Thread by @TheStudyofWar

NEW: Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed Ukrainian forces to at least temporarily seize the battlefield initiative in one area of the frontline and contest Russia's theater-wide initiative.🧵(1/7)

2/ Russia's possession of the theater-wide initiative since November 2023 has allowed Russia to determine the location, time, scale, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine and forced Ukraine to expend materiel and manpower in reactive defensive operations.

3/ The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, however, has forced the Kremlin & Russian military command to react and redeploy forces and means to the sector where Ukrainian forces have launched attacks. Russian forces were notably not conducting active operations in Kursk Oblast.

4/ Russia has been leveraging its possession of the theater-wide initiative to pressure Ukraine and attempt to prevent Ukrainian forces from accumulating manpower and materiel for future counteroffensive operations while determining a tempo of fighting that would allow Russian forces to sustain consistent ongoing offensive operations.

5/ Putin and the Russian military command likely incorrectly assessed that Ukraine lacked the capability to contest the initiative, and Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise and contest the theater-wide initiative is challenging the operational and strategic assumptions underpinning current Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine.

6/ The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and further possible Ukrainian cross-border incursions force a decision point on the Kremlin and the Russian military command about whether to view the 1000 km international border with northeastern Ukraine as a legitimate frontline that Russia must defend instead of a dormant area of the theater as they have treated it since Fall 2022.

7/ Moscow’s response may require the Russian military command to consider the manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international border as part of its theater-wide campaign design and can therefore impose long-term operational planning constraints that Russia previously did not face.

Latest on Ukraine: isw.pub/UkrWar081124