The two key railway marshalling yards for the Russian Army in occupied Ukraine are in Belgorod and Rostov on Don.
And Belgorod railway marshalling yard just got cut off from the north.
Rerouting train traffic like this hasn't happened in Russia since 1941.
2/
This Reddit map of AFU advances indicates the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), upper right, may soon be isolated from the Russian power grid to points south.
Given the Rostov on Don NPP lost one of two reactors to a maintenance casualty.
Given the number of confirmed AFU brigades involved in the Kursk operation, and the complete lack of a Russian strategic ground forces reserve anywhere.
It is looking far more like @secretsqrl123 idea strategic envelopment of Belgorod than mine of a strategic raid.
7/
The much reported AFU woes in the Donbas were the result of mostly 2nd line units being put into the front lines behind a "Ghost Army" strategic deception while the elite units were being quietly prepared for the Kursk/Belgorod axis envelopment.
Meanwhile, AFU ground forces are making amphibious raid demonstrations at the Kinburn Spit to try and freeze RuAF ground units in Kherson from redeployment.
Deploying lots of anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines with Gator cluster munitions dispensers was one of the major themes of the 1980's Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine.
The doctrine was highly effective, hence Ukraine using it in 2026.
I called out the Chinese invasion requirements for Taiwan in May 2023 complete with a prediction they would have to be building satellite detectable 1944 invasion of Normandy Mulberry style infrastructure.
In that thread I connected classic "irrational regime" Chinese 'Wolf Warrior diplomacy' as a behavior indicator of how they would view the world wide maritime trade and financial collapse invading Taiwan would cause as advantageous to China.
I did two further @grok analytical passes which reduced the truck movements, first to 3K to 8K truck movements:
"Revised estimate: Likely 3,000–8,000+ effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (e.g., M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), potentially higher in gross passages but far lower in productive throughput than Western equivalents due to systemic non-mechanized constraints."
2/
And then down to 2.5K to 7K truck movements, See:
"Likely 2,500–7,000 effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), with gross passages potentially higher to offset massive inefficiencies—but productive throughput remains severely constrained by non-mechanized realities, supplements like rail/barge, and systemic intelligence blind spots."
A hundred Russian trucks, with a high proportions of fuel tankers and wreckers concentrated on one or two supply roads or a single road junction in a couple of weeks is a horse of a different color.
That is anti-access area denial (A2AD) on a stick.