It's important to first of all define the terms. Tuaregs are a large semi-nomad Berber group that adopted Islam in the 7th century. They adhere mostly to Sunni Maliki Madhhab, which explains their visits to Morocco to pay homage to Saints. They are present in Niger, Mali, Libya, Algeria, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. Those in Mali speak Arabic and a Berber dialect, Tamashek.
They have historically controlled the caravan roads that stretch from North Africa to Central Africa.
Their clothes and veils are among their most noticeable characteristics. The women hardly ever cover themselves (until recently -- recently meaning last two centuries or so) the men wear blue veils so that just their faces or eyes are seen. They also typically base their social structures on tribal allegiances and heritage and have stringent customary laws.
The Azawad people, which are the ones who ambushed Wagner, are also Tuaregs, but are based in Northern Mali.
They are not ISIS, they are not Al-Qaeda, they are not JNIM, and they do not want to have a Sahel/Maghreb caliphate. It is a common misconception as to what their goals are.
They claim territories from Niger, and Southern Algeria, and most importantly, want to form an independent state.
Funny thing here is that the pattern regarding their warfare tactics remained intact as the Tuaregs are known for "surprise attacks."
Tuareg separatists in Northern Mali have started different rebellions since the 1990s, and even prior, given that the formation of the modern Malian state following French colonial retreat did not allow them to gain in representation, they did not agree on the constitution, and ethnic violence complicated their overall integration.
Through their organized movement, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) , in 2012, they have rebelled once again and claimed their independence in the North.
The problem was that Ansar Dine and AQMI, which are terrorist groups, wanted to seize the opportunity to absorb Azawad and create a caliphate. Which, in fact, did not happen. That being said, it is likely that they benefited from their weapons.
My point is very simple:
The people who killed Wagner group mercenaries, are Tuaregs, but most importantly, they’re Azawad people, they have their own demands and their own interests that should not be confused with other groups. For the sake of any reasonable discussion,..
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
This weekend, somewhere in the mountains of southwestern Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was hunting an American. They were chasing the most intoxicating image: a soldier of the “Great Satan,” bloodied and captured, paraded before the cameras on the very soil his country had come to destroy, the living fulfillment of every chant of vengeance that had echoed through Iranian streets since 1979. The IRGC held all the advantages a force could ask for: home terrain, local informant networks, and within its grasp the single most valuable propaganda asset of the entire war—a prisoner whose image alone could have rewritten the narrative of a campaign that has been catastrophic for the Islamic Republic from the first strike.
But American special operations forces got there first. And when Donald Trump announced the rescue on Truth Socialin three words—“WE GOT HIM!”—the IRGC walked away with nothing but the abandoned underwear of a man they never caught.
The episode revealed three things: complete American military superiority over the Islamic Republic on its own soil; the catastrophic failure of a surveillance architecture that Beijing had spent years and billions of dollars constructing; and the increasingly inescapable conclusion that the IRGC’s viability as a military institution is approaching its terminal phase.
Trump is running two operations simultaneously: one against the IRGC, and one against the assumption that the United States will indefinitely underwrite regional security at its own expense. His threats to leave NATO, vow to send the IRGC back to the stone age, and triumphalist mid-operation address thanking Gulf partners for their support are not the improvisations of an undisciplined communicator. They are the deliberate signaling of a strategic repositioning, designed to press allies into assuming greater responsibility abroad. The operation itself is a demonstration of what American military power can accomplish when it decides to act without hesitation.
Trump's Middle East
Operation Epic Fury is the Logical Conclusion of Trump's Foreign Policy
Operation Epic Fury is a military campaign that, should it achieve its objectives, may mark the beginning of the end of America’s era of massive military engagement in the region. An attempt for Trump to reorder the strategic landscape of the Middle East in a way no previous administration has attempted, shifting the burden of regional containment toward Israel while freeing American political attention and capital for higher priority theaters.
Absent that outcome, Trump faces the prospect of closing his term with a permanent "Iranian threat", no expansion of Abraham Accords, no IMEC corridor that would benefit U.S. businesses, no Pax Silica that would empower U.S. tech companies, and a legacy indistinguishable from every predecessor who pledged to end American overextension in the Middle East yet never established the strategic conditions that would have made withdrawal possible.
The Middle East, in his conception, is a real estate opportunity for the United States. Not simply a theater to be stabilized but a pivot between continents, a commercial and technological hub through which American-aligned economies would grow more deeply connected.
Gulf sovereign wealth funds would flow into American industry and technology. New corridors would reorder the movement of goods, energy, and data across Asia, Europe, and North America. That transformation, however, presupposes a Middle East in which Iran no longer holds the conditions for integration permanently at risk.
Operation Epic Fury reflects an attempt to shift the underlying conditions of Middle Eastern politics. It’s a structural solution to a structural problem for Trump. Because if it succeeds, the constraints described above will loosen.
The Abraham Accords offered, I think, an early indication of what such a region might look like:
Several Arab governments signaled their willingness to normalize relations with Israel and move closer to Washington. What held them back was not a lack of political inclination. The obstacle came from the shadow cast by Iran’s network of armed proxies including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. That network made visible alignment with Israel a potentially dangerous gamble. Trump perhaps understood that incentives alone would not change the region’s calculations. Lowering the costs associated with alignment with the United States was essential.
Nothing about Operation Epic Fury occurred within a thousand miles of Tokyo. Yet no capital in the world stands to gain more from the wreckage of Khamenei’s regime than the one sitting across the East China Sea from Shanghai.
Japan is China's principal strategic rival in the Western Pacific: the two compete for military dominance in the East and South China Seas, for economic influence across Southeast Asia, for secure energy supply chains, and for the allegiance of every mid-sized Pacific power now deciding whether its future runs through Washington or Beijing.
The gains Operation Epic Fury delivered to Tokyo are structural and extend across every dimension of that rivalry.
Iran is the world's most sophisticated laboratory for circumventing Western financial enforcement, and the networks it built had dual-use value for Beijing's own contingency planning in a Taiwan scenario where China itself could face comprehensive sanctions. The operational knowledge embedded in those networks is now degrading in real time. For Japanese defense planners, who have long worried that Western economic leverage over China might prove insufficient in a Taiwan crisis, the destruction of Beijing's most advanced sanctions-evasion rehearsal space is a strategic gain of the first order.
The Five Nations Railway connecting China to Iran through Central Asia depended on political stability that no longer exists. Every month that corridor remains inoperable is another month the Malacca Strait retains its strategic centrality, and another month Japan's geographic position astride the Western Pacific sea lanes appreciates in value. zinebriboua.com/p/japan-is-the…
The Iran Question Is All About China
Why Operation Epic Fury Is the Opening Act of the Indo-Pacific Century
The Iran question was never about Iran. Remove the Islamic Republic from the equation and China loses its pawns for a Taiwan contingency. Leave it in place and the Middle East remains what Beijing designed it to be: a second front that Washington can never afford to leave and can never afford to stay in. Trump's strikes are the first move by an American president who appears to understand that the road to the Pacific runs through Tehran.
Every dollar the United States spends defending Red Sea shipping lanes is a dollar unavailable for submarine production, Pacific basing, or Taiwan contingency planning. Every carrier group stationed in the Gulf of Aden is a carrier group absent from the Western Pacific. Iran’s proxies, armed with Iranian weapons and supported by Iranian intelligence, function as a mechanism of American strategic attrition, and the costs fall entirely on Washington while Beijing accumulates strategic gains.
Iran's threat pushes Gulf states to diversify their partnerships, and this very diversification increases Chinese leverage. And the more leverage China holds over Gulf capitals, the less likely those capitals are to side with Washington on the questions Beijing cares about most: Taiwan, semiconductor export controls, sanctions enforcement, and the future of the dollar-based financial order.
From the 1960s onward, Third-Worldist movements increasingly framed their politics through anti-Zionism, portraying Israel as the last fortress of Western imperialism and Palestinian resistance as the moral center of a global struggle. Mamdani draws directly from this legacy.
Zohran Mamdani found his audience at a moment when that voice had returned to prominence. The aftermath of October 7 and the surge of anti-Zionist activism on university campuses created the perfect moral terrain for his message.
If reports are confirmed that Israel has struck Fordow, Iran’s most heavily fortified underground uranium enrichment facility, here is why I think it’s a massive development 🧵
1/ Striking Fordow means Israel is going straight for the heart of Iran’s nuclear program, likely with deep-penetration munitions or advanced drone warfare. Fordow is buried deep in a mountain near Qom and designed specifically to withstand U.S. or Israeli airstrikes.
2/ To strike Fordow, Israel needed real-time intelligence, likely months of infiltration, and precision weapons designed for hardened targets. If this strike was successful, it shows that Israel has penetrated the most secure levels of Iran’s military and nuclear defenses.
It also reveals that Israel does not need U.S. forces on the ground to carry out highly technical and deeply risky operations.
3/ For years Iran believed that sites like Fordow were immune to attack. This belief formed the foundation of its nuclear bargaining power (especially under Obama)
Israel has now shattered that illusion by proving that reinforced bunkers and diplomatic ambiguity offer no real protection.