Made some rudimentary calculations on how the Russian 2024 summer offensive compares to the Ukrainian 2023 summer offensive in terms of territorial change of Russian controlled area on our map. 1/
It’s quite clear that the Russian pace of advance this spring and summer has been grindingly steady with few notable intensifications thrown in the mix. As for the Ukrainian summer offensive, its clear that almost all meaningful progress in terms of territory captured 2/
was made within the first two months of the offensive with the initiative slowly turning over to the Russians in September of 2023. Russian controlled area shrunk by total of ~321,5 square kilometers between June 1st and September 1st 2023: average of 24,73 km2 per 7 days. 3/
In comparison between May 3rd and August 2nd 2024 the Russians have captured ~591,70 square kilometers: average of 45,51 km2 per 7 days. Gains from Kharkiv offensive amount to roughly ~186,2 km2. 4/
After a several slow weeks in June, the Russian offensive is once again picking up speed. This time most of this progress is concentrated in few sections of the front in Donetsk region: notably the Ocheretyne-Prohres salient, and the Toretsk-Niu York sector. 5/
Lastly few caveats to close of this short thread: Number used in these calculations were derived from the size of the “Russian-occupied area” polygon on our map. This polygon includes some rather large bodies of water, especially around Crimea. 6/
Therefore, the total “Russian-occupied area polygon” is not geographically accurate of Ukrainian surface land area occupied by Russian forces. But the net changes of that polygon are accurate in respect to the changes in frontline situation. 7/
Choosing a different periodization could also affect the data for questions like “which period has seen the most gains by Russia”. The following weeks will show, if the situation begins to stabilize or if the Russians are able to further capitalize on their recent successes. 8/8
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05JUL24. Nearly two months have passed since Russia began its Kharkiv offensive. In terms of captured land, Russian gains have been limited and bought with very high cost. During the past month or so, most of the heaviest fighting has been in Vovchansk. 1/
In Vochansks a costly urban battle has taken place with both sides actively seeking to control this natural tactical and operational bottleneck. The now completely ruined town has become crowded with both sides committing considerable number of units into the battle. 2/
In my 16MAY24 thread estimated that the Russian operational goals were threefold: create a buffer zone, place Kharkiv under artillery fire and fix Ukrainian reserves before the onset of the Russian summer campaign. 3/
16MAY24 ORBAT and analysis thread on Kharkiv Front. RuAF began offensive operations in northern Kharkiv oblast UKR-RUS border regions on 10MAY24. During the past six days RuAF has advanced between 9 to 5 km in three distinct directions along the border. 1/
This operation is conducted by recently created NORTH (SEVER) operational-strategic grouping (OSG) based on the re-established Leningrad Military District. Offensive operations in Kharkiv area are conducted by two army corps. 2/
11thArmy Corps (Kaliningrad) and the recently established 44th Army Corps (Karelia). Each army corps has two motor rifle divisions: 18thGMRD (11th AC) and 72nd MRD (44th AC). 72ndis still partially undergoing formation. 3/
27APR24 Avdiivka sector ORBAT and operational thread. Over the past week RuAF has achieved series of local successes on Avdiivka sector. These began with sudden and unexpected penetration into village of Ocheretyne on 22APR24. 1/20
Exact reasons for this sudden success aren’t entirely clear, but likely involve a botched rotation of troops, misallocation of resources and problems with coordinating forces drawn from multiple different brigades on ad hoc basis, 2/
exacerbated by general lack of munitions and manpower. Russians constantly pressure the Ukrainian lines with small scale assaults and probing actions looking to exploit exactly these kinds of conditions. Following the sudden success in Ocheretyne, 3/
Two years of Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is an overview thread on the situation at the front and deployment of UkrAF and RuAF forces as of 24th FEB 2024. Attached is high resolution image of our Order of Battle tracking map. Zoom in for more detail. 1/
Ukrainian forces along the frontline are organized in three “Operational-Strategic Group of Forces” (OGS): Odessa (O), Tavriya (T) and Khortytsia (K). 2/
OSG Odessa is tasked with conducting raids and harassment across the Dnipro River and prevention of Russian incursions in its area of operations (AO) stretching roughly between cities of Odessa and Zaporizhzhia. 3/
A short thread on Kupiansk sector and the disposition of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA). Between 19-28JAN24 Russian forces from the 1GTA managed to capture the villages of Krokhmal'ne and Tabaivka. 1/
The offensive seems to have been local and opportunistic in nature, with several UkrAF 103rd TDF Bde positions being overrun by assaulting elements from RuAF 47th Guards Tank Division (47GTD) 2/
Russians were able to seriously threaten UkrAF positions around the village of Berestove and Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka, but it seems that at least for the time being RuAF forces have been unable to further exploit their initial success. 3/
It has been tough couple of weeks. General situation on the frontline seems to be deteriorating around Avdiivka and northern Luhansk. Velyka Novosilka sector been activating and Novomykhailivka not faring particularly well either. 1/
And then there is the mobilization deadlock and manpower&munitions crisis coupled with the military-political command crisis in Kyiv. Latter seems to be resolving now, at least publicly, but there may be unforseen consequences and shocks throughout the UKR armed forces. 2/
Timing for all this to go down could not be worse, especially since the command crisis has clearly been gaining momentum ever since the summer offensive failed. A lot will depend on Russian ability to exploit this situation and we should expect them to try within coming weeks. 3/