"Russia is burning Ukrainian troops to exhaustion"
The situation around the village of Prohress is deteriorating.
Russia is advancing at a rate of up to a kilometre per day. It has advanced 8km in two weeks.
The Pokrovsk front is buckling.
Some thoughts on the situation.
1/
A week ago Ukraine lost the village of Prohres after just 48 hours of fighting.
Defending Ukrainian units fled, while the reinforcing troops from the 47th also had to withdraw due to lack of infantry.
After the loss of the village the Russians have advanced up to 1km a day.
2/
Some Ukrainian units even got surrounded in the midst of the Russian offensive, although they managed to break free.
Check @Deepstate_UA for details.
Multiple Ukrainian sources are now calling the situation on the Pokrovsk front "critical"
What has led to this situation?
3/
The situation on the Pokrovsk front is the result of many of the long- and short-term challenges the Ukrainians face coming together at the same time.
The most significant ones are the issues with leadership and the manpower situation, which we've discussed since spring.
4/
To start off with leadership: The Ukrainian sources are continually criticising their own commanders for too slow, bad, or even self-destructive decisions. The troops surrounded at Prohress apparently never got a command to withdraw.
5/
Ukraine still seems to expend the lives of its soldiers to hold on to as much territory as possible.
It's politically understandable, but it does mean that the commanders at the frontline have very little flexibility and even need to leave their men in dangerous positions.
6/
This problem is exasperated by the issue of manpower & reserves.
Majority of the combat-capable Ukrainian troops are now at the front, even the 150-154 series of brigades. Russia has managed to create multiple crises over the summer which have tied up UA resources & reserves
7/
With little reserves left, to solve these crises Ukraine needs to move reinforcements from one part of the front to another. To strengthen defences in one place Ukraine needs to make another place vulnerable.
This constant fire-brigading burns through Ukrainian troops.
8/
Many Ukrainian formations haven't received replacements in a long time. When they do, the replacements may be of poor quality either due to age, or due to subpar training.
The same applies to green formations sent to the front, who are just getting their baptism of fire.
9/
Battered formations can rarely be pulled out of the line because there is nothing to replace them.
Russia on the other hand attacks the brigades and units that it has learned are either the most exhausted or the worst lead/trained. It especially strikes at troop rotations.
10/
Crises have accumulated over the summer with Ocheretyne, Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and now Prohress.
Russia has strived to exhaust the Ukrainians. Now, for the first time, it has managed to create multiple larger crises in different areas at the same time.
11/
With multiple fires to put out, (Toretsk is still very much ongoing and both sides are attacking in Kharkiv) Ukraine can't simply attempt to throw everything at Prohres like it did in Kharkiv.
Russians on the other hand have brought in fresh units to lead the attack.
12/
Ukraine's new mobilization laws will hopefully make the situation easier over the autumn, but we are not there yet. The reinforcements are still some ways away (and of unknown quality).
Russia definitely has a few weeks to even a couple of to try and exploit the situation.
13/
Ukraine will need to come up with a solution to the problem at hand with the limited resources it has, and within whatever political constraints it has.
Luckily, many Russian units are exhausted as well, and Russian resources are not limitless.
14/
Russia has also failed to make the most of Kharkiv. Had something like this happened after Kharkiv started the situation would be even worse. Russia is less prepared to exploit this than in early summer.
Ukraine has also managed to navigate precarious situations before.
15/
If they can stem or even exhaust the tide until the new waves of mobilized start appearing on the frontlines, the crisis is averted.
Russia seems to be throwing everything it has to break the Ukrainians before that happens.
16/
I wrote much the same in my analysis in Helsingin Sanomat. It's in Finnish, but it can be read from the link below.
While not in journalistic pursuits I'm still monitoring the Russian invasion of Ukraine with my colleagues at @Black_BirdGroup
The Russian border defences were most likely prepared to slow down and stop smaller-scale raids. Looking at the Russian telegram channels it seems that the Russian high command may have also ignored the Ukrainian buildup.
1/
As a result, Russia has to scramble the QRF's and local forces to respond to this. This gives the Ukrainians time and ability to joyride in the area to their souls content.
Reconnaisance groups are largely moving far ahead of the main force to sow more confusion.
2/
However, this means that we must be wary about our assessments of the extent of Ukrainian control in the Kursk region. Entering a village or driving through it does not consolidation make if it can't be held once the Russian reaction forces get to the AO.
3/
On both sides the battle ends up looking like a political objective made military neccesity.
For Ukraine, the initial river crossing didn't create the kind of a unified bridgehead that was needed for follow on operations.
2/
Ukraine attempted to gain a foothold near Pischanivka, Pidstepne, Kozachi Laheri and Krynky. Had they succeeded in all places, the bridgehead may have been wide enough to create an actual threat to Russia.
However, all other crossings were defeated except the one in Krynky.
I think here are multiple reasons why the 150-series of brigades are not being committed.
First of all, Ukraine has precious few units that have not been battered in this years fighting. Yes some have been moved to R&R but it's unclear how well they've been replenished.
Some of the brigades floating around in our internal ORBAT tracking have likely had battalions moved to support other brigades with individual battalions (especially tank brigades), or have likely had at least some manpower siphoned away to replenish casualties.
2/
If (we'll get to that if) the 150 series of brigades is battle ready, committing them to rotations of exhausted brigades would mean eating into Ukraines dwindling strategic reserve.
Once you commit the 150 series somewhere it's harder to react to Russian successes elsewhere.
3/
I've waited over the weekend for more information to make hard statements about the Avdiivka withdrawal.
By now it's safe to say that the worst case scenario of encirclement was avoided. Ukraine clearly managed to pull its formations out of the city bit by bit during the nights.
However, it does seem that the ultimate decision for abandoning the city was made quite late, judging by Ukraine holding the extreme positions within the perimeter, Zenit and the Pump station until the last possible moment.
Ukrainian success at preventing Russia from closing the cauldron makes it possible to reorganize the defense west of Avdiivka and limits the risk of immediate breakouts.
Yet, the defensive preparations west of Avdiivka have not been nearly as extensive as one would've hoped.
My main problem with Syrskyi isn't necessarily the man himself, but rather the very apparent conflict and contradiction between the political and strategic goals as outlined by the Zelenskyi admin, and the actual military reality on the ground.
The Presidential office has been hesitant to publicly announce that Ukraine goes on defense or to call the situation a stalemate. Umerov has been talking about the liberation of Crimea in 2024, and Budanov talks about summer counteroffensives.
A quick example of the minor mistakes in narratives having large implications.
I'm currently reading "The Battle for Kyiv" by Christopher Lawrence. It's an excellent book. There's however a minor mistake that seems to find its way into every story of the battle.
Ivankiv. 1/
Early on the morning of the 25th of February the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the withdrawing Ukrainian troops had managed to destroy the bridge over the Teteriv river and halt the Russians.
This was then repeated in the international media.