It's important to first of all define the terms. Tuaregs are a large semi-nomad Berber group that adopted Islam in the 7th century. They adhere mostly to Sunni Maliki Madhhab, which explains their visits to Morocco to pay homage to Saints. They are present in Niger, Mali, Libya, Algeria, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. Those in Mali speak Arabic and a Berber dialect, Tamashek.
They have historically controlled the caravan roads that stretch from North Africa to Central Africa.
Their clothes and veils are among their most noticeable characteristics. The women hardly ever cover themselves (until recently -- recently meaning last two centuries or so) the men wear blue veils so that just their faces or eyes are seen. They also typically base their social structures on tribal allegiances and heritage and have stringent customary laws.
The Azawad people, which are the ones who ambushed Wagner, are also Tuaregs, but are based in Northern Mali.
They are not ISIS, they are not Al-Qaeda, they are not JNIM, and they do not want to have a Sahel/Maghreb caliphate. It is a common misconception as to what their goals are.
They claim territories from Niger, and Southern Algeria, and most importantly, want to form an independent state.
Funny thing here is that the pattern regarding their warfare tactics remained intact as the Tuaregs are known for "surprise attacks."
Tuareg separatists in Northern Mali have started different rebellions since the 1990s, and even prior, given that the formation of the modern Malian state following French colonial retreat did not allow them to gain in representation, they did not agree on the constitution, and ethnic violence complicated their overall integration.
Through their organized movement, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) , in 2012, they have rebelled once again and claimed their independence in the North.
The problem was that Ansar Dine and AQMI, which are terrorist groups, wanted to seize the opportunity to absorb Azawad and create a caliphate. Which, in fact, did not happen. That being said, it is likely that they benefited from their weapons.
My point is very simple:
The people who killed Wagner group mercenaries, are Tuaregs, but most importantly, they’re Azawad people, they have their own demands and their own interests that should not be confused with other groups. For the sake of any reasonable discussion,..
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Why is Russia in Africa? To recruit Africans to fight in Ukraine, among other things.
Jeune Afrique published a compelling investigation titled "Putin's Riflemen," revealing how hundreds of Africans, primarily from Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and the Ivory Coast, have either been enlisted into Russia's army or joined Wagner mercenaries.
They found that Russia uses different methods to recruit them, giving them often the illusion that they would join a company in Russia, but it is only when they arrive that they find themselves part of the Russian army.
Key findings:
1- Central Africans make up the majority of Russia's recruitment efforts, with hiring practices conducted openly. 2- Russia also targets the 40,000 African students studying in Russian universities for recruitment. 3- The Russian army frequently resorts to threats against these students if they refuse to enlist.
This investigation also confirms what was reported by Reuters :
"The three African inmates Reuters followed were among the tens of thousands of Russian convicts who took up Wagner’s offer of a pardon in return for six months service in Ukraine"
The October 1st attack bore many similarities to the one in April, though this time Iran’s posture has notably shifted.
Firstly, Hezbollah, Iran's most prized and sophisticated proxy, has been significantly weakened. This complicates any coordination of attacks from Lebanon and Syria against Israel.
Secondly, as seen last year, Iran is facing significant domestic challenges. The Islamic Republic struggles to appeal to its younger generation and offers few economic prospects. Its discriminatory practices towards ethnic minorities have pushed Tehran to intensify its rhetoric, blaming the "Zionist" threat for its internal woes.
Lastly, Israel's sabotage operations, targeting not just Hezbollah but also the Houthis (with the killing of Houthi leader Mohammad Abdul Salam) and Hamas (with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh), have likely increased the regime's sense of paranoia. When I check on Arab media, both pro and anti-Iran, I have also noticed that one of the main concerns revolves around Iran being no longer reliable as a sponsor for "Jihad against Zionists and their supporters (meaning Sunni countries);"
By taking a step back, it becomes evident that Iran is in a position of weakness. However, it is precisely this vulnerability that makes it more threatening. Although its attacks may not be devastating, they can still achieve significant political objectives. To understand this, one must consider the regime's nature and priorities.
Since October 7, Iran has pursued three objectives: 1) asserting dominance over the Palestinian issue, 2) expanding and arming its network of proxies, as seen with the Houthis, and 3) compensating for its technological shortcomings by deepening cooperation with China and Russia, particularly in the development and acquisition of disruptive military capabilities. These short-term goals are designed to ensure Iran can seize opportunities as they arise. In this context, Iran has applied maximum pressure on U.S. allies, while also challenging U.S. influence, as demonstrated in the Red Sea, where the Houthis have successfully disrupted a vital trade route through which $1 trillion worth of goods passes.
While Israel and other U.S. allies have successfully hindered Iran from achieving its short-term objectives, this does not mean that Iran believes it is straying from what it considers "the right path."
The regime is not centered around individuals or figures; instead, the people serve the regime's interests. Iran continues to sign significant agreements with Russia and China, asserts dominance over the Palestinian issue to gain influence in the Arab and Muslim world, and uses proxies as distractions while quietly advancing its nuclear weapons program.
For the Islamic Republic, anything that serves as a distraction is valuable—even a low-impact attack on Israel with minimal casualties. Why? Because in Iran's calculations, the response from the White House matters more than that from Jerusalem.
Iran's attack in April, followed by a recent barrage of 200 ballistic missiles, without facing significant repercussions from Washington, is seen as a victory in Tehran. Iran recognizes that it cannot effectively defeat Israel or "restore deterrence"—something it barely possesses—but it understands that the Biden administration, like Obama's, operates under the assumption that a diplomatic solution with the Islamic Republic is possible, despite Iran’s strategic objective of subverting and weakening the United States.
This administration views Israel as a potential obstacle to a nuclear agreement with Iran. As a result, Iran is carefully positioning itself to influence U.S. policy, provoking Israel at every opportunity while counting on Washington to restrain Israeli responses.
Pavel Durov, founder and CEO of Telegram, was arrested today in France, there are different charges against him.
While it would be interesting to discuss the investigation itself, putting the censorship arguments aside, (I personally use Telegram a lot to keep track of the news) I just would like to highlight how Telegram represented over the last years a national security concern for the French.
Russian mercenaries, obviously, use different platforms, but Telegram played for them an important role in accelerating the deterioration of France's military posture, especially in Africa.
I think it's important to take it into consideration when wondering why the French would get involved.
A few things to keep in mind:
- The biggest Wagner channels are on Telegram
- In general, the best way to assess if a disinformation campaign is taking place, is to check if multiple channels that are pro-Wagner or so have relayed it
- Many people use Telegram as their source of information
There were several reports that show how Telegram was spreading anti-French sentiment and fake information about French military involvement in places such as Mali that would find its way to propagate in mainstream social media platforms like Facebook.
Wagner channels, in fact, launched campaigns not only against the French but also against UN missions.
But, of course, disinformation campaigns against the French were not only taking place in the digital world, they also took forms of organized protests.
One of the most notable ones was in Niger, where right after a successful Wagner-backed coup d'état, thousands of protesters gathered outside a French military base in Niamey demanding that French troops leave, despite the fact that their missions revolved around counterterrorism against the rising Islamist insurgents in the Sahel. The French ended up leaving and putting an end to their military cooperation with Niger.
The case of Niger is especially important since it put also the EU in a tough spot given that it allocated around $554 million to Niger the last few years.
When the Wagner mercenaries arrived in Africa, the French were simply not prepared for what was coming. Waves of disinformation campaigns from Telegram took place that not only revived revanchist attitudes towards France as a former colonial power in the Continent, but that also ultimately led to immense military loses as they had to leave several of their military bases and severe ties with countries that are now backed by Wagner.
Telegram became for the French since then a factor among many that explains their inability to counter information warfare operations.
What happened since Wagner's defeat in Mali on July 25?
I would like to reiterate that this is the most significant defeat Wagner has ever experienced in Africa.
A little recap:
The Tuareg Azawad (based in the Northern part of Mali) and which operated under the group of the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) defeated Wagner mercenaries and their Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) allies with a surprise ambush at Tinzaouaten, a rural commune close to Algerian southern borders.
The results of the defeat were the following according to Reuters:
- Several Russian mercenaries were killed, 20 approximately, some others have fled
- Around 10 FAMA soldiers were killed as well
- Several armored vehicles and weapons were lost
- FAMA also lost a helicopter (I saw some reports saying 2, but I can't really verify yet)
The Wagner losses were so significant that they had to issue a statement, Lavrov was also embarrassed and called his Malian counterpart where he "expressed Russia's "firm intention to continue rendering the necessary support," including on socioeconomic issues, boosting the combat capability of the armed forces, and training military personnel."
It's important to keep in mind that Mali is important for Russia for the following reasons:
1- Wagner's source of legitimacy came from its ability in 2021 to help the Malian junta's coup d'état, in which it succeeded. 2- Mali is part of the Alliance of Sahel States (with Burkina Faso, and Niger) which plays a role in weakening the African Union and ECOWAS which have a good relationship with Western institutions. 3- Yes for the gold and minerals, but Moscow is after geostrategic interests first, the gains help the mercenaries sustain themselves. I think this is an important point to emphasize. Moscow does not have a mercantilist approach contrary to common belief.
A very recent report by France 24 showed that the Tuareg rebels diffused and recovered videos from cell phones and cameras that they found on the bodies of Wagner mercenaries
Including a video of the battle that was filmed by Nikita Fedyanin (administrator of the Grey Zone Telegram channel) before he got killed.
Libya is once again the center of attention given the recent activities of Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and ex-officer in Gaddafi's army on Libya's Southwestern borders (directly confronting Algeria).
I would like to highlight a few things & offer some analysis of the possible repercussions.
First of all, we should keep in mind that: 1- The Basics: Libya is important because of the obvious energy resources, plays a big role in the security of the Mediterranean, and is the terminal station for migration flows. 2- Since the death of Gaddafi and the civil war, Libya is still working on preserving its territorial integrity, it is not in a comfortable state where it can act freely. 3- There is still a fight over who will be the ruler, and despite the different attempts to establish a smooth democratic transition, the interventions of Russian Wagner mercenaries and the emergence of various entities and factions such as Haftar are complicating the process. Among other things.
What is happening right now, is, however, particularly different.
Let's take a look at Libya's relationship with its neighbor, namely Algeria.
Contrary to common belief, even when Gaddafi was aligned ideologically with Algeria during his reign (anti-colonial and anti-imperialist arc), there were obvious tensions as Algeria accused Gaddafi of supporting Islamist militant groups during the Algerian Civil war in the early 1990s. The relationship stayed amicable but still tense.
After Gaddafi's death, the most important conflict remained over the borders.
Libya and Algeria share a long border of approximately 1,000 km, and the civil war led Algeria to take intense security measures against al-Qaeda/ISIS and other groups that might try to cross the borders or infiltrate the country.
However, several reports were circulating that Algeria seized the opportunity during the civil war to expand its influence in Libya. Reports noted that a full regiment of Algerian paratroopers was in Libya and that they had occupied a zone that served as a corridor for Libya.
But the most important accusation was made by Haftar as he criticized Algeria's position. He considers Algeria an enemy that interferes in Libyan affairs (an accusation he made in 2014) and that Algiers maintains "neutrality" while it keeps on advocating for other groups.
In 2018, he made direct threats and said that he would "transfer the Libyan war to Algeria in a matter of seconds," (sorry, rough translation). Basically asking Algeria to let Libyans handle the security matters themselves and to not use terrorism which he considers an excuse for Algerian interference.
Is China trying to take over the Middle East? The answer isn't "Yes", or "No", the answer is: "Of course it is!" 🧵
1/ There were many indicators that China is challenging the US, not just in tech & economic warfare, but in building a parallel system that excludes the US.
Xi Jinping, unlike his predecessors, has a grand vision of what China is, what it should represent, & what it deserves. Historically, China & the Middle East were close via the trade routes and there were notable cultural exchanges (Tang Dynasty), all of which Xi is aware of.
Other than Xi's personal/historical motives, he considers US presence in the region as an anomaly, & one can see this in his speeches. In fact, one of the reasons his alliance with Islamic Republic of Iran is so strong, is because they both want to expel Americans from the region