Thread by @RALee85

Some early thoughts about this operation. The most important factor in the war right now is Russia's manpower and force availability advantage, in particular with infantry. That is the primary reason why Ukraine is struggling to hold back Russian advances in Donetsk oblast. Russia's Kharkiv offensive further stretched Ukraine's reserves, which means Ukrainian commanders have limited forces to reinforce units that are under pressure or to stop breakthroughs.

The situation on the Pokrovsk and Toretsk fronts is serious. The war has not seen large swings of the front line since 2022, but Russia's advances on the Pokrovsk front over the past three weeks have been relatively rapid for the 2023-2024 period. So the question is how this operation will affect the fighting elsewhere and whether these forces could have been employed more effectively in Donetsk oblast. 2/

Compared to previous crossborder operations, this one is notable in that it appears to involve Ukrainian conventional forces and not just from GUR. Ukraine likely also is not able to employ HIMARS in support of the operation because the US only authorized strikes in Belgorod oblast relevant to Russia's Kharkiv offensive. 3/

Ultimately, the two previous large crossborder operations in May-June 2023 and March 2024 had little effect on the fighting on the priority axes. The 2023 operation caught Russia by surprise and may have been a relatively effective economy of force mission (though it did not force Russia to redeploy significant forces from priority areas) but the March 2024 operation was far less successful. 4/

Since then, Russia stood up a Northern Group of Forces leading the Kharkiv offensive, and has strengthened its forces on the border. So Russia already has greater forces/conventional capabilities in the area, better command and control, and it has conscript units that can be deployed, which are not used in Ukraine. It is unlikely this operation will force Russia to pull significant forces from Ukraine. 5/

Russia has improved its dynamic targeting with persistent ISR coverage from UAVs behind Ukrainian lines, which are used to locate targets for Lancets, Krasnopol, Iskander-M, and other PGMs. Russian UAV footage of Ukrainian units moving across the border suggests this problem has not been solved, which can make it dangerous to mass armor. 6/

A limited operation might be able to achieve limited goals, but a more ambitious operation carries greater risks. It is unlikely this operation will have a significant effect on the course of the war, and previous crossborder operations did not have serious domestic political ramifications for Putin. 7/

We only have limited information right now and the size and scope of the operation isn't clear, but largescale crossborder operations are more difficult now than they were in 2023 and Russia continues to advance in the Donbas. 8/

https://x.com/J_JHelin/status/1820864139100877285

Offensive operations also risk taking higher casualties than in defense at a time when Ukrainian forces are stretched thin. Ukraine needs to maintain a favorable attrition ratio given the manpower situation, so taking heavy losses in this operation could make it more difficult for Ukraine to hold back future Russian assaults if it saps Ukraine's limited reserves. 9/