Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Aug 12, 2024 20 tweets 5 min read Read on X
The Ukrainian operation in Kursk is almost one week into execution. As the Russians slowly but surely redeploy forces to seal off the breach in their border and attempt to push the Ukrainians back into #Ukraine, it is worth pondering the options the Ukrainians might have once they reach their limit of exploitation. 1/20 🧵🇺🇦Image
2/ Like all military operations, this will have been planned as a multiphase operation, including the prelude shaping operations. These would have included intelligence collection, force preparation, deception, operational security, logistics and other aspects necessary to prepare the Ukrainian force for battle.
3/ Other phases will have been planned, including the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ battles, ongoing exploitation and consolidation phases. These phases will have a range of forces and support elements applied to each.
4/ The Ukrainian’s the first phase, the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ are complete. They are currently in an ‘exploitation’ phase. Many operations also normally include a ‘limit of exploitation’ governed by terrain, logistics and reaction of the enemy, as well as the objectives of the operation.
5/ What might be Ukraine’s strategic options once they reach their limit of exploitation? I think they probably have three options. Each will have minor branch plans, as well as opportunities and risks.
6/ Option 1 is for the Ukrainians to consolidate on the terrain they have seized so far and then defend it until some form of negotiation takes place. This is the highest risk option because the Ukrainian dispositions feature multiple small salients which would be easily cut off and destroyed by even a semi-competant Russian commander.Image
7/ The high probably of losing a large number of forces in this scenario makes it a strategic & political liability. Ukraine could lose battalions and brigades, as well as artillery, EW and air defence it could not afford to lose. This option, should it go bad, would also squander the very positive strategic messaging that has been generated by the Ukrainian surprise attack into Russia.
8/ The objective for this option would be to continue posing a significant risk to Russian sovereignty and critical assets, and constitute a draw for Russian forces from Ukraine. It might also provide Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. It is questionable whether the downside risks of this option are worth the return however.
9/ Option 2. The 2nd option is for the Ukrainians to undertake a partial withdrawal from the territory it has seized, back to ground that is more defensible. This is a medium risk option, with a decreased risk of Option 1.
10/ This would rely on the Ukrainians conducting a withdrawal into pre-designated terrain that is easier to defend, requires a smaller quantity of troops to defend, and is able to be supported by fires, logistics and other functions more effectively.
11/ This option would also ensure that more troops could be reallocated after the operation to other activities, be they defending in the Donbas or subsequent cross-border attacks into Russia where there is an opportunity to do so.
12/ Option 2 allows #Ukraine to maximise the political and strategic benefits of the strategic shock, while reducing the risks of losing that combat force. It would still require large numbers of combat and support troops to defend the seized Russian territory, and would demand a major engineer effort to build minefields and other obstacles, trenchlines and deep bunkers and logistic storage locations.
13/ The objective for this option would be to continue posing a risk to Russian sovereignty, comprise an ongoing draw for Russian forces from #Ukraine, and to give #Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. The humilitation of Putin and his military is also important. The risks of this opportunity might be worth the potential gains.Image
14/ The third option for #Ukraine would be to fully withdraw back to the international border between #Russia and #Ukraine. This would permit Ukraine to maximise the political and strategic benefits of operation into Russia while preserving a large body of experienced combat troops that might be employed on subsequent offensive operations in 2024 and 2025.
15/ By choosing this option the Ukrainians would be messaging to the Russians that “we can invade and hurt your country if we choose, but we have no wish to occupy our neighbours”. While the Ukrainian invasion may allow Putin to reinforce his point to Russians about the ‘threat from NATO’, he also appears weak because he was not able to punish those who conducted the operation in Kursk.
16/ The objective for this option would be to humilitate Putin, preserve Ukrainian combat forces, while sending a strategic message to Ukraine’s supporters that that can go on the offensive and do so in a manner which does pose an existential risk to the ground forces conducting the operation.
17/ Given the preservation of Ukrainian forces under this option, it will probably be the one that gives Zelenskyy the best domestic political boost and improvement in Ukrainian morale.
18/ A range of factors will have an influence on which option the Ukrainian government chooses. These factors include how the Russians change their force posture in Ukraine (including in the Donbas), the Russian response in Kursk, domestic and international political considerations, and the sustainability of the operation itself.
19/ You can read a much more detailed examination of this issue in my new (free) post at Futura Doctrina. End. mickryan.substack.com/p/kursks-next-…
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20/ Thank you to the following, whose links and images where used in this thread: @War_Mapper @Militarylandnet @emilkastehelmi @UAControlMap @DefenceU @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @Maks_NAFO_FELLA

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More from @WarintheFuture

Oct 13
Russia has employed missiles similar to Tomahawks since Day 1 of the full-scale invasion. This is NOT escalation. It is just leveling the playing field for a three-year-long Ukrainian long-range strike campaign that has now achieved critical mass and momentum. How have they done this? 1/16 🧵 🇺🇦
msn.com/en-us/news/wor…Image
2/ Back in 2022, when Ukraine received HIMARS, it changed the game. Ukraine could now hit Russia at depth. But it was clear even back then that Ukraine had bigger plans for making Russia hurt through even deeper strikes.
mickryan.substack.com/p/striking-fur…Image
3/ By the 2nd half of 2023, Ukraine’s strategic aspirations for deep strike against Russia were clear. As I wrote back then, “throughout the war the Ukrainian Armed Forces have undertaken a range of adaptations to their force posture, structure and processes to enhance their operational effectiveness.  Their development of more complex, long-range strike capabilities stands out.”Image
Read 16 tweets
Oct 8
The last few years have seen many examples of wartime adaptation. This has occurred in #Ukraine as well as the Middle East. We have also seen nations in Europe, North America and Asia seek to learn and conduct peacetime adaptation. But there is a 3rd form of #adaptation that is crucial. 1/4 🧵Image
2/ This 3rd form of adaptation is that which occurs in the short period between peace and war: Peace to War Adaptation. It is important to understand this form of adaptation because it is the crucial process of learning and change that connects peacetime and wartime adaptation.
3/ The effectiveness or otherwise of Peace to War Adaptation can also influence the trajectory of a war. It is important to ensure governments, industry, the military and society are all prepared for such a rapid cognitive shift.
Read 4 tweets
Sep 3
An initial assessment of the PLA parade that has just finished in Beijing. Overall, no major surprises although there were was some new equipment. The structure and content of the parade was pretty standard. Five key themes stood out for me however. 1/9 🧵 Image
2/ Theme 1. Most of the weapons and platforms were not brand new, but generally, every land, air and sea platform was more modern than that in the inventories of western military organisations. Newer does not always mean better however. While most western military equipment has been tested in Iraq, #Ukraine and elsewhere, none of China's new kit has.Image
3/ Theme 2. The new weapons and platforms were interesting and demonstrate the ongoing, advanced military R&D eco-system that China now has. The Large Underwater Uncrewed Vessels, the uncrewed rotary wing aircraft and the HHQ-16C (HT @AlexLuck9), DF-61 and DF-31BJ missiles as well as the laser defence systems were new reveals by the PLA. I thought the UAV on the back of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle was interesting. Long gone are the days were China was reliant on Russia or other foreign systems. This level of indigenous capacity infers high levels of sustainability in any future conflict.Image
Read 9 tweets
Sep 2
Tomorrow's big parade in Beijing will preview new Chinese weapon systems. But the military 'bling' may also provide insights into new and evolved PLA operating concepts for drones and missiles. 1/7 🧵 Image
2/ In my latest piece, I explore the concept of a Pacific drone wall built by China, and how tomorrow’s PLA parade might preview some of its new components. There has been much speculation about the new weaponry that might be unveiled during the 3 September parade. Two key systems that are likely to receive a lot of attention are missiles and drones.
3/ Of course, China is not the only nation capable of assembling a 21st century military barrier comprised of air, sea and land drones. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has been discussing and simulating the creation of a drone barrier in the Taiwan Strait called Hellscape.
Read 7 tweets
Aug 31
I have just published my regular update on global conflict. This week: Gerasimov's Ukraine war update, the aerial campaigns of Ukraine & Russia, Japan's missile moves, China's big parade and my Big Five reads. 1/5 🇺🇦🧵(Image: @DefenceU) Image
2/ This week, Russia's General Gerasimov provided an update on the war in Ukraine. Among his insights, Russia won't stop until it achieves its objectives, and that Russia holds the strategic initiative. He also discussed Russia's attacks on 'industrial targets' in Ukraine. Image
3/ In the Pacific, Japan made announcements about the deployment of American Typhon missile systems in September, as well as the deployment of indigenous counter-strike missile systems throughout Japan. Also, Exercise Alon 2025 concluded and China practiced for its 3 September parade. (Image: @TaiwanMonitor)Image
Read 5 tweets
Aug 23
Ukraine has developed a world-class long-range strike capability. My latest assessment explores this topic. Ukraine's strikes in the past few months, especially against the Russian oil industry, reinforce that Russia cannot win this war. 1/6 🇺🇦🧵 Image
2/ The impact of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign shows that Russia can only be handed a victory through a political process, which is why Putin is so desperate to convince the Trump administration about land transfers, and deny the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine.
3/ Ukraine's long-range strike capability has been a vital development for the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022. They have developed an increasingly capable range of weapons to hit further into Russia and hold a wider range of strategic targets at risk.
Read 6 tweets

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