1/ I still think this could be a serious mistake given the situation in the Donbas. However, the situation can quickly change, proving me wrong. The stakes are very high, and there is significant potential here. The outcome is unclear
2/ Russian troops on the border, including FSB border troops and conscripts, were enough to stop small incursions but clearly not enough to stop the advance of the combined force that Ukraine assembled for this assault.
3/ The large number of POWs is a big humanitarian win for Ukraine. This is a good chance to exchange Ukrainian prisoners and a huge win for the families of Ukrainian soldiers who have been waiting for their loved ones for over a year. Incredible job by the Ukrainian Forces.
4/ When it comes to response forces, Russia is likely to use its internal reserves located in Kursk, Moscow, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts. We might also see units from the "North" grouping. The absence of a swift reaction shows that they were not informed or assembled
5/ So far, there is no evidence of Russian forces slowing down their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast, nor is there evidence that Russia is moving any reserves or units from the "Center" grouping of forces. This can change, but not at the moment, hence my skepticism.
6/ It's hard to gauge the moral blow to Russian society. Social media posts and influencers show they are unpleasantly shocked and clearly upset. However, it's uncertain how long this will last, as they quickly moved on from the losses of Kherson and the retreat from Kyiv Oblast
7/ Russia failed to identify this assault, showing a significant improvement in Ukrainian counterintelligence measures. Despite advanced ISR capabilities, Russian forces failed to interpret the concentration of Ukrainian forces as an offensive maneuver.
8/ I currently have serious reservations about the logistical capabilities needed to sustain deep advancements into Russian territory, as well as the ability to continuously support these forces with AD and EW. However, I will refrain from drawing conclusions at this moment.
9/ Maintaining such intensity of assault and advancement would require a continuous infusion of resources, where Ukraine has constraints. As a result, we might see an eventual slowdown, potentially leading to a pullback or an effort to seize and fortify current positions.
10/ The lack of timely assembled reaction forces on the RU side gives AFU crucial time to organize their defense. As time goes on, it might become more difficult for Russia to retake territories, similar to how Ukrainian forces are still struggling to regain control in Kharkiv
11/ Overall, it's unlikely that we are nearing the end of the operation, so these conclusions are early and preliminary. My hope is for a total victory by the AFU forces, allowing me to write a follow-up apology thread acknowledging how wrong my initial assessment was.
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Russia’s military rearmament, especially weapon production numbers, reveals much about its future plans. These numbers are usually hidden in classified documents, a problem Frontelligence Insight, with help from insiders, has solved. For the first time, we can share some of them:
2/ Before the release of the documents, spoilers of which an attentive eye may already have found in the image, we ask our followers to click the notify button in the profile so you don’t miss it. Many have reported that after updates, they don't see posts from those they follow
3/ While we prepare our X release, we invite everyone to read our latest research, based on tens of thousands of personal records of Russian deserters, published yesterday, but something you might have completely missed with the new “better” algorithms.
It’ll be like the Chechen war - said one mobilized soldier. Even if it ends, our leader will thank and leave. A new one will say: I never promised you anything. Back home they’ll say: We never sent you.
One of many remarks gathered by Verstka from mobilized Russians. 🧵Thread:
2/ Russian media outlet Verstka has interviewed dozens of mobilized. Three years in, most express regret and little desire to continue. “There aren’t many patriots here. Almost everyone just wants to go home,” said another mobilized
3/ Here are some more statements from mobilized:
- I wish I could go back three years and tear up that draft notice. I’d rather take a suspended sentence than have spent all this time fighting and suffering. Every day out here has felt like a waste of my life
It’ll be like the Chechen war - said one mobilized soldier. Even if it ends, our leader will thank and leave. A new one will say: I never promised you anything. Back home they’ll say: We never sent you.
One of many remarks gathered by Verstka from mobilized Russians. 🧵Thread:
2/ Russian media outlet Verstka has interviewed dozens of mobilized. Three years in, most express regret and little desire to continue. “There aren’t many patriots here. Almost everyone just wants to go home,” said another mobilized
3/ Here are some more statements from mobilized:
- I wish I could go back three years and tear up that draft notice. I’d rather take a suspended sentence than have spent all this time fighting and suffering. Every day out here has felt like a waste of my life
Russia’s government plans to raise the value-added tax from 20% to 22%, breaking Putin’s pledge not to increase taxes before 2030. The budget deficit has already widened to ₽4.2 trillion ($50 billion), or 1.9% of GDP, as revenues decline with falling oil prices, reports the FT:
2/ This is the second direct tax increase since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
For the full year, the finance ministry expects the deficit to reach ₽5.7 trillion, or 2.6% of GDP, Interfax reported, citing a draft budget law not yet published in full.
3/ Oil and gas sales, which once made up nearly half of Russia’s budget, are expected to account for no more than 22% of revenue next year, according to Finance Minister Anton Siluanov. He said last week that Russia aims to lower the break-even oil price for its budget.
Ukraine successfully hit two refineries with drone strikes early on September 20. Geolocated videos show both the Novokuybyshevsk and Saratov refineries damaged and on fire. Ukraine has successfully targeted these facilities earlier this year. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to Rosneft, the Saratov Refinery has a designed capacity of 7.0 million tons of oil per year. It processes Urals crude, crude from the Saratov field via pipeline, as well as crude from the Orenburg fields by rail. It produces gasoline, vacuum gas oil, and bitumen
3/ Ukraine has struck Saratov Refinery multiple times in the past - once in August and twice in September (including today’s strike). The August strike halted oil intake, and the September 14 strike led to operational disruptions, though the full scale of impact remains unclear.
The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has published new details about the Russian “Geran-3” UAV. The “U” series model is equipped with a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of 300–370 km/h and an estimated operational range of up to 1,000 km.
2/ The “Geran-3” reaches its maximum speed of up to 370 km/h mainly in areas covered by Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare systems, in zones where interceptor UAVs are deployed, and during the terminal phase of flight as it descends toward its target.
3/ Electronic units are largely the same as in the gasoline-powered versions of the “Geran-2” UAV of the “Ы” series. It includes, in particular, the standard SADRA inertial navigation system, an air data computer (ADC), a power distribution unit (PDU), and other components