🧵/ Link in the last post. There are increasing reports in Russia about conscripts being sent to Kursk for reinforcement after the Russian army failed to push back Ukrainian forces there. Together with @pustota, we decided to take a deeper look into this issue.
First of all, this is not the first case of using conscripts in combat during this war. The most infamous one dates back to June 2022. themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/07/rus…
Second, legally, Russia can send its conscripts to war after 4 months of service and proper training. However, what we (and other journalists) have found is that those conscripted in the spring and being sent to Kursk most had served less than 4 months.
The scale of what we see is unknown, but we shouldn’t overestimate it. We spoke with several relatives of conscripts, and here’s a map of the regions they’re being sent from (add Tyumen oblast here, the confirmation arrived after our piece was published ) t.me/iditelesom_hel…
A separate issue involves conscripts who were in Kursk already and were the first to face the Ukrainian offensive.
Many of them (unlike the lucky ones in the post above) survived and made it back to Kursk. Now they're being forced to sign contracts and return to the fight. There’s even a petition demanding that this stop. Surely, it will change Putin’s mind (not). change.org/p/%D0%BC%D0%B0…
We also found that not only conscripts from the 80th Arctic Motor Rifle Brigade in Murmansk oblast are being sent to Kursk, but those from the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (also Murmansk oblast) as well.
Interestingly, the 200th Brigade conscripts are scheduled to be sent to Kursk only in September, which among other things hints that Russia doesn’t expect a quick resolution to the Kursk issue.
Additionally, we learned that conscripts from the 15th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade near Samara are also being sent.
The NGO called 'Go Through The Forest,' which helps Russians avoid the army or even desert, confirms a spike in panic messages from relatives of conscripts. t.me/iditelesom_hel…
But what can those conscripts really do? Quickly become POWs if sent on a combat mission? Fill in the defensive trenches that are being dug by Russians in Kursk Oblast, 15 kilometers from the Kursk NPP? That too, but… (sat. imagery by @planet, coords in the bottom right corner)
…as @KofmanMichael puts it, they will probably also 'prepare fortifications and provide support to regular units, because Russia has been unable to stabilize the front in Kursk Oblast and has no reserves behind the units on the front line'.
But what about more combat-ready troops? Did Ukraine force Russia to redeploy them from Donbass or Kharkiv? There aren’t many signs of it, to be honest.
Let @Tatarigami_UA speak: 'While we observe some movements of units, such as the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, the core forces involved in the advances in Pokrovsk, Toretsk, or Chasiv Yar are still engaged in their operations'.
@Tatarigami_UA adds that interpreting messages about 'reinforcements' can be problematic. 'It’s quite common nowadays for both sides to redeploy portions of units, like a battalion or two...
...therefore, when we read reports indicating that Russia moved a certain unit because part of it was spotted and identified in Kursk, we need to be careful before jumping to conclusions, as it could be an undermanned battalion with 250 people or a brigade with 4,000.'
Also, let’s not forget that Russia has troops in the southern part of occupied Ukraine. Redeploying them to Kursk won’t significantly ease the situation on Pokrovsk axis or near Vovchans’k for Ukraine.
It’s still more unknowns in the battle in Kursk oblast than facts. How many conscripts or other reinforcements will be used by Russia depends on how the things will unfold in the next weeks.
For now, I recommend you follow our dynamic Kursk battle map here (last updated this afternoon) svoboda.org/a/33069581.html
Read the full story here (please Google Translate for your language). /ENDsmarturl.click/4keJY
Bonus post: a @severrealii article from August 10th, first revealing the fact that Russia redeployed at least some soldiers from Avdiivka to Kursk (Avdiivka is about 30 km behind the main battle front line though). severreal.org/a/budem-prevra…
Yet another confirmation that conscripts are being moved to Kursk to postpone the redeployment of more combat-ready troops.
I was happy to answer a few questions about the Russian conscripts being summoned in the Kursk Oblast on @KevinRothrock's 'Naked Pravda' podcast, together with @pustota. meduza.io/en/episodes/20…
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1/5 One of the Geran-2/Shahed-136 drones downed in Kyiv today had a catapult mount supplied by Chinese company less than 2 months ago, on 23rd of May. 46 days earlier, on April 9-11, the company, Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing, took part in the St. Petersburg Technical fair.
3/5 Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing was one of only two Chinese companies that took part in the St. Petersburg fair. The other one, Suzhou Hongyishan, specializes on 'standard and non-standard industrial parts, pneumatic and hydraulic components'. Neither of the 2 sanctioned.
Israel is really lucky that the Iranian rockets mostly hit modern apartment blocks for now. Bat Yam is something of an exception – that’s why there were so many casualties. But believe me, there are far more rundown apartment blocks in Bat Yam compared to the ones that were hit.
The pin marks where the modern apartment complex was hit in Petah Tikva last night. If the missiles had landed in the large red circle, it would have been a disaster. Around 50% of the buildings in such areas were built before the 1980s, with no protected rooms, thin walls, etc.
Just tap a random Street View to see for yourself. On the left: a building in Petah Tikva located a few kilometers from the modern one that was hit last night (on the right).
🧵Recently, Yandex blurred some additional military-related facilities on its satellite maps. It hasn't revealed any major surprises (yet), but it did lead me to yet another 'Pantsir' system installed in Moscow Oblast after Ukrainian drone attacks.
Some examples of the newly blurred objects (mostly military complex plants): x.com/wartranslated/… (source t.me/sotaproject/98…). I already found many more, but they're mostly well-known sites.
One well-known site that is now blurred is the missile storage facility for the A-135 (ABM-4 Gorgon), a Russian anti-ballistic missile system deployed around Moscow to intercept incoming warheads targeting the city and its surrounding areas. 55.625, 37.387 wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=5…
🧵1/6 As after every Ukrainian drone attack, my dynamic map of air defense systems installed in Moscow and the Moscow Oblast gains a few new entries, thanks to multiple enthusiasts like @jembobineuse and @Dmojavensis. The most recent addition is particularly interesting. 🔽
2/6 The 'Flakturm', identical to the one we saw earlier (that the shorter and taller sections are swapped), was constructed in Bulatnikovo near Moscow 1.5 years ago, in September 2023. 55.557090, 37.664654
1/3 Russian Maj. Gen. Jaroslav Moskalik, allegedly killed today near Moscow, took part in at least two Normandy Four format meetings: in 2015, when the infamous 'Steinmeier formula' was adopted, and on Dec. 9, 2019, when Volodymyr Zelensky met Putin in person for the first time.
2/3 Moskalik also took part in a visit by a Russian delegation to Damascus, where Putin’s special envoy Alexander Lavrentyev held talks with Syrian President Bashar Assad in 2018.
🧵A Russian diplomat, pressured to leave Brussels amid espionage allegations, has been nominated for a key role in the OSCE. Another 19 diplomats were expelled too, with open sources clearly showing their ties to Russian intelligence (and yes, they liked posting on Strava).
But first things first: meet Dmitry Iordanidi, a former deputy head of the @OSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina with deep experience in the Balkans, who was nominated by Moscow to lead the organization’s mission to Serbia.
Russia also nominated Iordanidi to head an OSCE program office in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, and for the same position in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana. I think that falls under the ‘flood the field’ tactic.