Ukraine's Kursk 2024 operation has effectively degraded Russian near front GLOC
Russian Logistics:
The Russian counter-attack will have 2 main logistical depots to support the eventual counter attack being Kursk and Belgorod with RZD and ZHV bringing supplies in by rail. Should the Russians deem Kursk and Belgorod no longer safe then secondary hubs are Oryol, Voronezh, and Stary Oskol can be used.
Once supplies come in by rail they will be offloaded and sent to likely Russian staging points (red stars) at Rylsk, Lgov, Chermoshnoi, Selikhovy Dvory, Oboyan, and Rakitnoe by the MTO Brigades by truck. The most optimal routes for the MTO brigades to transport material from the rail yards to Russian troops within 45 miles are highlighted in green. Secondary routes for the MTO to take that will be able to bring a third less supplies a day are highlighted as thick yellow line. Third route option and least preferred that will be able to bring in 2/3 less supplies per day is highlighted in dark orange.
The MTO Brigades are Russia's logistical support to bring supplies from rail hubs to the front ground forces. As highlighted in many papers over the years for a century and a half the Russian army is a railway army and in order to sustain deep operations, and offensive operations it relys of rail with last mile done by truck and is effectively limited to stay preferably within 45 mi of a rail line so that the MTO brigades can most effectively Ferry supplies to the front. Beyond that there is reduced capacity to move supplies. The glaring issue with the eventual counter attack in Kursk in is that they will be operating at around 80 miles or more from a rail line at the current Ukrainian FLOT which logistically speaking for Russia is not ideal in staging and conducting a counter offensive because their supply lines will be stretched thin.
The second problem that Russia is going to run into while organizing and the response to counter the Ukrainians is deciding where to pull MTO assets in Ukraine from and relocate to Kursk leaving units in Ukraine short on logistical resupply assets making the The daily replenishment needed to sustain combat operations more difficult than it already is for the Russians that have had issues with properly supplying units across the front from strategic rail heads.
A MTO Brigades is committed to supporting 1 Combined Arms Army (CAA). Russia has a total of 11 of these MTO Brigades.
Each MTO Brigade fields
2 truck battalions, each battalion comprising
408 transport vehicles composed of
-148 general freight vehicles
-260 specialized vehicles
-48 trailers.
Each Battalion can reportedly haul 1,870 tons of cargo (1190 tons of dry cargo, 680 tons of liquid).
MTO Brigade serves a CAA
MTO Battalion serves a Division
MTO Companies serves Regiments and Brigades
If you want some more reading best if done on PC most of f these links are PDFs.
Finally, another issue for Russian Logistics is the logistical hub Belgorod at is also the main GLOC for Task Group North in Kharkiv so now some of those supplies are going to have to be diverted to establish a new group of forces to counter-attack Kursk from the south and east.
The Russian Army is a Railway Army. This has not changed for Russia since the creation of the ZHV in 1851 and you can look at any conflict Russia has engaged in since then and you will see in each one of these conflicts the over dominance and reliance on the railroads, whether it's the Boxer rebellion the Russo-japanese war World War I. The Russian Civil War World War II, Afghanistan the Chechen wars, the invasion of Georgia, the invasion of Ukraine and it's also notable in Russian peacekeeping operations, and military exercises with its csto partners.
The MTO Brigade was supposed to be a streamlining and modernization of the last mile supply in the logistical chain for the Russian armed Forces that would give Russian forces greater mobility during a conflict and the utilization of the MTO brigades is a first in this war in Ukraine and as proven to be not capable under-equipped for the task.
For Russia, they need rail supremacy without it or a contested rail environment Russian Forces will struggle if they stray too far from a rail head and are limited both offensively and defensively and in order to succeed they need a dense rail network.
For most of the world, the rise of the automobile was the decline of the railroad and militaries across the planet opted to switch to vehicles and less reliant on trains due to mobility and efficiency Russia to this day has not embraced this in part due to Russia's geography and the practicalities of its geography and due to Russia's doctrine of active defense which also really has not changed for 100 years. In many ways, Russia is in the same situation as the Austrian empire and the Ottoman empire during World War I in terms of Military Logistics. Russia's Military Logistics is unique across militaries of the planet due to being one of the only few countries still that has an entire branch of its armed forces dedicated to the sole task of rail operations, which most countries have not had literally since World War 1 pretty much the only countries besides Russia are Brazil and Italy and their Railway forces are really tiny and limited compared to Russian Railway Forces.
The reason why Russian railroads are really wide compared to everyone else is literally a Tsarist era policy for the idea of making foreign invasion unsuitable because no one else would be able to use the Russian railroad to invade Russia though this also limits Russia's ability to project power abroad and their reach is effectively limited to those that have the Russian Gauge
Last note, another issue that Russia is going to face logistically in organizing a counter-offensive in Kursk currently, Russian supply lines through the MTO Brigade will be stretched in order to supply the Russian FLOT meaning that Russian forces currently engaged against the ukrainians will not have the most efficient and adequate supplies in timely manner which will likely result in more land being captured by the ukrainians which they can't afford because if Ukraine gets too close to any of the areas that I highlighted such as which will likely result in more land being captured by the Ukrainians which they can't afford because if Ukraine gets too close to any of the areas that I highlighted such as
Rylsk, Lgov, Chermoshnoi, Selikhovy Dvory, Oboyan, and Rakitnoe then logistically speaking, their lines to Belgorod and Kursk will be even further degraded and then it will become a siege and it will be a matter of time before Ukraine captures two major Russian population centers.
In shorts they cannot afford to allow Ukraine to advance further and must Marshal necessary forces to counter-attack. The problem with that though is to rally the forces needed. They will need to strip the logistical resources from the front lines in Ukraine which will make those areas vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-attack.
In short,
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Belarusian media report that the Ukrainian Defense Forces Operation in Kursk region has led to a collapse in rail traffic in the western and central regions of russia: RZD is not accepting trains from Belarus on the Moscow and Bryansk routes
@Prune602
Like I highlighted a few days ago and with everything above on the logistics side that the seizure of Sudzha was a significant blow to the Russian Railways and the Russian Armed forces now Belarus Media reports RZD has shut down rail traffic in the Moscow Rail District. Besides, attaching a previous thread, I've also attached the map of the Moscow Rail district and have crudely circled in red. The rail lines that according to Belarus media are no longer accepting Rail traffic.
The operation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces has led to a collapse in rail traffic in the western and central regions of the Russian Federation: Russian Railways is not accepting trains from Belarus on the Moscow and Bryansk directions
A telegram was sent to the Belarusian Railway about the need to stop sending freight trains from ALL stations of the Belarusian Railway to stations of the Oryol-Kursk branch of the Moscow Railway (MRZhD RR) from 12.08.2024. This telegram is not limited by the validity period, but has the mark "until cancellation". A large number of "abandoned" trains* (code 12 - no locomotive) are noted at stations in the Smolensk region of the MRZhD. This circumstance also affects the rhythm of sending freight trains from the Belarusian Railway in the direction of the MRZhD and leads to a disruption of the traffic schedule.
On 13.08.2024, phone calls with requests not to send trains in the direction of the Smolensk region (via the Krasnoye junction) came directly from the Moscow Railway traffic control apparatus to the Belarusian Railway management. The need for urgent transfer of troops and evacuation of refugees led to the fact that there were no locomotives left for freight trains. Civilian recipients can no longer count on the delivery of goods on time.
BREAKING: Russian Railroads are officially collapsing in real time from the Belarus Railroad Workers Community.
Telegram has sent from the central office of Russian Railways (RZD) to the Belarusian Railways (BCh) about the need to stop sending freight trains from all stations of the Belarusian Railways to stations of the Oryol-Kursk branch of the Moscow Railway (MRZhD RR) effective immediately from 12.08.2024 no end date given.
It is noteworthy that the received telegram with notification of the impossibility of receiving trains from the Belarusian Railways in the specified direction is no longer limited in validity, but has the mark "until cancellation" . This circumstance terminates railway communication from Belarus to stations in the specified region of Russia for an unknown (unlimited) period.
It should be noted that such a decision was made by Russian Railways against the backdrop of military events (the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and the establishment of their control on Russian territories) occurring in the Kursk region, as well as statements by the Russian authorities about the “successes” achieved.
In addition to the events described above, there is a large accumulation of "abandoned" trains * (code 12 - no locomotive) at stations in the Smolensk region of the Moscow Railway. This circumstance also affects the rhythm of sending freight trains from the Belarusian Railway in the direction of the Moscow Railway and leads to disruption of the schedule.
Yesterday, 13.08.2024, corresponding telephone calls with verbal requests to find ways not to send trains in the direction of the Smolensk region (via the interstate junction point (IGCP) Osinovka (BZhD) - Krasnoe (RZhD)) were received directly from the Moscow Railway traffic control apparatus to the management of the Belarusian Railway.
For its part, Russian Railways currently explains the situation with the filling of stations in the Smolensk region with “abandoned” trains by the “lack of traction” (the required number of locomotives (mainline diesel locomotives and electric locomotives), as well as locomotive crews to carry out the removal of trains).
The tense situation with the availability of the required number of locomotives and locomotive crews on Russian Railways has been going on for quite a long time, and has been sensitive since 2023. The reason is poor quality repairs, lack of spare parts, and people's lack of interest in low-paid work. However, these facts are only an indirectly related issue .
Our sources report that the lack of traction in the situation described is caused by the Russian authorities conducting a large-scale operational transfer of troops in the direction of the Kursk region and the redeployment of a significant part of the Moscow Railway's fleet of freight locomotives to carry out military transportation from the central part of Russia .
At the same time, some sources report that the concentration of armed forces is being carried out from virtually all regions, even from fairly remote ones or those with complicated logistics .
Obviously, such movements cannot be accomplished without the use of the railway.
It is not yet clear what role the Belarusian Railways is currently assigned in this regard.
We continue to monitor the situation.
Side note:
An "abandoned" train is a conventional term that generally refers to a train that has been left without a locomotive on a station side track for more than 24 hours.
Well it looks like we'll have to address some of David's false claims about trains because Sudzha is part of the Russian primary rail network. This station has been in operation the entire length of the war. There was one partisan attack on one of the bridges south of the town in May of 2022. They sent the Russian Railways and the zhv and had a brand new bridge installed within 48 hours to keep uninterrupted freight rail flowing down and this train station was only closed for the first time in this war last Friday.
We will have to go over how Russia has had almost complete freedom of movement for it. Conducting rail operations this entire War. The number of times locomotive have been attacked by Ukraine. I can count on one hand. The number of times Russian zhv has been attacked. I can count on one hand. The amount of times critical rail infrastructure has been attacked. I can count on two hands and this idea that Russia won't be using a train station like Sudzha which is literally operated the entire War because it's in range of Ukrainian musicians. Guess what Tsar train is 5 mi from the line of contact and trains go down at every single day unharassed not a single attack and the Surovikin line yeah Russia's main GLOC Maine is a single rail line that's in the range the entire length and the amount of times that's been attacked I can count on one hand. The new rail line from Mariupiol 2 attacks One of which was on the granite quarry and the other completely missed the rail bridge no follow-on.
Perhaps go read up on the ZHV and the MTO brigades. Or really look at any of Russia's military logistical doctrine that really hasn't had drastic change since the Cold War in those exercises that they did right before invading, Ukraine and Belarus that was with the MTO brigades to try and iron out issues.
But sure David, the Russians hopped in their t62 and drove the tank all the way up over 600 km on the interstate. Instead of putting it I don't know on a train and having it transferred via the MTO Brigade whose literal job is to be the logistical support for a CAA.
Also it's literally faster to transport by train than to drive. Especially when you talk about moving an entire unit's worth of equipment. Whether it's a regiment, a battalion, a brigade or division, it's going to get there far faster by rail than by truck or by road.
Ukrainian Intelligence hit a gold mine on Russian Logistics in near real time!
The capture of Sudzha may not seem grand on a map but the capture of the railway station may allow Ukrainian Intelligence direct access into Russian Railway Computer Systems, Schedules, Train Consists, and internal Russian Railway Communications from Dispatch to Defect Detectors.
Sudzha station besides being part of the Lgov-Belgorod Line that I've highlighted previously is part of the Moscow Railway division, which must be causing panic in Russian High Command knowing that the enemy has real time capability to view your logistical movements.
Nice part is you can't really shut this thing off. A lot of those defect detectors and the signal sensors are automated. The only way you're shutting it off is if you go out there and rip the whole system apart. Which they're not going to do because that's insanely expensive and creates insane risk and safety issues for both passenger and freight rail and would leave trains out on the track completely blind as to what's in front of them so you can't really shut it off
Also, a lot of those systems transmit via radio automatically. They are tripped when a train goes by. So even if they lost access to the computer, they would now have the frequencies needed to listen in on those sensors and detectors. Which again you physically can't turn off unless you go out there and rip them apart which they're not going to do. The systems are designed so that the train out in the middle of nowhere has an ability to know if they are safe and to know what's in front of them and what's behind them. Can't shut it off
The likely Ukrainian objective is at Belaya. Securing of Belaya will allow Ukraine to have complete control of the main and most likely southern approach to Sudzha by road and rail for Russian Forces. Securing Belaya will be able to act as a FOB and check any Russian advances in this direction. Immediately North of Belaya is local high ground that also will be able to turn the paths of approach from the south and east into well prepared kill zones. Belaya is also likely a Ukrainian decision point securing this town will give them the option to go two separate directions.
Option 1 follow the road East and go towards Oboyan.
Option 2 follow the road South and go towards Proletarskii/Rakitnoe
Either approach can directly threaten the city of Belgorod.
Taking the southern approach also gives the opportunity to potentially link up with Ukrainian forces IVO Grayvoron should this develop into third mutually supporting axis of offensive.
Red GPS icon is where Ukrainian forward elements were spotted.
Blue stars are likely decision points/objectives
Black line and black icons are the railroads
Red line is Russian defensive fortifications.
Yellow and orange shaded areas are Ukrainian occupied areas and likely minimal Ukrainian presence.
Ukrainian decision point has been reached and have taken option 1 driving towards Oboyan clashing with Russian forces just outside of the town. Should the Ukrainians reach Oboyan they will have access to the E105 Highway. Gaining access onto this highway will sever a major and critical Russian GLOC from Kursk to Belgorod.
Source Russian Telegram Channel Two Majors claims that the size of the Ukrainian new breakthrough is 'several dozens of km' further south from Sudzha They say that Oboyan, located 65 km from the border, can hear the noise of the battle..
Maps for the moment based on Russian Reporting Ukrainian forces have deployed mines along the road from Suzhda to Belitsa, preventing direct access for Russians. (Highlighted in Orange) The Lgov-Belgorod Railway also traverse is the same area with several Rail Bridges there's no mention of them in the reporting though. Personally it is likely they are mining the road. They're also deploying mines near the bridges.
An Likely indicator that Ukraine
have done this yesterday with the announcement of several Railway stations being closed by the Russian Railways a station that was on that list is the Psel train station in Giri and Sudzha indicating the whole line is shut down. The placement of mines along the strip will delay the Russians and or force them to traverse further north further delaying a Russian response from Belgorod and Kharkiv making Russian forces have to practically go all the way up to Kursk and come at Ukrainian forces from the north.
I'll have to merge these maps together later tonight but Russia has lost control of the Lgov-Belgorod Rail line. A 🇺🇦 Battalion-sized element from the 22nd Mechanized Brigade supported by roughly a battalion-sized element from the 88th Mechanized Brigade reached the tracks yesterday afternoon in Sudzha. Interestingly Ukrainian forces made an attempt with the 82nd Air Assault Brigade also roughly a battalion-sized element to take the town of Korenevo.
Korenevo is an interesting choice because it has a rail line that goes from Lgov directly into Ukraine to the town of Vorozhba.
The tracks from Vorozhba go directly to Sumy and Kyiv.
It is Highly Likely that securing the town of Korenevo is a must objective for Ukrainian forces. This will allow them to establish a direct rail line from Ukraine into Kursk Oblast and be able to bring in significant quantities of equipment and supplies. I think the difference between the Kursk Incursion being a Raid in Force vs a Offensive rests on the capture of Korenevo
This may also explain why Ukraine has brought a significant amount of air defense with them. If they are seeking to try and bust open a door into Kursk Oblast they need to defend the logistical hub and push Russian Aviation away and that logistical hub is Korenevo.
Essentially if they fail they can maintain their position. It's easy to defend and they can just continue to harass the Russians from a easily defendable position and at the same time maintain direct control or direct fire control over the Lgov-Belgorod railroad severing a key Russian GLOC for Task Group North while at the same time putting all kinds of logistical pressure on the city of Belgorod as well by forcing all rail traffic to go down a single line from Belgorod to Bulanets. which would be prone to OWA-UAV attack. So even if the ukrainians fail in busting a door open into Kursk they have the ability to just maintain position and put logistical strain on the Russian forces in Kharkiv and Belgorod and they would be able to withdraw whenever they want and maintain a narrative that it was just a raid.