This @TheEconomist chart should really keep European and German policymakers awake at night.
China’s state-directed investment in ‘high-quality, productive’ forces is leading to massive overproduction that will reverberate in global markets for manufactured goods. 1/
As China's manufacturing exports exploded in the 2000s (to 19% of world total by 2013), aided by protectionism/subsidies, the US lost one million manufacturing jobs.
A second China shock is rapidly unfolding, this time in the EU's key sectors. And the shock is much larger. 2/
After China’s property bubble burst in late 2023, China directed the country’s savings toward making cars, chemicals, machinery, and chips (hi Germany).
And China has been selling the resulting overproduction on global markets to avoid unemployment at home. 3/
The EU is poised to potentially lose many more jobs than the U.S. did during the first shock.
For one, the bloc currently has around 30 million manufacturing jobs compared to the 17 million the U.S. had in 2000. 4/
But the second China shock is also roughly twice as large as the first one - if you look at China’s manufactures trade surplus as a share of global GDP (h/t @Brad_Setser).
The Economist chart is another piece of evidence on the larger scale this time. 5/
Here the chart again - supported by the levers of state capitalism, the number of lossmaking Chinese industrial firms is multitudes higher now than at any point in the last 25 years (right-hand side).
Rough times ahead for European manufacturing. 6/
Wait, but this seems unsustainable? Sure seems like it.
The Economist hopes that China will not do bailouts and ultimately filter out weak producers
That should curb overproduction and the impact on global markets.
The conventional wisdom (@TheEconomist or @FT) is that the EU should embrace the glut of subsidised Chinese greentech goods. And rejoice at how cheap they are because of Beijing's subsidies and repressed consumption at home. But this is risky not only for 'security' reasons. 2/
Labour and capital are less mobile than in the US to reallocate from deindustrialisation. The EU's (much larger) manufacturing sector is also more productive than services - letting it shrink more than it must is antithetical to Europe's efforts to boost growth. 3/
Some observations on the new Dutch government’s EU policies based on the draft coalition agreement ('hoofdlijnenakkoord'). The Netherlands will become a more difficult partner for the EU, but in a more British than, say, Hungarian way.
On Ukraine: “[We] will continue to support Ukraine military, financially and morally against Russian aggression”. Doing so in the EU-context seems acceptable, even preferred. The gov also commits to a minimal 2% of GDP defense spending and EU defense-industrial coordination.
But on enlargement the tune is decisively different. The coalition agreement stresses that the Netherlands is ‘very critical of further enlargement of the EU’ and will insist that there’ll be no concessions on the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership.
"Subsidy race with US and China would harm Europe’s ailing economy" IMF warns
Broadly agree with the Fund. But the choice for Europe shouldn't be misrepresented as a blanket free-trade v industrial policy binary. There are sectoral shades of grey. (1/5) ft.com/content/0ee289…
In greentech, the EU is in a better position than assumed, with almost twice the US share in global export markets. The combination of (early) policy levers like carbon taxes, regulation and CBAM have nudged private sector innovation in Europe - so we need less subsidies (2/5)
The Fund also warns that running subsidies to help national champions could fragment the EU market, and lead to capital misallocation. Right! Trade within the EU is growing faster than with the RoW: the single market is a key channel of resilience to economic nationalism. (3/5)
Tonight, over dinner, European finance ministers hope to hammer out a compromise on EU fiscal rule reform. So where do things stand, what are the remaining bones of contention, and what would a deal mean?
Open issues relate for example to ‘safeguards’ put in by Germany and the frugals (as guardrails on the spending path rooted in a debt sustainability analysis), especially the debt sustainability safeguard and the deficit resilience safeguard.
The former is to nudge member-states towards enough debt reduction ambition over time. The latters aim is so govs don’t end up ‘hanging out’ just below a 3% deficit. So, in the latest draft, govs with debt>60% of economic output must keep structural deficits at/below 1.5% of GDP
Mark Rutte's VVD makes it moves. It says it won't do a coalition deal with Geert Wilders, but it "will make a center-right cabinet possible," according to party leader Dilan Yeşilgöz. It’s a halfway house. On purpose. Quick thread. nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/11…
Broad strokes there were three options after the election result.
A) A government with Wilders PVV, VVD and Omtzigt’s NSC.
B) A ‘cordon sanitaire’ of all the other parties
C) A minority government with ‘tactic’ support from others.
Scenario A was seen as the most obvious, given that Wilders + Omtzigt gained most seats om the right, and the right-side spectrum overall dominates the landscape. In line with parliamentary tradition, the PVV as biggest party appointed a ‘scout’ to explore coalitions.
The Netherlands heads to the polls tomorrow. Small country, no big deal for Europe right? Perhaps I'm biased, but I don't think that's true. The Netherlands is often a pivotal player in the EU. And this is an era-ending election after 13 years of Rutte as PM. Some observations🧵
The Netherlands is what you might call the 'biggest of the small economies'. It boasts Europe’s key port with Rotterdam + the EU's key technology company, ASML, which is central to Washington cajoling Europe into also throttling China’s access to semiconductors.
In the pre-pandemic era, the Netherlands leveraged such structural strengths to lead a coalition of small ‘frugal’ countries called the New Hanseatic League. The League vocally opposed further EU fiscal integration. But the last few years 🇳🇱 was proactive as EU bridge-builder.