizational shifts, the Airborne Forces of the USSR would see extensive rearmament initiatives, with the purpose of giving these units a greater capability for independent operations within enemy depth, which was severely lacking as experienced in WW2. They began to receive systems increasing their ability to engage both indirect, and direct fire, the operation of artillery and mortars within these units improved their efficacy substantially, in 1953 this ideal was fully actualized. Following this an effort to adopt improved anti-armor capabilities was pushed, seeing as this was an element which was similarly absent in WW2, which was one of the defining requirements surrounding the expedient development and integration of the 3M6 Shmel ATGM.
The BMD-1 was first conceptualized due to the lack of an amphibious vehicle which could be supplied to airborne troops. Volgograd Tractor Plant was chosen to design and produce the system, this is due to their experience in the production of light armored vehicles. Astrov Design Bureau wished to usurp the contract, seeing as they had spearheaded the previous generation of ASU-57 and ASU-85. At this time Volgograd was in the process of updating the aging PT-76, and found that the strict requirements which were demanded by both programs shared many facets, and therefore, BMDs distant ancestry is tied closer to PT-76 than BMP-1. The BMDs unique requirements were that it had to be light enough for AN-12 to carry two of them, be capable of employing the P-7 + MKS-760 multiple parachute system, and to share its armament with BMP-1, (which was a contract Volgograd competed for years prior).
Soviet naval infantry may be employed for both operational and strategic maneuvers. When concerning the strategic level of warfare, naval infantry would be seen as the primary vector for the creation of a new front within enemy depth, which would often involve the seizure and destruction of both governmental and military command and control, as well as the sabotage of industrial assets, if successful, smaller powers may be driven out of a large scale conflict, and a new avenue of advance for land forces may be established. At the operational level, naval infantry is employed to ensure a decisive conclusion on land through capturing straits and islands of regional importance, they may also be deployed to disrupt the enemies rear if their flank rests along a coastline fit for assault. Naval infantry, akin to air assault forces, are seen as an ideal means of delaying enemy reserves, cutting off lines of retreat, and harassing raids, which may break the enemies will to fight and scatter their intelligence. Naval infantry will also see application if coastal installations and C2 elements of high operational value are capable of being contested, they may also perform deep reconnaissance raids in decentralized fashion. The application of naval infantry places great emphasis on the actualization of surprise, especially considering the increased vulnerability of their transportation to missile and air attacks. If the enemy is not caught at a significant disadvantage, they may be capable of launching a counter attack which would severely diminish the efficacy of the landing operation. Due to this, a secondary axis with the goal of deception and limited disruption will accompany the main force, often times delivered towards the more defended of the two locations, landings will almost always be conducted at night to preserve a degree of concealment.
Being roughly 300,000 strong in regards to personnel, the SRF seek to, as their primary objective, effectively ablate the strategic capabilities of an adversary. This is accomplished through the destruction of command and control at the governmental level, industry which may aid their wartime production, and nuclear armament. These aims are to be accomplished via the application of 3 subtypes of missile, firstly is the intercontinental class which encompasses anything with ranges from 2500 to 7500 nautical miles, this is followed by the intermediate class which has a maximum range of 2500 nautical miles, lastly missiles considered medium range operate with a maximum of 1000 miles.
Following the shift in mindset from nuclear to conventional superiority, the Soviet military has placed great importance on the support provided by the helicopter on the modern battlefield, especially one where allies and opposition alike possess great capabilities for expedient maneuverability. Due to this helicopters (since 1978) have been integrated into independent regiments subordinate to both combined arms and tank armies, this is only furthered by the fact that at the divisional level, motorized and tank units are home to an organic helicopter squadron. The decentralization of the rotary wing aircraft below the front level offered commanders a great degree of flexibility in the application of these systems. The regiment employed at the army level operates two squadrons of twenty Mi-24s each, and a single squadron of twenty Mi-8s, while the division often employs 6 Mi-24s and 6 Mi-8s.
Before one can discuss Soviet armored doctrine as it applies to tank divisions, one must understand the fact that tanks are generally considered to be a basic requirement in a given units offensive capabilities, it is ultimately an extension of any units ability to maneuver, especially within enemy depth to a considerable degree, and therefore tanks are integrated into almost every arm of the Soviet ground forces. Furthermore it is understood that the tank is at its most efficient in offensive environments, where their ability to exploit varied terrain, weather, and adverse nuclear conditions is quite high. Therefore tanks are primarily employed for breakthroughs and pursuits. Defense through the application of armor is often considered secondary, or to be avoided, and is generally seen as a preliminary measure to a counter attack. Due to this, unlike the infantry arm of the Soviet ground forces, the tank commander is expected to display great initiative.
Organized underneath the control of the Front Chief of Engineers, these units are an integral facet of the Soviet combat support system. Interestingly, akin to artillery, these units are by no means static in their formation, and will disintegrate and regroup as the mission requires.
Before one can understand the key principles of Soviet artillery doctrine, one must be aware of the understanding Soviet Commanders hold towards the concept of control and flexibility. Generally speaking, the Soviet Commander wishes to enact the highest possible degree of control upon his units as to ensure they can be employed flexibly in an operational sense. This level of control varies greatly and descends a hierarchical command structure.
The Soviets believe that generally, one's ability to reconnoiter and observe is one of if not the most important supporting capability to an offensive or defensive operation. It is understood that if one fails to properly actualize this vital and wholly essential endeavor than combat actions will suffer significantly as a result. Therefore, Soviet Commanders believe it to be imperative that at a minimum 75% of the capabilities and axis the enemy may employ in opposition to these aims be identified prior to an actions conduct. This results in the means of engaging said reconnaissance being placed at a level of prestige and elite operation which is gleaned from the view their success is essential to the effective use of the wider body of forces.
To discuss the KGB is difficult, as we have very little information on their operation in regards to specifics, firstly, we are unaware of their manpower, especially at their peak in the 1980s (it can be assumed they were nearing 700,000 personnel at this time), we also have very little information on their budget, given it was split between the military and other entities within the USSR, as it stands there will be many holes in this analysis for that reason.
The Soviet OMG (Operational Maneuver Group) is an exceedingly important element to the rapid advance and the maintenance of momentum of the main body of forces.
To understand the individual within the Soviet military, one must understand the goals of the Soviet military, this is an often forgotten progression in regards to critiques of the Soviet infantryman and how he fights.
Airborne divisions are an exceedingly important facet of the ideals surrounding deep battle, which calls for disruption of the rear echelon as a core tenant.
The evolution of Soviet logistics spans the entire Cold War, shifting considerably with each decade. To cover such a complicated subject these threads will be separated by the period in which they are relevant.
The most qualified and experienced officers within the Soviet Union are chosen through competitive examination to attend one of countries sixteen military academies.
Starting from the top, Soviet aviation regiments tend to be composed of an HQ, three interceptor squadrons, and a technical/maintenance unit. These units are often accompanied by an independent technical service battalion, which is stationed at each airfield. 
As we look back upon the Cold War it's difficult not to immediately recall hyperbolic sentiments such as the global proliferation of Communist ideals threatening to destroy America at large. 
A common misconception that is often peddled (especially in regards to force comparisons between East and West) is the notion that due to the lack of peacetime deployment the CCCP's military demonstrates a lack of combat readiness. 
Soviet military procurement has a deep connection to doctrinal research, and therefore it is outlined well in advance what the USSR's combatants wish to actualize in the field, equipment is then in turn designed to fulfill these aims.
It is important to begin such a complicated topic with a comparison, while this is not a blatant critique it is to demonstrate the consequences of and the limitations presented when it comes to the Western ideal (when concerning the Cold War).