having a look at his more recent work, notably his chapter in the HPE handbook (edited by @jaj7d and @jaredcrubin) as well as his ... academic.oup.com/edited-volume/…
Jurado, Ignacio, and Sandra León. 2019. ‘Geography Matters: The Conditional Effect of Electoral Systems on Social Spending’. @BJPolS 49(1): 81–103. cambridge.org/core/journals/…
Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2020. ‘Geographic Divides and Cosmopolitanism: Evidence From Switzerland’. @cps_journal 53(13): 2061–90. doi.org/10.1177/001041…
@SJRickard 2018. Spending to Win: Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. cambridge.org/core/books/spe…
@SJRickard. 2020. ‘Economic Geography, Politics, and Policy’. Annual Review of Political Science 23(1): 187–202. doi.org/10.1146/annure…
@amycatalinac, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, and Alastair Smith. 2020. ‘A Tournament Theory of Pork Barrel Politics: The Case of Japan’. @cps_journal 53(10–11): 1619–55. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00…
@amycatalinac, and Lucia Motolinia. 2021. ‘Why Geographically-Targeted Spending Under Closed-List Proportional Representation Favors Marginal Districts’. @ElectoralStdies 71: 102329. sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
@amycatalinac, and Lucia Motolinia. 2021. ‘Geographically Targeted Spending in Mixed-Member Majoritarian Electoral Systems’. @World_Pol 73(4): 668–711. cambridge.org/core/journals/…
Moretti, Enrico. 2024. ‘Place-Based Policies and Geographical Inequalities’. Oxford Open Economics 3(Supplement_1): i625–33. academic.oup.com/ooec/article/3…
Moretti, Enrico, and Moises Yi. 2024. ‘Size Matters: Matching Externalities and the Advantages of Large Labor Markets’. nber.org/papers/w32250
Dauth, Wolfgang, Sebastian Findeisen, Enrico Moretti, and @jsuedekum. 2022. ‘Matching in Cities’. @JEEA_News 20(4): 1478–1521. doi.org/10.1093/jeea/j…
@TimBartik. 2020. ‘Using Place-Based Jobs Policies to Help Distressed Communities’. Journal of Economic Perspectives 34(3): 99–127. aeaweb.org/articles?id=10…
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Happy to circulate a new @cage_warwick working paper, which is joint work with @fetzert and @Prashant_Garg_.
Using original data on high-street vacancies in England and Wales, we investigate the political ramifications of local decline. Brief summary 👇
Motivation & contribution
The literature on populism has produced robust evidence of a reduced-form causal between:
▶️local economic shocks and negative spatial externalities (crime, homelessness, mental distress)
▶️ lregional exposure to shocks and
populist support
Gap: Still little direct evidence on the link between the local decline induced by these externalities and populists' electoral success
Our contribution is empirical: we gather data on a highly visible type of spatial externality, high-street vacancies.
Foucault died 40 years ago. His work is not easy to read for someone trained in quantitative social science, but in a fascinating essay @ethanbdm draws on (among others) Foucault reflect on the "perils of quantification" in policy analysis. bostonreview.net/forum_response…
"In truth, the very notion of the “aims” of public policy is shaped in a deep way by the dictates of quantification. We don’t quantify because we are utilitarians. We are utilitarians because we quantify. Reflecting on similar themes, Michel Foucault perhaps put it best,
saying that for modern policy analysts, utilitarianism has ceased to be a philosophy or even an ideology. It has become 'a technology of government.'"
Caveat: Imo this does by no means imply that we should jettison the welfare-economic toolkit. But it requires greater ...
Agreed. The way we think about this in our climate institutions report is that institutions are an important means for addressing the strategic challenges associated with climate policy - in addition to policy instruments and, potentially, rhetoric (see👇).
What are these strategic challenges? In the absence of a good theory of climate policymaking, we derived these inductively from the literature. We came up with the following list:
1⃣ Agenda setting +seeding (drawing on the path-breaking work by @owasow)
2⃣ Knowledge and transparency
Crucially, this includes "common knowledge", which is familiar to game theorists, but overlooked in the institutional literature. @page_eco had a nice post recently on CK, which I can thoroughly recommend. optimallyirrational.com/p/the-strategi…
I agree. See below for some recent work in political science and economics that should make us worried about voters' willingness to sanction democratic backsliding.
On Hungary:
Ahlquist, John S., Nahomi Ichino, Jason Wittenberg, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. ‘How Do Voters Perceive Changes to the Rules of the Game? Evidence from the 2014 Hungarian Elections’. Journal of Comparative Economics 46(4): 906–19. sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
I agree, the VoC framework has yielded some powerful insights, particularly its emphasis on institutional complementarities (though this also featured prominently in Aoki's analysis of the 🇯🇵economy).
Descriptively, however, the dichotomy between LMEs and CMEs has turned ...
out to be too stylised to be of much analytical use, I'd argue.
On institutional complementarities: @benwansell has a nice discussion (125-126) in his "Why Politics Fails" (see👇)
On the descriptive weakness of VoC: There is imo too much substantively important variation ...
in labour market outcomes within the two VoC clusters. The paper below is just one of many examples.
I haven't made up my mind as to the best approach to capturing this variation. The growth model perspective introduced by Baccaro and ... aeaweb.org/research/chart…
Volle Zustimmung.
Die moral hazard Dynamik wird bei der nächsten Finanzkrise wieder ihre hässliche Fratze zeigen.
Es ist einfach schwer, das Commitment-Problem zu lösen, also den Unternehmen glaubwürdig zu drohen, dass die Steuermittel nicht dafür verwendet …
werden, die Externalitäten von "reckless behaviour" zu internalisieren.
@ThomasPHI2 und Wang haben kürzlich einen sehr interessanten Lösungsvorschlag im @QJEHarvard durchdekliniert. Sie zeigen, dass das Commitment-Problem unter bestimmten ... academic.oup.com/qje/article-ab…
Annahmen gelöst werden kann, wenn sich die Regierung dazu verpflichten kann, das schlechteste Unternehmen pleitegehen zu lassen.
Der Anreiz, nicht das schlechteste Unternehmen zu sein, trägt de facto dazu bei, die Externalitäten von excessive risk-taking zu ...