Body blows keep coming for UBI fans. $1k/month transfers had no effect on net worth or credit access. All the money was ploughed straight into consumption, recipients actually went more into debt. nber.org/papers/w32784
For reference: most spending categories rose by similar percents: UBI recipients did NOT necessarily prioritize immediate needs. In fact, they disproportionately gave their UBI away.
Now as an aside.
The average UBI recipient here got $35,000 in total transfers.
They spent $$11,000 of it on increased spending.
They reduce work by $12,000.
That accounts for $23,000.
So their net worth SHOULD have gone up by $12,000!'
Instead it fell $1,000.
????
Did they just.... light $13,000 on fire?
Is the income decline underestimated?
Is the spending increase underestimated?
Did they invest money in terrible assets?
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It's clear that @propublica 's strategy is to spam stories of alleged deaths due to abortion bans, and never actually engage with any of the arguments about how they're actually running a cover operation for medical negligence.
From the latest one.
They want to blame Texas' abortion ban for a hospital sending away an actively miscarrying women WHO ALREADY TESTED POSITIVE FOR SEPSIS.
everybody agrees this was a case of the hospital failing to provide basic, obvious standard of care.
nobody has evidence this failure was caused by the abortion law.
To begin with, some basic facts: Finland's total fertility rate was around 1.87 children/woman as recently as 2010. It did NOT decline during the "great recession" after 2007, but actually ROSE.
Since 2019, Finland's fertility has bounced around a lot, but the decline 2019-2024 was just 0.08 children per woman, vs. the decline from 2014-2019 of 0.36. So clearly the pace of decline has slowed, even if not stopped entirely.
But you may wonder: what drove Finland's decline? Did big families get rarer, or did people stop having families at all, or what was it?
Here's parity-specific birth rate indicators:
You can see they all decline after 2010. Here's each indicator, its 2022 value expressed as a ratio of its 2010 value:
You can see that 3rd births rates fell the most, down almost 30%, then 1st birth rates, down about 27%, then 5th, then 4th, then 2nd, down about 15%.
But they're all down. Finnish women became less likely to have an extra birth at every single parity.
What does this look like in terms of total birth count?
Well, it looks like appreciable declines for every birth order. And indeed, births fell 25-33% at every parity.
So did Finland's fertility decline because of a broad-based shift away from kids across all families? Perhaps!
But now let's ask this another way:
Comparing 2010 to 2022 births, what share of the decline in births was 1st vs. 2nd vs. 3rd, etc?
37% of the decline is due to lost first births, 36% second births, 17% third births, 5% fouthr, and 5% 5th+.
So more than a third of the total decline was due to a drop in first births, and more than half was due to a drop in first or second births. Low-parity births accounted for the lion's share of decline.
I think some open questions in the Finnish case are: 1) Why was Finland so resilient to the Great Recession? 2) Why the drop then at 2010? 3) Why was the drop so broadly shared across parities?
For the curious, here's Korea.
Korea's big drop post-2010 coincided with NO CHANGE in rates of progression to higher-parity births! People with 2 did NOT become less likely to go on to 3 (or 4, or 5).
The entire decline was falling rates of progression to 1 and 2.
UN, IHME, VID, all produce population forecasts- and they always seem too optimistic. Human population will start declining much earlier than the UN expects.
This has been obvious for a long time. @jburnmurdoch is right to highlight it--
But why does the error persist?
🧵🧵
You can actually see a defense of the UN's method here:
TL;DR-- the UN's method really is the best-performing forecast method in historic data compared vs. other structural forecasting methods.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pn…
Let's talk about what a structural forecast is.
Basically, we're talking about forecasts which: 1) Do not incorporate any explicit assumptions about GDP or education 2) Use the same method for all countries and periods with no special sauce
Just finished talking on a panel for a nice @BrookingsInst event about REMOTE WORK AND FERTILITY.
Here's a finding I haven't published anywhere on remote work and fertility across 8.6 MILLION employed women in the ACS. Remote-working women have WAY higher birth rates!!!
Now, note that this effect is plausibly reverse causality: it's very plausible that women work remotely because they had a baby in the past year! Unfortunately ACS is going to be entirely "current work and retrospective fertility."
Here's Clark's agricultural wages vs. the new paper's agricultural wages, both vs. English population. I've circled the period of the Black Death. Clark shows a huge wage increase around the Black Death, new paper shows very little increase until a generation or two later.