1/ I still think this could be a serious mistake given the situation in the Donbas. However, the situation can quickly change, proving me wrong. The stakes are very high, and there is significant potential here. The outcome is unclear
2/ Russian troops on the border, including FSB border troops and conscripts, were enough to stop small incursions but clearly not enough to stop the advance of the combined force that Ukraine assembled for this assault.
3/ The large number of POWs is a big humanitarian win for Ukraine. This is a good chance to exchange Ukrainian prisoners and a huge win for the families of Ukrainian soldiers who have been waiting for their loved ones for over a year. Incredible job by the Ukrainian Forces.
4/ When it comes to response forces, Russia is likely to use its internal reserves located in Kursk, Moscow, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts. We might also see units from the "North" grouping. The absence of a swift reaction shows that they were not informed or assembled
5/ So far, there is no evidence of Russian forces slowing down their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast, nor is there evidence that Russia is moving any reserves or units from the "Center" grouping of forces. This can change, but not at the moment, hence my skepticism.
6/ It's hard to gauge the moral blow to Russian society. Social media posts and influencers show they are unpleasantly shocked and clearly upset. However, it's uncertain how long this will last, as they quickly moved on from the losses of Kherson and the retreat from Kyiv Oblast
7/ Russia failed to identify this assault, showing a significant improvement in Ukrainian counterintelligence measures. Despite advanced ISR capabilities, Russian forces failed to interpret the concentration of Ukrainian forces as an offensive maneuver.
8/ I currently have serious reservations about the logistical capabilities needed to sustain deep advancements into Russian territory, as well as the ability to continuously support these forces with AD and EW. However, I will refrain from drawing conclusions at this moment.
9/ Maintaining such intensity of assault and advancement would require a continuous infusion of resources, where Ukraine has constraints. As a result, we might see an eventual slowdown, potentially leading to a pullback or an effort to seize and fortify current positions.
10/ The lack of timely assembled reaction forces on the RU side gives AFU crucial time to organize their defense. As time goes on, it might become more difficult for Russia to retake territories, similar to how Ukrainian forces are still struggling to regain control in Kharkiv
11/ Overall, it's unlikely that we are nearing the end of the operation, so these conclusions are early and preliminary. My hope is for a total victory by the AFU forces, allowing me to write a follow-up apology thread acknowledging how wrong my initial assessment was.
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There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
Thread 🧵:
2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”