Weird timing for publishing to concide with Kursk, but in this op-ed, I wanted to talk straight about a realistic path to the end of the war, tackling the semi-taboo (in Ukraine) idea of negotiations and what really needs to be done for peace. A thread 1/
My last op-ed from November ruffled some feathers: it was early days, but it had become clear to me that the paradigm of the war had shifted: from a grand attempt at Ukrainian military victory to a renewed fight for survival, more brutal than in 2022. 2/
What followed was another five months of delayed U.S. aid, the fall of Avdiivka, and the exacerbation of Ukraine's manpower problems amid shortcomings in ammunition, fortifications, and of course, the internal mobilisation process. 3/
Complete Ukrainian victory is the only just outcome of this war. But now, with aid coming in but the manpower situation still worsening, in the current state of things, only radical power shifts in Ukraine, the West, and Russia could bring it back within reach. 4/
Being real about the prospects of victory in the short to mid term shouldn't mean the alternative is opening to a vague idea of "negotiations." But rejecting the concept of peace talks altogether leaves it in a grey zone of understanding that Russia can exploit. 5/
As different actors slowly come up with their own frameworks for peace, friends of Ukraine need to be very clear on the inside and out that there are two scenarios for entering negotiations: one that ensures the survival of independent Ukraine, and one that is akin to defeat. 6/
Many people, especially here in Ukraine, often talk about the likelihood of Russia violating a peace deal and invading again when it suits them as a reason to reject negotiations entirely. This, of course, is completely understandable. But there is a solution. 7/
What is needed to avoid a repeat invasion is the same thing needed to secure peace on favourable terms, and coincidentally, the same thing crucial to keeping the hope of full victory alive in the future.
The focus must be on winning the defensive war and doing so decisively. 8/
Real, sustained pressure needs to be put back on Moscow, not just the temporary discomfort that something like Kursk will likely bring (though I hope it's more that that). Material, financial, social pressure. Putin needs to understand that his path to victory is hopeless. 9/
For this, both the West and Kyiv need to refocus and get their act together, as Ukraine's manpower reserves are under strain and ultimately limited, so is time itself. Events in the Pokrovsk sector are an early warning sign of what future battlefield collapse might look like. 10/
The broad steps that I think the West and Ukraine have to take are in the article. But first and foremost, both sides need to be on the same page about a realistic plan, and how we go forward to peace must always be grounded in a solid connection to the battlefield reality. end.
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Wrote about the Kursk Oblast offensive as of last night for @KyivIndependent. A few thoughts from myself, two days in: watching this operation, it's important to separate the emotional effects from the kinetic. 1/
Yes, the incursion's results are looking pretty spectacular so far (by design given the serious forces committed), and carry with them symbolic weight: bringing the war to Russian soil, exposing Putin's weakness, boosting morale etc. etc. 2/
For over two years of full-scale war, Ukrainians have watched a foreign army drive through their land, bringing fear and destruction, and playing conquerer. All these memes about the Kursk People's Republic, "everything under control" etc. bring a lot of cathartic joy. 3/
Wrote about the storm building around Ukraine's mobilisation policy for @KyivIndependent:
This issue is both a uniquely painful catalyst of societal tension in a country at war, but also a very stark condensation of all of Ukraine's internal woes. 1/
There are so many layers to this: but to boil it down to its very simplest essence: this is about a military fighting a brutal war of attrition needing more men to keep up the fight and a civilian male population not keen to go at this point in the war. 2/
^And in this aspect, by the way, nobody who is not either fighting or eligible to be taken and sent off to the trenches has the right to a moral position on what a given individual should do. I feel this acutely as a foreign citizen in Ukraine. It's just so tough. 3/
Apart from Western aid deliveries, Ukraine's ability to defend effectively is the most important factor for how the war will play out in 2024. For that they must dig.
I wrote about Ukraine's need to fortify for @KyivIndependent: Some thoughts here: 1/
As much as the leadership doesn't want to publicly give up on the idea of pressing forward, Ukraine has been forced into a strategic defensive stance, after the summer/autumn counteroffensive failed to make gains that would strategically change the game. Why did it fail? 2/
The success or failure of the counteroffensive was always going to be a function of three very different broad factors: 1) Amount and timeliness of Western aid 2) Ukrainian strategic planning and tactical execution 3) The strength of Russia's defence. 3/
The last month has been a bit of a depressing one for Ukraine, especially for those who are here, invested, and paying attention rather than cheering on their sports team from afar.
I want to inject some clarity into this key point in the war. Thread:
Zelensky's and Zaluzhny's respective pieces in Western magazines triggered the discussion and the bad vibes about the future, but they all described things we already knew. This wave of gloom was brought not by the articles, but by two key events. 1/
First, the disappointing culmination of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, failing to make gains that change the game strategically. To add insult to injury, Russia's capture of the initiative around Avdiivka showed that Moscow is neither short of resources nor of confidence. 2/
Reading all the talk about the Arakhamiia interview, the possibility of peace in April 2022, and the mischievous warmonger Boris, I feel like I'm taking crazy pills.
A reminder: the most important factor in Russia/Ukraine peace talks is territorial control and its status. 1/
Let's refresh: This is what the war looked like in April 2022. Russia's war of conquest had failed around Kyiv, but had achieved an equally stunning victory in the south.
Russian forces had taken Kherson and a lot of land west of the Dnipro, and linked Crimea to Donbas. 2/
Independent Ukraine still stood strong, but the Novorossiya project of conquest (the famous land bridge) was basically achieved. Most of Luhansk Oblast was overrun, as was Izium and Kupiansk, while the Russians still lurked just outside Kharkiv city. Mariupol was surrounded. 3/
Just like with the war as a whole, with drones you see a pattern over time: Ukraine with the edge over Russia (especially in the use of civilian DJIs for frontline recon) for the first months of of full-scale thanks to initiative, innovation, and flexibility on the battlefield. 2
By now though, both sides have learned and adapted, and what you have is this dizzying race of innovation and production, of better electronic warfare vs better signal systems (analog vs digital etc.), not to mention the training of units in their use. 3