People have been puzzling over Ukraine’s objectives in the Kursk operation. Politically, I can think of at least 7:
- catch Russia off guard and bring the war to Russians in a way they haven’t experienced before
- make Putin look stupid and hopefully generate discontent
- boost morale in Ukraine
- kill morale in Russia
- seize control of the information sphere
- show the west that Russia can be attacked without it resulting in WW3 (🤞)
- reassure western supporters that Ukraine can win this war
- put an end to the recently increased talk about when would be a good time to start negotiating by mixing up the front line
- tactically, to force Russia to move troops in a way that opens possibilities for Ukraine elsewhere
(Ok that was already 9 but one more:)
Finally, and most importantly: the Kursk operation potentially changes the whole tradeoff Russia has assumed the war is about. In the eventuality that Ukraine manages to hold this territory for a longer period of time, Russia might have to trade Ukrainian territory for its own.
It’s the question of “Kursk for Crimea/ other Ukrainian region” that must be keeping Putin awake at night right now.
Even if that never becomes an object of negotiation, it’s bad enough that Ukraine made it necessary to consider that eventuality and strategise accordingly.
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This reminds me of a conversation I had in November 2022 with a Russian opposition-supporter who had fled Russia. They said that Finland’s visa restrictions on Russians are undermining our own value system.
I explained that the extensive access Russians enjoyed to Europe was a privilege, not a right. Therefore, it can be revoked if the trust that’s the basis of granting such a privilege is broken.
No other third country nationals from the EU’s eastern neighbourhood had such access
Apart from the necessity to make Russian citizens feel the consequences of the war, which includes taking away that access to Europe, it’s also a security question. Due to Russia’s extremely cynical methods, it’s hard to know who might turn out to be a “little green man”.
In the past 2 years, most Finns also seriously asked themselves the question: would I be ready to die defending my country ? And for most of them, the answer was yes. Finns know that a war would mean many of us dying. That’s why we want to prevent one (hence NATO membership)
In spring 2022, I had this conversation with literally all my friends: Finns living abroad wondering whether they should go back to Finland just in case, and even most left wing artist friends inquiring whether they could also contribute in some way to the war effort if need be
Now, the mood is different. Russia has emptied the border of troops and equipment (they’re all in Ukraine…) and it looks like it’ll take them a while to reconstitute in a way that would pose a serious military threat to Finland. The new military districts only exist in excel
European NATO countries’ security isn’t separate from that of Ukraine.
The better the war goes for Russia, the more capacity it has free to stir up incidents in other countries - likely below the threshold of armed conflict but it’s a quite direct threat nevertheless.
Example from Finland: we had a peaceful year after submitting the NATO application as Russia was bogged down in Ukraine. Since fall 2023, after the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive, we’ve seen:
- instrumentalized migration
- several attempts at sabotage at water supply
- attempted break-ins (at least one successful) at other critical infrastructure, such as electricity supply.
Call me a hopeless idealist but I’d like to think that 80 years of western European integration and 30 years of integration with what was separated by the iron curtain means something.
It’ll be hard to re-learn how to be serious about defence again but unity might prevail
European integration was facilitated by the American security guarantees but it’s nevertheless a unique political process in the world. We Europeans managed to do this one thing right after having messed up pretty much everything imaginable, on a global scale, in the past.
Europeans got very comfortable under the US security blanket and it’ll be brutal to get out into the real world. But I’m not sure that we’re completely doomed.
Just look at defence cooperation in many parts of Europe: the Dutch have integrated their land force with Germany
Suomessa on täysi konsensus siitä, että itäraja pitää turvata kaikkia mahdollisia hyökkäyksiä vastaan.
Edellinen keskusta-vasemmistohallitus aloitti aidan rakentamisen, sääti lain rajan väliaikaisesta sulkemisesta ja aloitti rajamenettelyn valmistelun.
Mikä nyt harmittaa monia tämän hallituksen käännytyslaissa on sen huono valmistelu. Huutia on tullut jo heti alkuvaiheessa ja on alusta asti ollut selvää, että tämä laki on ristiriidassa Suomen muun oikeuskäytännön kanssa. Lopulta se ei ehkä edes mene läpi juuri siitä syystä.
Moni olisi toivonut, että hallitus olisi osannut etsiä keinoja vastata rajan haasteisiin tavalla, joka ei vesitä sääntöperäisen järjestyksen periaatteita - jonka ylläpitäminen on siis Suomen kaltaiselle pienelle valtiolle ehdoton turvallisuusintressi.
Yes, the chancellery seems to be very consistent in its risk assessment that supporting Ukraine remains the riskier option, as it might bring us closer to the nuclear threshold if Ukraine can eliminate Russian ability to attack too effectively.
Conversely, it suggests that if Ukraine were to lose this war, it would be deeply regrettable, but at least a nuclear war would be averted.
Why this logic is flawed is fairly obvious: giving in to nuclear blackmail isn’t going to help non-proliferation efforts
As @drfranksauer & I argued in a response to @tobiaspfella, a risk assessment must consider also the risks of failing to support Ukraine. Apart from Berlin, this concern prevails in most European capitals. At least anywhere close to the Russian border. ipg-journal.de/rubriken/ausse…