🧵/ Link in the last post. There are increasing reports in Russia about conscripts being sent to Kursk for reinforcement after the Russian army failed to push back Ukrainian forces there. Together with @pustota, we decided to take a deeper look into this issue.
First of all, this is not the first case of using conscripts in combat during this war. The most infamous one dates back to June 2022. themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/07/rus…
Second, legally, Russia can send its conscripts to war after 4 months of service and proper training. However, what we (and other journalists) have found is that those conscripted in the spring and being sent to Kursk most had served less than 4 months.
The scale of what we see is unknown, but we shouldn’t overestimate it. We spoke with several relatives of conscripts, and here’s a map of the regions they’re being sent from (add Tyumen oblast here, the confirmation arrived after our piece was published ) t.me/iditelesom_hel…
A separate issue involves conscripts who were in Kursk already and were the first to face the Ukrainian offensive.
Many of them (unlike the lucky ones in the post above) survived and made it back to Kursk. Now they're being forced to sign contracts and return to the fight. There’s even a petition demanding that this stop. Surely, it will change Putin’s mind (not). change.org/p/%D0%BC%D0%B0…
We also found that not only conscripts from the 80th Arctic Motor Rifle Brigade in Murmansk oblast are being sent to Kursk, but those from the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (also Murmansk oblast) as well.
Interestingly, the 200th Brigade conscripts are scheduled to be sent to Kursk only in September, which among other things hints that Russia doesn’t expect a quick resolution to the Kursk issue.
Additionally, we learned that conscripts from the 15th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade near Samara are also being sent.
The NGO called 'Go Through The Forest,' which helps Russians avoid the army or even desert, confirms a spike in panic messages from relatives of conscripts. t.me/iditelesom_hel…
But what can those conscripts really do? Quickly become POWs if sent on a combat mission? Fill in the defensive trenches that are being dug by Russians in Kursk Oblast, 15 kilometers from the Kursk NPP? That too, but… (sat. imagery by @planet, coords in the bottom right corner)
…as @KofmanMichael puts it, they will probably also 'prepare fortifications and provide support to regular units, because Russia has been unable to stabilize the front in Kursk Oblast and has no reserves behind the units on the front line'.
But what about more combat-ready troops? Did Ukraine force Russia to redeploy them from Donbass or Kharkiv? There aren’t many signs of it, to be honest.
Let @Tatarigami_UA speak: 'While we observe some movements of units, such as the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, the core forces involved in the advances in Pokrovsk, Toretsk, or Chasiv Yar are still engaged in their operations'.
@Tatarigami_UA adds that interpreting messages about 'reinforcements' can be problematic. 'It’s quite common nowadays for both sides to redeploy portions of units, like a battalion or two...
...therefore, when we read reports indicating that Russia moved a certain unit because part of it was spotted and identified in Kursk, we need to be careful before jumping to conclusions, as it could be an undermanned battalion with 250 people or a brigade with 4,000.'
Also, let’s not forget that Russia has troops in the southern part of occupied Ukraine. Redeploying them to Kursk won’t significantly ease the situation on Pokrovsk axis or near Vovchans’k for Ukraine.
It’s still more unknowns in the battle in Kursk oblast than facts. How many conscripts or other reinforcements will be used by Russia depends on how the things will unfold in the next weeks.
For now, I recommend you follow our dynamic Kursk battle map here (last updated this afternoon) svoboda.org/a/33069581.html
Read the full story here (please Google Translate for your language). /ENDsmarturl.click/4keJY
Bonus post: a @severrealii article from August 10th, first revealing the fact that Russia redeployed at least some soldiers from Avdiivka to Kursk (Avdiivka is about 30 km behind the main battle front line though). severreal.org/a/budem-prevra…
Yet another confirmation that conscripts are being moved to Kursk to postpone the redeployment of more combat-ready troops.
I was happy to answer a few questions about the Russian conscripts being summoned in the Kursk Oblast on @KevinRothrock's 'Naked Pravda' podcast, together with @pustota. meduza.io/en/episodes/20…
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🧵A Russian diplomat, pressured to leave Brussels amid espionage allegations, has been nominated for a key role in the OSCE. Another 19 diplomats were expelled too, with open sources clearly showing their ties to Russian intelligence (and yes, they liked posting on Strava).
But first things first: meet Dmitry Iordanidi, a former deputy head of the @OSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina with deep experience in the Balkans, who was nominated by Moscow to lead the organization’s mission to Serbia.
Russia also nominated Iordanidi to head an OSCE program office in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, and for the same position in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana. I think that falls under the ‘flood the field’ tactic.
🧵/ link in the last post. Remember Bosnian Serb Davor Savičić, who recruited Serbs to fight in Ukraine? Using a leaked database of Russian WIAs, we found he’s a GRU colonel with personal tag V-0001 ('V' for 'Волки' – 'Wolves' – as his battalion was named after his callsign).
It's well known that both 'private' military companies where Savičić fought, 'Wagner' & ‘Redut,’ were overseen by GRU (GU GSH). Previous investigations found several GRU staffers there, but it was never revealed that Savičić is a GRU colonel himself
Savičić got a shrapnel wound to his right shoulder on June 17, 2022. At that time, Russian forces were attempting to attack Severodonetsk, while the UAF were counterattacking near Izyum. The exact location where Savičić was wounded remains unknown.
🧵With my colleagues, we analyzed the Russian Main Military Medical Directorate's database on 166,000 hospitalizations in Russian MoD facilities (Jan 2022–June 2024). It's incomplete but offers insights into the Russian army's dynamics. svoboda.org/a/tysyach-rane…
First things first: THIS DATABASE SHOULD NOT BE USED TO ESTIMATE TOTALS. It doesn't have those hospitalized to civilian hospitals, very limited number of wounded in 'DNR' and 'LNR' hospitals, etc. Thanks to @MassDara and @Mortis_Banned for their comments on the data we studied.
Also, A LOT of soldiers stay for a day or 2 in a field hospital before being sent back to front. They DO NOT MAKE IT TO THIS DATABASE.
🧵/ Link in the last post. How much information can one get from a single blurred-out police video with the help of OSINT? Let’s find out together. No BS – we're talking 'possible precursors to chemical weapons or nerve agents' here, destined for Russia and seized in Spain.
Back in October 2024, Spanish police reported the seizure of 13 tons of 'chemical products' in the port of Barcelona, destined for Russia. It was claimed to be the result of a two-year-long special operation. 4 people were arrested. interior.gob.es/opencms/gl/det…
The operation was named 'Probirka' ('test tube' in Russian) and was carried out together with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as part of the enforcement of EU sanctions against Russia. anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/media-corner/n…
🧵Timur Praliev, arresred in the U.S. for illegally crossing the border from Mexico, received an official 'combat veteran ID' as a 'former Wagner fighter' less than a month ago, as we found together with @Mike_Eckel and @CarlSchreck.
A photo of Praliev receiving his veteran ID was posted on VK on Dec. 12th. The event took place in Bashkortostan: . We found Praliev's empty VK acc., which lists the same YOB as in the U.S. court docs (1993), and one of his friends confirmed that it is him.archive.is/jYw10
What puzzles me most about this story is the timing. On December 12th, Praliev receives his official Russian veteran ID as a 'former Wagner fighter.' By January 10th, Praliev is arrested with a drone in his backpack after crossing into the United States from Mexico. Insanely fast
1/2 Comparison of Dec. 5 and Dec. 10 HR @Planet satellite images of the Russian airbase in Al-Jufra, Libya, shows an Il-76 loading/unloading, as well as newly appeared objects which I hesitate to ID (maybe radars?)