"Russia is burning Ukrainian troops to exhaustion"
The situation around the village of Prohress is deteriorating.
Russia is advancing at a rate of up to a kilometre per day. It has advanced 8km in two weeks.
The Pokrovsk front is buckling.
Some thoughts on the situation.
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A week ago Ukraine lost the village of Prohres after just 48 hours of fighting.
Defending Ukrainian units fled, while the reinforcing troops from the 47th also had to withdraw due to lack of infantry.
After the loss of the village the Russians have advanced up to 1km a day.
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Some Ukrainian units even got surrounded in the midst of the Russian offensive, although they managed to break free.
Check @Deepstate_UA for details.
Multiple Ukrainian sources are now calling the situation on the Pokrovsk front "critical"
What has led to this situation?
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The situation on the Pokrovsk front is the result of many of the long- and short-term challenges the Ukrainians face coming together at the same time.
The most significant ones are the issues with leadership and the manpower situation, which we've discussed since spring.
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To start off with leadership: The Ukrainian sources are continually criticising their own commanders for too slow, bad, or even self-destructive decisions. The troops surrounded at Prohress apparently never got a command to withdraw.
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Ukraine still seems to expend the lives of its soldiers to hold on to as much territory as possible.
It's politically understandable, but it does mean that the commanders at the frontline have very little flexibility and even need to leave their men in dangerous positions.
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This problem is exasperated by the issue of manpower & reserves.
Majority of the combat-capable Ukrainian troops are now at the front, even the 150-154 series of brigades. Russia has managed to create multiple crises over the summer which have tied up UA resources & reserves
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With little reserves left, to solve these crises Ukraine needs to move reinforcements from one part of the front to another. To strengthen defences in one place Ukraine needs to make another place vulnerable.
This constant fire-brigading burns through Ukrainian troops.
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Many Ukrainian formations haven't received replacements in a long time. When they do, the replacements may be of poor quality either due to age, or due to subpar training.
The same applies to green formations sent to the front, who are just getting their baptism of fire.
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Battered formations can rarely be pulled out of the line because there is nothing to replace them.
Russia on the other hand attacks the brigades and units that it has learned are either the most exhausted or the worst lead/trained. It especially strikes at troop rotations.
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Crises have accumulated over the summer with Ocheretyne, Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and now Prohress.
Russia has strived to exhaust the Ukrainians. Now, for the first time, it has managed to create multiple larger crises in different areas at the same time.
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With multiple fires to put out, (Toretsk is still very much ongoing and both sides are attacking in Kharkiv) Ukraine can't simply attempt to throw everything at Prohres like it did in Kharkiv.
Russians on the other hand have brought in fresh units to lead the attack.
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Ukraine's new mobilization laws will hopefully make the situation easier over the autumn, but we are not there yet. The reinforcements are still some ways away (and of unknown quality).
Russia definitely has a few weeks to even a couple of to try and exploit the situation.
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Ukraine will need to come up with a solution to the problem at hand with the limited resources it has, and within whatever political constraints it has.
Luckily, many Russian units are exhausted as well, and Russian resources are not limitless.
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Russia has also failed to make the most of Kharkiv. Had something like this happened after Kharkiv started the situation would be even worse. Russia is less prepared to exploit this than in early summer.
Ukraine has also managed to navigate precarious situations before.
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If they can stem or even exhaust the tide until the new waves of mobilized start appearing on the frontlines, the crisis is averted.
Russia seems to be throwing everything it has to break the Ukrainians before that happens.
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I wrote much the same in my analysis in Helsingin Sanomat. It's in Finnish, but it can be read from the link below.
While not in journalistic pursuits I'm still monitoring the Russian invasion of Ukraine with my colleagues at @Black_BirdGroup
Over the past 10 days, a Russian offensive pushed Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk salient, ending a 7-month operation.
What happened? Why did Ukraine withdraw? What’s next? 🧵
You can read a longer version on our Substack
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In August a Ukrainian offensive captured over 1200 km² of Russia's Kursk oblast.
The claimed goals were to draw Russian forces from Pokrovsk, capture leverage for negotiations and spoil a Russian operation from Sumy. It was likely also meant to shift the discourse.
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However, the Ukrainians failed to expand & secure their flanks and over the next 6 months the Ukrainian perimeter in Kursk diminished steadily. By the beginning of March the Ukrainians only held a bit over 300 km² of terrain in a narrow salient around the town of Sudzha.
I think there is some flawed logic here. In general the article fail to compare and contrast the Ukrainians and the Russians on similar grounds.
To an outside observer it feels like picking and choosing talking points instead of a completely honest assessment of the situation.
For example, the authors engage with assessments of Russian casualty numbers, yet fail to mention how Ukrainian officials have multiple times now published UA casualty numbers that indicate, at best, a 1:2 overall casualty ratio.
Current ratios may, naturally, differ from that.
It also ignores the enduring Ukrainian manpower issue that Ukraine has seemingly been unable to solve, while Russian recruitment is, according to Ukrainian intelligence, able to replace the casualties it's taking in Ukraine.
One needs to consider that when talking of attrition.
After breaching Selydove and Hirnyk early in the week, the Russians started offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on Friday..
Due to these developments the situation on the South Donetsk frontline has turned very difficult.
Dark red = 20. OCT
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Vuhledar front:
On Friday the Russians began large scale attacks towards Shakhtarske and Bohoiavienka.
They gained ground quickly, advancing almost 7km towards Shakhtarske.
These attacks were supported by large scale artillery and air bombardments.
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In Bohoiavienka the Russians had managed to advance within 3km of the town before Friday.
Although the initial attacks may have been repelled, video footage from Bohovienka and reports from Shakhtarske indicate that Russians have a strong foothold in both villages.
After a few weeks of (relatively) lower intensity actions, the Russians have resumed offensive operations in the Selydove-Hirnyk area, south of Pokrovsk.
In the past few days, we've seen the Russians make tactical gains throughout the AO.
Selydove direction, a thread.
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As said, after an operational pause and transfer of reinforcements, the Russians have restarted offensive operations.
They are taking advantage of Ukrainian lack of manpower and using infiltration tactics, sending small infantry units through gaps in the Ukrainian line.
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The Russian advance here has been relatively rapid, over the past three days. Pictured is the confirmed change since monday.
According to unconfirmed reports, the Russians may control much of the grey area.
Confirmed advance is up to 2,6 kilometers, but likely further.
Just a reminder, at least a part of the 59th is in the salient north of Krasnohorivka.
We've repeatedly seen the willingness of the Ukrainians to spend lives over territory, but in recent months these sort of complaints from the front have become increasingly common
With the experienced brigades being drawn to Kursk and getting replaced with greener ones, and with increased pressure, it seems the UA high command is expecting to do more with less. If the line doesn't hold it seems the blame is pinned on the soldiers, not the orders.
Some have blamed the increase in these sort of orders and repercussions on Syrskyi, and I there may be some truth to it.
However, we also saw these style of stubborn static defense actions in Bakhmut and under Zalushnyi.