1/ Dear all! As I will be on holiday as of tomorrow, I will write down some words on the current #kursk offensive.
First, information is imperfect. Current estimation of ๐บ๐ฆstrength are based on ๐ท๐บbloggers. And may well be exagregated.
First, information is imperfect. Current estimation of ๐บ๐ฆstrength are based on ๐ท๐บbloggers. And may well be exagregated.
2/ If ๐ท๐บ loses, it was always a mighty NATO Panzer-Army that beat them, never their own incompetence, corruption, and disorganisation.
๐บ๐ฆ may achieve this with less ressources than we think.
๐บ๐ฆ may achieve this with less ressources than we think.
3/ But if ๐บ๐ฆ intends to hold territory to leverage it for negotiations, this would need substantial forces. Especially if ๐บ๐ฆ continue to grow as rapid as they are now.
Hence I am still a bit skeptical whether this is actually the plan.
Hence I am still a bit skeptical whether this is actually the plan.
4/ It may just be a diversion to make ๐ท๐บ re-direct forces from the Donbas and hence trash the ๐ท๐บ plans for the remaining summer offensive. Force ๐ท๐บ to keep more troops close to the border, away from the front.
5/ But even the idea of holding Kursk ransom for a "land for land" swap has a logic. To force Putin to the negotiation table, ๐บ๐ฆ needs to apply pressure on ๐ท๐บ. It will not be able to do so it it keeps turning the other cheek.
6/ Indefiniently defending till ๐ท๐บ is drained of materiel to continue the war is in itself a risky proposal. The ๐บ๐ธ elections pose a risk. No one knows how US aid will continue.
In ๐ซ๐ท there is no government. ๐ฉ๐ช has cut its assistance in half.
In ๐ซ๐ท there is no government. ๐ฉ๐ช has cut its assistance in half.
7/ ๐บ๐ฆ cannot rest its strategy on luck. They need to size the initiative and put pressure on ๐ท๐บ. On the "conventional" front, ๐ท๐บ defences are too strong and well manned, it will take one or two years to prepare a conventional offensive against ๐ท๐บ occupying forces.
8/ Can ๐บ๐ฆ wait so long? If not, it needs to think unconventionally, and try to apply pressure where Russia is weak, not where it is strong. This obviously is the border.
This operation entails a significant risk for ๐บ๐ฆ. It may overstretch, use up reserves, exhaust troops.
This operation entails a significant risk for ๐บ๐ฆ. It may overstretch, use up reserves, exhaust troops.
9/ Then there is the political risk of international suppoerters not seconding the operation. In ๐ฉ๐ช the pacifist camp already goes ballistic. I have no idea how this is received in ๐บ๐ธ.
Then there is the risk of ๐บ๐ฆ falling victim of its own success.
Then there is the risk of ๐บ๐ฆ falling victim of its own success.
10/ That a raid (this may still be a raid, not an offensive) gets so popular that it becomes an offensive, and that terrain then needs to be hold for domestic purposes. But this then overstretches ๐บ๐ฆ, consumes reserves intended for the East, creates imponderabiles...
11/ However, for ๐บ๐ฆ, no possible course of action (including just continue static defence) is risk free. All these different risks need to be weighted against each other.
There is no risk-free option. There is no risk-free war.
There is no risk-free option. There is no risk-free war.
12/ In a long war of attrition, both parties battle with problems retaining, recreating, and rebuilding their forces. Both fight on knive's edge, and small things may tilt the balance in one or the other direction. Only hindsight will tell.
13/ Triumpf and tragedy are very close neighbours, no one can predict with certainty what it will be.
However, I will be on vaccation with my little ones, so please turn to others for two weeks to tell you how it will end.
However, I will be on vaccation with my little ones, so please turn to others for two weeks to tell you how it will end.
โข โข โข
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