.@criticalthreats and ISW are considering two possible Hezbollah courses of action after the IDF strike that likely killed Fuad Shukr:
1. Hezbollah may decide to respond with a major rocket and drone barrage on northern Israel that resembles previous Hezbollah attacks in retaliation for previous IDF strikes on senior commanders.
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2/ Hezbollah has previously responded by launching salvoes of 100+ rockets targeting IDF bases in northern Israel and the Golan Heights.
3/ Hezbollah could attempt to build a strike package that it calibrates to avoid a strong Israeli response, thereby allowing tensions on the border to diffuse and return to the standard tit-for-tat attacks.
4/ Hezbollah’s strike package would presumably be larger and strike deeper into Israel than past retaliatory attacks given Shukr’s seniority, however.
5/ Israeli sources said immediately after the strike targeting Shukr that this would be the extent of Israel’s response to the Majdal Shams rocket attack, and that further escalation is dependent on Hezbollah's response.
6/ Hezbollah officials messaged on July 29 that Hezbollah did not want an all-out war, suggesting that Hezbollah will temper its response to deescalate the situation.
7/ There remains the risk that even a carefully calculated strike package would unintentionally strike a sensitive target in Israel and prompt further escalation.
1. The killing of Haniyeh reflects the degree to which Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security sector and is able to strike high-value targets within Iran.
2. Hamas responded to the killing by calling on Middle Eastern countries to “deter” and “rein in” Israel.
Iran is signaling that it will retaliate directly for Israel killing Haniyeh. ⬇️
3. One of the most dangerous courses of action would be Iran and other members of the Axis of Resistance conducting a large-scale, combined drone and missile attack into Israel. ⬇️
NEW: Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Siversk direction.
More key takeaways ⬇️🧵(1/7)
2/ Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use nuclear saber-rattling to target Western decision-making and promote Western self-deterrence.
3/ Russia used Navy Day celebrations to showcase Russia's relations with a number of non-Western states as part of efforts to create a supposed Russian-led group of states to rally against the West.
NEW: Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against an oil refinery and Russian military airfields in Saratov, Ryazan, and Murmansk oblasts on the night of July 26 to 27. 🧵(1/7)
2/ Sources with Ukrainian special services told Ukrainian media that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck Russian military airfields in Engles, Saratov Oblast; the Dyaghilev Airfield and an oil refinery in Ryazan Oblast; and the Olenya Airfield in Murmansk Oblast with drones.
3/ Suspilne's sources reported that Russian forces base an unspecified number of Tu-95, Tu-22, Tu-134, and Il-78 (tanker) aircraft at the Dyaghilev Airfield and that the GUR drones damaged a TU-22M3 strategic bomber at the Olenya Airfield.
NEW: The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' AOR in Donetsk, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. (🧵1/6)
2/ The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.
3/ The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force along a narrow front in the Avdiivka area following the seizure of Avdiivka in Feb 2024 and tasked CMD elements with exploiting Russian tactical advances and pushing as far west as possible before Ukrainian forces established more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area.
Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City amid continued assaults north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Hlyboke.
2/ Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Slavna Street within northern Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and along Zaporizka Street in central Zalizne.
3/ Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 25 but did not make any confirmed gains.
Russian forces reportedly continued to advance northwest of Avdiivka on July 25, but there were no confirmed changes in the area.
The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time. 🧵(1/8)
2/ The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine.
3/ The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough vehicles to sustain a high level of equipment losses even with further economic mobilization.