The Ukrainian operation in Kursk is almost one week into execution. As the Russians slowly but surely redeploy forces to seal off the breach in their border and attempt to push the Ukrainians back into #Ukraine, it is worth pondering the options the Ukrainians might have once they reach their limit of exploitation. 1/20 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Like all military operations, this will have been planned as a multiphase operation, including the prelude shaping operations. These would have included intelligence collection, force preparation, deception, operational security, logistics and other aspects necessary to prepare the Ukrainian force for battle.
3/ Other phases will have been planned, including the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ battles, ongoing exploitation and consolidation phases. These phases will have a range of forces and support elements applied to each.
4/ The Ukrainian’s the first phase, the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ are complete. They are currently in an ‘exploitation’ phase. Many operations also normally include a ‘limit of exploitation’ governed by terrain, logistics and reaction of the enemy, as well as the objectives of the operation.
5/ What might be Ukraine’s strategic options once they reach their limit of exploitation? I think they probably have three options. Each will have minor branch plans, as well as opportunities and risks.
6/ Option 1 is for the Ukrainians to consolidate on the terrain they have seized so far and then defend it until some form of negotiation takes place. This is the highest risk option because the Ukrainian dispositions feature multiple small salients which would be easily cut off and destroyed by even a semi-competant Russian commander.
7/ The high probably of losing a large number of forces in this scenario makes it a strategic & political liability. Ukraine could lose battalions and brigades, as well as artillery, EW and air defence it could not afford to lose. This option, should it go bad, would also squander the very positive strategic messaging that has been generated by the Ukrainian surprise attack into Russia.
8/ The objective for this option would be to continue posing a significant risk to Russian sovereignty and critical assets, and constitute a draw for Russian forces from Ukraine. It might also provide Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. It is questionable whether the downside risks of this option are worth the return however.
9/ Option 2. The 2nd option is for the Ukrainians to undertake a partial withdrawal from the territory it has seized, back to ground that is more defensible. This is a medium risk option, with a decreased risk of Option 1.
10/ This would rely on the Ukrainians conducting a withdrawal into pre-designated terrain that is easier to defend, requires a smaller quantity of troops to defend, and is able to be supported by fires, logistics and other functions more effectively.
11/ This option would also ensure that more troops could be reallocated after the operation to other activities, be they defending in the Donbas or subsequent cross-border attacks into Russia where there is an opportunity to do so.
12/ Option 2 allows #Ukraine to maximise the political and strategic benefits of the strategic shock, while reducing the risks of losing that combat force. It would still require large numbers of combat and support troops to defend the seized Russian territory, and would demand a major engineer effort to build minefields and other obstacles, trenchlines and deep bunkers and logistic storage locations.
13/ The objective for this option would be to continue posing a risk to Russian sovereignty, comprise an ongoing draw for Russian forces from #Ukraine, and to give #Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. The humilitation of Putin and his military is also important. The risks of this opportunity might be worth the potential gains.
14/ The third option for #Ukraine would be to fully withdraw back to the international border between #Russia and #Ukraine. This would permit Ukraine to maximise the political and strategic benefits of operation into Russia while preserving a large body of experienced combat troops that might be employed on subsequent offensive operations in 2024 and 2025.
15/ By choosing this option the Ukrainians would be messaging to the Russians that “we can invade and hurt your country if we choose, but we have no wish to occupy our neighbours”. While the Ukrainian invasion may allow Putin to reinforce his point to Russians about the ‘threat from NATO’, he also appears weak because he was not able to punish those who conducted the operation in Kursk.
16/ The objective for this option would be to humilitate Putin, preserve Ukrainian combat forces, while sending a strategic message to Ukraine’s supporters that that can go on the offensive and do so in a manner which does pose an existential risk to the ground forces conducting the operation.
17/ Given the preservation of Ukrainian forces under this option, it will probably be the one that gives Zelenskyy the best domestic political boost and improvement in Ukrainian morale.
18/ A range of factors will have an influence on which option the Ukrainian government chooses. These factors include how the Russians change their force posture in Ukraine (including in the Donbas), the Russian response in Kursk, domestic and international political considerations, and the sustainability of the operation itself.
19/ You can read a much more detailed examination of this issue in my new (free) post at Futura Doctrina. End. mickryan.substack.com/p/kursks-next-…
20/ Thank you to the following, whose links and images where used in this thread: @War_Mapper @Militarylandnet @emilkastehelmi @UAControlMap @DefenceU @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @Maks_NAFO_FELLA
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“The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. The disadvantages could be numerous.” My weekly update on Iran, Ukraine and the Pacific. 1/6 🧵
2/ Ukraine has achieved something significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. But there is also a trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.
3/ In Iran, the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question being probably being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.
The latest update on drone and missile attacks on the UAE has just been released. With this as context, I thought I would share some initial insights arising from this Iranian retaliatory campaign and the overall war against #Iran. 1/9 🧵
2/ First, the battlespace is not transparent. It is highly visible but high visibility is not the same as high wisdom about what is seen. And we must not fall into the trap of assuming that we actually are seeing everything we need to see rather than what the enemy wants us to see. Finally, no tech can see into the hearts and minds of soldiers and combat leaders, especially when they are functioning under conditions of existential threat.
3/ Second, Understanding the enemy, and how resilient it is, matters. The Iranians have been preparing for this fight for decades, will have many caches of weapons and have strategised how this might play out. And assuming that a few bombs from the sky topple a regime (especially when it has never been achieved before) badly under estimated the Iranians.
"America & Iran are fighting two very different wars and have two different theories of victory. China & others in the authoritarian learning & adaptation bloc are observing closely & learning." An assessment of where we are, & who is learning from the Iran War. 1/6 🧵
2/ This assessment examines the two wars in and around Iran: the military campaign that Washington is fighting, and the economic campaign that Tehran is waging. It then asks the following question: what are the respective theories of victory, and how does that theory play out differently for each belligerent?
3/ A theory of victory is not simply a list of military objectives. It is a coherent account of how the application of military force produces a political outcome that endures. The Trump administration entered Operation Epic Fury with a theory of the means, and a range of constantly changing ends (at least in public). It might be able to use the military to win the war, but it is unclear whether it has a longer-term plan to win the peace.
Wars are never simple. Despite the efforts of governments, war resists the clarity, certainty & clever narratives supported by AI slop videos, we wish to impose on them. The #Iran war & developments in #Ukraine, were exemplars of this during the week. 1/7
2/ Welcome to my weekly update on war and strategic competition. This week, shifting strategic initiative in Ukraine, the war in Iran, politics in the Pacific & my Big 5 reading recommendations.
3/ In #Ukraine, Ukrainian forces achieved some of the most operationally significant gains of the past year, reclaiming territory in the south while striking deep into Russia’s military-industrial complex. Diplomacy continued its chaotic and erratic journey.
"At some point, Putin will have to reckon with the failure of his strategic bombing campaign against Ukraine’s cities to shift Ukraine’s political posture, and the slow-rolling military failure that is Russia’s bloody ground campaign." A comprehensive update of the big #Ukraine & Pacific issues this week. 1/6 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In Europe this week, the annual Munich Security Conference was held. Lots of interesting speeches, but not a lot of progress on ending the war in Ukraine.
And as Zelenskyy stated: "A lot of time now is spent on negotiations. We truly hope that the trilateral meetings next week will be serious, substantive, and helpful for all of us. But honestly – sometimes it feels like the sides are talking about completely different things."
3/ In Ukraine, the armed forces were able to undertake opportunistic counter attacks against Russian forces deprived of Starlink.
But otherwise, as I describe in my assessment of the trajectory of the war in 2026, "the brutal calculus of the past four-years will continue into 2026 unless there is a significant breakthrough in technology, tactics or strategy that changes the deep, close and rear aspects of the overall battlefield dynamic.
The only other thing that might significantly change the trajectory of the war is if there is a significant shift in political will in Kyiv or Moscow."
America has just released its 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Not seeing much press activity from the Dept of Defense/War on this. While I need time to ponder the deeper implications of the document, a few things stand out on first reading. 1/11 🧵
2/ First, the document is consistent with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump Administration in November 2025. Key priorities in the NDS align with the NSS, as you would expect. However, while the NSS has priorities, the NDS has "Lines of Effort". whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
3/ There are four Lines of Effort in the new NDS:
1. Defend the U.S. Homeland. 2. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. 3. Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. 4. Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.