When we talk about immigration, we're often told that we need immigration because our public services, like the NHS, are reliant on it.
A short 🧵 on why this is nonsense - and why we shouldn't let the NHS be a thought-terminating cliché when discussing migration:
Let's start with a basic point - most migrants don't come to the UK to work in the NHS.
In fact, according to analysis from @BernoulliDefect, just 2.6% of the 1.22 million migrants who came to the UK in 2023 did so using the Health and Social Care Visa route.
It's not even fair to say that immigrants are *disproportionately* likely to work in the NHS - thanks again to @BernoulliDefect.
Clearly then, it's possible to cut immigration - even radically so - without impacting the NHS' access to an overseas labour pool...
But maybe it's still fair to say that the system is 'dependent' on migration? After all, we don't have enough people training to be doctors and nurses here in the UK - it's simply inevitable that we have to prop up our system with foreign-trained practitioners, right?
Nope - this is entirely a self-imposed problem.
In partnership with the British Medical Association, the Government caps the number of training places at UK medical schools - currently it's 7,500, though there are indications that this might be increased over time to 15,000.
When the cap was temporarily lifted in 2020/21, demand for medical training places shot up - before the cap was reimposed in 2022.
The obstacle to a self-sustaining NHS workforce is the UK Government's reticence to make a long-term investment in the UK's domestic workforce.
This decision stems back to 2008, when the BMA voted to cap the number of medical places and ban the opening of new medical schools - for fear of "overproducing" doctors and "devaluing the profession".
This is racketeering and protectionism, plain and simple.
Between 2010 and 2021, 348,000 UK-based applicants were refused a place on a nursing course.
The House of Lords found that, in 2016 alone, 770 straight-A students were rejected from all medical courses to which they applied.
Failing to train our own workforce is a choice.
And, of course, there are second-order impacts of migration on public services as well. Like the rest of us, migrants use the NHS - between 2010 and 2020, there were 7 million new GP registrations by migrants.
That's BEFORE the 2022/23 spike in overall migration.
"But what if we rejected those applicants because they weren't good enough? We don't want low-quality medical practitioners."
As @93vintagejones notes, foreign-trained doctors are 2.5x more likely to be referred to the GMC as unfit to practice than British-trained doctors.
We've known for years that foreign-trained doctors are more likely to fall below expected standards than British-trained ones.
We're substituting a high-quality domestic workforce for a low-quality international one, thanks to BMA protectionism and government incompetence.
"But training takes time! We won't be able to fill those gaps immediately."
First, successful management of public services requires a long-term perspective.
Second, that may be the case - so create a special, time-limited visa route for practitioners from certain countries.
Plenty of countries have schemes that enable high-quality migrants to come to the country for a fixed period of time, under particular conditions.
A policy of using migrant doctors to fill short-term gaps doesn't require us to open the borders in perpetuity - obviously.
"But even if you opened those training places, you wouldn't fill them with British people."
Once again, we know that this isn't true - when the cap was temporarily removed, applications increased.
And if that doesn't work, there's a case for increasing public sector pay.
However we choose to address the NHS workforce, the key takeaway is that we shouldn't allow this to be a thought-terminating cliché.
Most migrants don't contribute to the NHS.
Our "reliance" on migration is entirely self-imposed.
We can choose to do things differently.
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The 'r-somalia' page is one of the most interesting places on the Internet.
A community of more than 40,000, it's a fascinating insight into Somali culture. Lots of infighting between Somalis and Somalilanders, Somalis and Arabs, Somalis and Ethiopians...
Some highlights 🧵
Under the post above - a discussion about integration amongst UK-based Somalis.
The consensus seems to be that second and third generation Somalis in the UK have integrated poorly - but the blame is largely placed with other Muslim communities, such as Arabs and Pakistanis.
Plenty of calls for reparations here.
"Actual retribution/reparations didn’t go far enough. British people may not have chosen colonialism but they sure still do benefit from it, reparations are in order."
As of 2021, London was 53.8% White, and 36.8% White British - but how do White Londoners actually vote?
Despite living in a major urban area, White Londoners are actually quite a right-wing group of voters.
A 🧵 on the political habits of London's White population
But first, some caveats.
In the UK, we don't collect granular data about racial or ethnic voting patterns.
Given the scale and speed of demographic change over the past few decades, these tools haven't had time to develop - unlike in countries like the United States.
That said, we can reverse-engineer the voting habits of White Londoners.
We know, roughly, how ethnic minority voters behaved at the last election - and we know the ethnic makeup of each constituency.
By combining these two datapoints, we can effectively remove ethnic minority voters from the broader voting population - leaving us with the rough breakdown of White voters.
For example, if a seat is 10% Black, and we know that 72% of Black voters backed Labour, we can subtract a roughly accurate number of voters from the total Labour vote.
Britain has some of the best human capital in the world - and some of the worst government policy 🇬🇧
We mustn't lose sight of this fact. There is so much to celebrate about our country.
A 🧵 with some reasons to be bullish on Britain - if we can just get the basics right
Let's start with London.
The capital ranks alongside New York as one of the world's truly 'global cities'.
The City of London in particular is a financial powerhouse. 38% of global foreign exchange transactions take place in London - more than any other city in the world.
The City generates over £97 billion in economic output annually - and the UK as a whole exports over £175 billion p/a in financial and professional services.
London sits in second place, behind New York, on the Global Financial Centres Index - and the UK is the second-largest services exporter globally.
By the 1500s, England's murder rate was lower than the murder rate in modern-day Africa 🏴
And by the 20th century, Britain was one of the least violent societies on Earth - but why was this the case?
A 🧵 on the history of how England crushed crime
Mid 20th-century Britain was one of the least violent societies on Earth.
By the late 1930s, despite the mass unemployment caused by the Great Depression, the murder rate in England was similar to that of modern Japan (about 1 per 100,000 people).
But this wasn't always true.
14th-century London had a murder rate of about 22 per 100,000 - similar to modern Nigeria.
During the same period, Oxford had a murder rate of about 65 per 100,000, higher than any country in the world today.
Other forms of violent crime were also far more prevalent.
This case concerns a Turkish man, who first entered the UK in 1988.
He claimed asylum but was removed to Turkey just four days after arriving.
Nevertheless, in 1991, he was allowed to return to the country while his claim was being considered. Why was this necessary?
His claim was refused in March 1993 - but he was given exceptional leave to remain here, and was eventually given indefinite leave to remain as a refugee, in 1997.
The man's refugee status rests upon the fact that, as a Kurd, he is liable to be discriminated against in Turkey.