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Aug 4, 2024 11 tweets 4 min read Read on X
Sanctions and Reality: Western Tech's Enduring Role in Russian Arms.

Frontelligence Insight presents a special investigation into how Western components continue to power Russian missile navigation systems that guide Russian missiles to Ukrainian cities.

🧵Thread:Image
2/ A batch of confidential documents, spanning hundreds of pages and supplied to our team by the @CyberResUa, directed our investigation to a military base in Shaykovka, Kaluga Oblast. This base is home to military unit #33310 or 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment Image
3/ It gained notoriety for several incidents, including the launch of a Kh-22 missile that struck a civilian shopping center in Kremenchuk in 2022.

According to a confidential document, this unit has been using the "SN-99" as the satellite navigation system in Kh-32 missiles. Image
4/ The CN-99 (in English) is a navigation module for cruise missiles that is heavily composed of Western components. In September 2022, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) released a comprehensive report detailing its use in Russian cruise missiles

5/ According to the "War-Sanctions" database, which includes photos, the CN-99 module can be traced back to several Western manufacturers - Silicon Laboratories, NXP Semiconductors, Dallas Semiconductor, SPANSION, Maxim Integrated Products, and Integrated Silicon Solution. Image
6/ The same documents reveal that the State Machine Building Design Bureau "Raduga," a Russian developer and manufacturer of missiles, has been tasked with retrofitting modernized SN-99 modules into Kh-32 missiles. Image
7/ The modernization and repairs are carried out in collaboration between the Dubnensky Machine Building Plant and Design Bureau "Raduga," both of which are sanctioned by Western countries. Unfortunately, the documents do not specify the way Russia gets parts for the SN-99. Image
8/ Sanctions are crucial not only to hinder Russia's missile production but also to disrupt their maintenance and repair efforts. According to a 2022 restoration report, at least 15 Kh-32 missiles, produced between 2007 and 2010, were identified as defective at the Shaykovka. Image
9/ The presence of Western components in the SN-99 module used in Kh cruise missiles at Shaykovka is just one example out of thousands, and points to a much broader issue: sanctions are not that ineffective if not enforced properly.
10/ Without strict enforcement, sanctions will lose their effectiveness, as seen with the 2014 sanctions that faded with time. Consequently, Russia will continue to modernize its equipment using Western components, exploiting enforcement gaps to its advantage.
11/ We appreciate your support. Please consider retweeting and liking the first message in this thread to boost visibility. Raising public awareness is crucial to prevent the issue of sanctions from being swept under the rug and ignored.

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

May 6
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.

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2/ Tariff wars:

China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
Read 15 tweets
Apr 19
Thread🧵

1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
Read 7 tweets
Apr 10
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:

1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
Read 7 tweets
Mar 30
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Read 8 tweets
Mar 25
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.

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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement. Image
Read 23 tweets
Mar 21
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:

1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.Image
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10. Image
Read 20 tweets

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