Sanctions and Reality: Western Tech's Enduring Role in Russian Arms.
Frontelligence Insight presents a special investigation into how Western components continue to power Russian missile navigation systems that guide Russian missiles to Ukrainian cities.
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2/ A batch of confidential documents, spanning hundreds of pages and supplied to our team by the @CyberResUa, directed our investigation to a military base in Shaykovka, Kaluga Oblast. This base is home to military unit #33310 or 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment
3/ It gained notoriety for several incidents, including the launch of a Kh-22 missile that struck a civilian shopping center in Kremenchuk in 2022.
According to a confidential document, this unit has been using the "SN-99" as the satellite navigation system in Kh-32 missiles.
4/ The CN-99 (in English) is a navigation module for cruise missiles that is heavily composed of Western components. In September 2022, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) released a comprehensive report detailing its use in Russian cruise missiles
5/ According to the "War-Sanctions" database, which includes photos, the CN-99 module can be traced back to several Western manufacturers - Silicon Laboratories, NXP Semiconductors, Dallas Semiconductor, SPANSION, Maxim Integrated Products, and Integrated Silicon Solution.
6/ The same documents reveal that the State Machine Building Design Bureau "Raduga," a Russian developer and manufacturer of missiles, has been tasked with retrofitting modernized SN-99 modules into Kh-32 missiles.
7/ The modernization and repairs are carried out in collaboration between the Dubnensky Machine Building Plant and Design Bureau "Raduga," both of which are sanctioned by Western countries. Unfortunately, the documents do not specify the way Russia gets parts for the SN-99.
8/ Sanctions are crucial not only to hinder Russia's missile production but also to disrupt their maintenance and repair efforts. According to a 2022 restoration report, at least 15 Kh-32 missiles, produced between 2007 and 2010, were identified as defective at the Shaykovka.
9/ The presence of Western components in the SN-99 module used in Kh cruise missiles at Shaykovka is just one example out of thousands, and points to a much broader issue: sanctions are not that ineffective if not enforced properly.
10/ Without strict enforcement, sanctions will lose their effectiveness, as seen with the 2014 sanctions that faded with time. Consequently, Russia will continue to modernize its equipment using Western components, exploiting enforcement gaps to its advantage.
11/ We appreciate your support. Please consider retweeting and liking the first message in this thread to boost visibility. Raising public awareness is crucial to prevent the issue of sanctions from being swept under the rug and ignored.
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The latest satellite images show 3 major developments: a large Russian troop buildup in Bryansk Oblast, damage from recent drone strikes in Kyiv, and unusual military activities at Taiwan’s Wangan Airport.
All three have one thing in common - they were generated by AI. 🧵Thread:
2/ While those who regularly work with satellite imagery or OSINT can quickly tell that something is "off," the quality of AI-generated satellite images is improving fast. As the number of convincing fakes grows, I've put together a few recommendations to help avoid being misled
3/ In the case of the "Kyiv attack," it took just a single prompt on a free platform to generate the image. While it appears convincing at first glance, a closer look reveals clear geometric irregularities - distorted car shapes, and irregular windows and balconies on buildings
A drone attack is ongoing against Russian airbases with strategic bombers. While the full damage is still unclear, several videos show multiple bombers have been badly hit. Satellite images from yesterday confirm that Belaya hosts various Tu-95 models, Tu-22M3s, and Tu-160s
Satellite imagery of Olenya Airbase from May 26 at 09:50 UTC, shared by @avivector , shows the presence of 11 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 5 An-12 (Cub), and 40 Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) aircraft.
Another suspected target is Belaya Airbase. Satellite images from May 31, analysed by @avivector , show the presence of 7 Tu-160 (Blackjack), 6 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 2 Il-78M (Midas), 6 An-26, 2 An-12, 39 Tu-22M3, and 30 MiG-31 aircraft.
Over the past few months, Russians have focused on disrupting Ukrainian logistics, using a mix of drones, including fiber-optic. Once EW is neutralized or forced to withdraw by fiber-optic drones, it clears the way for drones like the Molniya, which can fly over 20 km. Thread:
2/ Cutting off supply lines has made vehicle transport nearly impossible. In some cases, individual soldiers must walk more than 10 km at night to deliver basic supplies: an unsustainable way for supporting any sizable unit, or even rotating troops.
3/ Despite growing logistical problems, Ukrainian command has made bad choices to launch Russian-modelled assaults. The attempt to capture positions while already struggling to hold current ones, with fewer troops and less equipment, lead to predictably poor outcome
Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
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2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war