Sanctions and Reality: Western Tech's Enduring Role in Russian Arms.
Frontelligence Insight presents a special investigation into how Western components continue to power Russian missile navigation systems that guide Russian missiles to Ukrainian cities.
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2/ A batch of confidential documents, spanning hundreds of pages and supplied to our team by the @CyberResUa, directed our investigation to a military base in Shaykovka, Kaluga Oblast. This base is home to military unit #33310 or 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment
3/ It gained notoriety for several incidents, including the launch of a Kh-22 missile that struck a civilian shopping center in Kremenchuk in 2022.
According to a confidential document, this unit has been using the "SN-99" as the satellite navigation system in Kh-32 missiles.
4/ The CN-99 (in English) is a navigation module for cruise missiles that is heavily composed of Western components. In September 2022, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) released a comprehensive report detailing its use in Russian cruise missiles
5/ According to the "War-Sanctions" database, which includes photos, the CN-99 module can be traced back to several Western manufacturers - Silicon Laboratories, NXP Semiconductors, Dallas Semiconductor, SPANSION, Maxim Integrated Products, and Integrated Silicon Solution.
6/ The same documents reveal that the State Machine Building Design Bureau "Raduga," a Russian developer and manufacturer of missiles, has been tasked with retrofitting modernized SN-99 modules into Kh-32 missiles.
7/ The modernization and repairs are carried out in collaboration between the Dubnensky Machine Building Plant and Design Bureau "Raduga," both of which are sanctioned by Western countries. Unfortunately, the documents do not specify the way Russia gets parts for the SN-99.
8/ Sanctions are crucial not only to hinder Russia's missile production but also to disrupt their maintenance and repair efforts. According to a 2022 restoration report, at least 15 Kh-32 missiles, produced between 2007 and 2010, were identified as defective at the Shaykovka.
9/ The presence of Western components in the SN-99 module used in Kh cruise missiles at Shaykovka is just one example out of thousands, and points to a much broader issue: sanctions are not that ineffective if not enforced properly.
10/ Without strict enforcement, sanctions will lose their effectiveness, as seen with the 2014 sanctions that faded with time. Consequently, Russia will continue to modernize its equipment using Western components, exploiting enforcement gaps to its advantage.
11/ We appreciate your support. Please consider retweeting and liking the first message in this thread to boost visibility. Raising public awareness is crucial to prevent the issue of sanctions from being swept under the rug and ignored.
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Russia is Relocating Its Valuable Military Assets Deeper into Its Territory. Frontelligence Insight has conducted research and released a special report for subscribers, detailing how the Russian army has moved further critical assets, including bomber jets and helicopters. 🧵:
2/ Based on a comprehensive geospatial analysis of thousands of square kilometers, our team has concluded that between the second half of June and mid-July, Russian forces relocated many valuable assets away from the Ukrainian border.
3/ This includes valuable assets such as jets, attack helicopters, and their associated logistics.
This is likely a preemptive measure designed to mitigate potential ATACMS strikes or other Western long-range weaponry.
After the missile strike on Okhmatdyt, Ukraine's largest children's hospital, Russian propagandists falsely claimed that a Ukrainian air defense system was responsible. A special OSINT investigation for @EuromaidanPress confirms that it was a Russian Kh-101 missile.🧵Thread:
2/ An initial visual examination of the video uploaded by Ukrainian journalist Tsaplienko allows us to identify key characteristics of the missile, despite the limiting angle. These features include a wing position and a prominent rear section.
3/ The large oblong object at the bottom rear corresponds to the drop-down turbofan jet engine, a distinctive feature shared by Kh-101/102 and Kh-55/555 missiles, and completely absent on any air defense missiles which use inboard rocket motors for propulsion.
Sanctions enforcement against Russia remains weak, as companies, including those from the West, continue to supply critical manufacturing equipment to sanctioned Russian firms. Frontelligence Insight reveals details of its investigation and provides evidence.
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2/ The Russian UAV manufacturer "Albatros," based in Alabuga, is led by Aleksei Florov, also a chief designer involved in the localization of Iranian Shahed drones in Alabuga. Both "Albatros" and Aleksei Florov are sanctioned by several countries, including the US.
3/ The documents obtained by @CyberResUa and analyzed by Frontelligence Insight reveal that Aleksei Florov and his "Albatros" not only maintain trade relations with foreign companies through intermediaries but often engage directly with them.
Summarized update from Frontelligence Insight on frontlines:
1/ The main Russian efforts remain in Donbas, particularly along the Pokrovsk-Chasiv Yar axis, which is currently the most difficult area. Vuhledar and Kupyansk areas are also key areas of focus. 🧵Thread:
2/ So far, Russian forces have failed to capitalize on the Kharkiv oblast incursion and did not achieve any operational successes in Donbas. They made tactical advances in Chasiv Yar, but given the number and higher-than-average quality of units there, progress is slow and costly
3/ As our team indicated months ago, the goal in Chasiv Yar isn't to hold the town at any cost but to ensure the enemy expends far more resources than planned, thereby crippling their ability to capitalize on its capture and develop an offensive towards Kostyantynivka
Within a decade, hybrid warfare against the West and Ukraine escalated into the largest war in Europe since WWII. To grasp how a demographically and economically smaller Russia achieved this, we need to look at the underlying processes, including escalation management. 🧵Thread
2/ We need to start with the concept known as "reflexive control" - a method to shape an opponent's mindset, steering their behavior towards the initiator's desired outcome. Russia used it to influence the West's mindset, suggesting that any aid could lead to nuclear escalation
3/ These tactics were also influential in 2014-2015, leading European leaders like Angela Merkel to pursue peace resolutions in Ukraine on Russia’s terms. Fearing conventional or nuclear escalation, many leaders embraced what they deemed "responsible" politics.
In this war, timely aid and permission to strike are playing a key role. Ukraine must not be limited by weapon types or target locations. Delays or restrictions risk missing a critical window of opportunity, prolonging the war.🧵Thread about consequences and missed opportunities:
2/ These images show Russian concentrations of forces, camps, and field repair bases on the border with Ukraine. All these images have two things in common: by 2024, these sites have moved and dispersed, and none were targeted before their deployment to the frontlines
3/ It's fair to assume that many of these forces have been destroyed or damaged by now. However, the extent of casualties and damage they caused beforehand is unknown. This could have been avoided in 2022 and 2023 if Ukraine had permission and weaponry for strikes.