1/ I still think this could be a serious mistake given the situation in the Donbas. However, the situation can quickly change, proving me wrong. The stakes are very high, and there is significant potential here. The outcome is unclear
2/ Russian troops on the border, including FSB border troops and conscripts, were enough to stop small incursions but clearly not enough to stop the advance of the combined force that Ukraine assembled for this assault.
3/ The large number of POWs is a big humanitarian win for Ukraine. This is a good chance to exchange Ukrainian prisoners and a huge win for the families of Ukrainian soldiers who have been waiting for their loved ones for over a year. Incredible job by the Ukrainian Forces.
4/ When it comes to response forces, Russia is likely to use its internal reserves located in Kursk, Moscow, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts. We might also see units from the "North" grouping. The absence of a swift reaction shows that they were not informed or assembled
5/ So far, there is no evidence of Russian forces slowing down their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast, nor is there evidence that Russia is moving any reserves or units from the "Center" grouping of forces. This can change, but not at the moment, hence my skepticism.
6/ It's hard to gauge the moral blow to Russian society. Social media posts and influencers show they are unpleasantly shocked and clearly upset. However, it's uncertain how long this will last, as they quickly moved on from the losses of Kherson and the retreat from Kyiv Oblast
7/ Russia failed to identify this assault, showing a significant improvement in Ukrainian counterintelligence measures. Despite advanced ISR capabilities, Russian forces failed to interpret the concentration of Ukrainian forces as an offensive maneuver.
8/ I currently have serious reservations about the logistical capabilities needed to sustain deep advancements into Russian territory, as well as the ability to continuously support these forces with AD and EW. However, I will refrain from drawing conclusions at this moment.
9/ Maintaining such intensity of assault and advancement would require a continuous infusion of resources, where Ukraine has constraints. As a result, we might see an eventual slowdown, potentially leading to a pullback or an effort to seize and fortify current positions.
10/ The lack of timely assembled reaction forces on the RU side gives AFU crucial time to organize their defense. As time goes on, it might become more difficult for Russia to retake territories, similar to how Ukrainian forces are still struggling to regain control in Kharkiv
11/ Overall, it's unlikely that we are nearing the end of the operation, so these conclusions are early and preliminary. My hope is for a total victory by the AFU forces, allowing me to write a follow-up apology thread acknowledging how wrong my initial assessment was.
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У США спалахнув гучний скандал після того, як Конгресовий комітет опублікував переписку Джеффрі Епштейна, відомого організатора зустрічей із неповнолітніми та впливовими людьми. Серед тих, хто згадується у листах - Дональд Трамп. Крім того, у документах не обійшлось без росіян:
2/ Зокрема, у листі Джеффрі Епштейна до Торб’єрна Ягланда від 24.06.2018 р. він зазначав: «Чуркін був чудовим. Після наших розмов він зрозумів Трампа. Це не складно - йому потрібно лише побачити щось, щоб зрозуміти, усе дуже просто». (Чуркін на той час був постпердом РФ при ООН)
3/ Його наступна відповідь звучала так: "Я думаю, ви могли б запропонувати Путіну, щоб Лавров поспілкувався зі мною і отримав необхідне розуміння. Віталій Чуркін раніше це робив, але він помер. ? !"
На той час, Торб'єрн був Генеральним секретарем Ради Європи
A few broad observations on the course of war, based on observations, discussions with officers, soldiers, and analysts, data, and other relevant sources. I will begin with a high-level sociopolitical overview before gradually moving toward operational-tactical level. 🧵Thread:
2/ Overall, the situation for Ukraine has not improved since last year. Ukraine has markedly increased its long-range strike capabilities, which have very tangible effects across Russian society. However, the battlefield initiative remains with Russia, much as it did most of 2024
3/ A plausible Ukrainian "victory" approach can be summarized as: disrupt logistics, degrade the Russian economy, and avoid catastrophic operational collapses. Russia’s apparent approach is simpler: keep pressing until Ukraine exhausts its will or physical capacity to resist.
According to Russian milblogger Fighterbomber, who has a wide network within the Russian Air Force, an Il-76 was shot down in Sudan on November 4 by the Rapid Support Forces. According to him, the aircraft had been purchased in Kyrgyzstan a month and a half ago for $12 million
2/ A video showing a burning object falling from the sky, likely the claimed Il-76, has also been recorded and published
3/ While I do not have solid sources in Sudan, one of my contacts located there has confirmed that reports about a downed Il-76 have been circulating within the RSF since yesterday. Government forces are actively using the Air Force to supply besieged cities
Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere.
North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at ~9 billion rubles (~$110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long
A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.
3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence