THREAD: It seems that the potential retaliation by Iran and Hizbullah against Israel may hinge on the outcome of tomorrow's ceasefire talks in Doha. This connection has been indicated by multiple sources: Iran's UN envoy mentioned it last week, three Iranian officials conveyed this to Reuters yesterday, and today, Nabih Berri, the Lebanese parliament speaker and close Hizbullah ally, referred to the upcoming talks as "the last shot". 1/
However, given that Israel is more likely to scupper the talks, especially considering new demands it has reportedly added, and its longstanding aversion to a cease-fire, it's more probable that Iran and Hizbullah are merely engaging in a perfunctory exercise, ready to take action once these negotiations inevitably conclude without yielding any meaningful results. 2/
Iran and Hizbullah appear to be allowing this last ditch diplomatic attempt to run its course despite their recognition that these talks have been weaponised against the Resistance Axis: first, to buy Israel more time at the Palestinians' expense, and second, to delay or limit the expected retaliation from Iran and Hizbullah. 3/
But responding is an existential matter, particularly for Hizbullah. While longer term deterrence remains elusive, Hizbullah is seeking to restore immediate deterrence so that Israel doesn't expand its "phase 3" assassination campaign or its attrition-focused drone warfare strategy from Gaza into Beirut. As such, this delay will do little to blunt the intended impact of Hizbullah's and Iran's retaliatory strike(s). 4/
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THREAD: Forecasting the nature of Iran and Hizbullah's potential retaliation is challenging. It's unclear whether they will opt for a high-impact joint operation or a staggered offensive with overarching strategic alignment, designed to produce a cumulative impact. 1/
Putting aside logistical and tactical considerations related to Israel’s reaction time, target selection, and so on, the type of response will also be dictated by their perception of whether or not the US is seen as willing to restrain Israel in the aftermath of the counter-strikes and its overall willingness to enter a broader war. 2/
If there is high confidence in the US’ aversion to a wider war, then Iran and Hizbullah’s responses will be informed by the need to restore immediate deterrence that aims at preventing repeated targeted assassinations in Beirut and Iran. This would not require a coordinated or joint response, but could be achieved by each actor independently albeit sequentially. 3/
THREAD: How might Hizbullah and the Resistance Axis respond to Israel's new targeted shock and awe campaign, or what Nasrallah has called the "new phase" of the war? 1/
2/ An analysis of the possible retaliation will be shaped in large part by what the Axis believes Israel's aims are, and the extent of US support for these aims. In other words, whether Israel is simply trying to intimidate and coerce its enemies into submission with these very provocative assassinations, or if its trying to bait Hizbullah and Iran into a wider regional war with the aim of forcing the US to step in militarily. 2/
Given that their previous deterrence strategies are no longer effective, both Iran and Hizbullah have to go beyond their responses to the attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria and the assassination of al-Arouri, respectively. This entails an abandonment of their signature "sub-threshold" response, and the adoption of a vertical escalation strategy that crosses Israel's red lines forcefully, compelling it to redraw those lines and absorb the counter-strike(s), without triggering an all-out war. 3/
THREAD: It's highly unlikely Hizbullah was behind the Majdal Shams strike yesterday. This isn't just due to Hizbullah's unprecedented denial of responsibility for the attack, but stems from other factors as well. 1/
Since October 8, Hizbullah has refrained from targeting Israeli civilians, much less Syrian Druze. The strong support for the resistance movement among this community, which lives under Israeli occupation, makes it illogical for Hizbullah to risk striking in this vicinity. 2/
Hizbullah has not shied away in the past from admitting responsibility for rockets which have mistakenly landed on Palestinian areas. In one such incident in 2006, Hizbullah apologised for the error and Nasrallah personally offered condolences to the victims of the strike 3/
THREAD: Today appears to mark the beginning of a new stage in the war, evidenced by significant escalations from both the Houthis and Hizbullah, demonstrating a combination of horizontal and vertical escalation strategies and a further consolidation of the Resistance Axis' "unity of arenas" strategy. 1/
This joint escalation isn't solely a response to Israeli airstrikes against South Lebanon last night, which caused civilian casualties, but also appears to be a strategic response to Netanyahu's attempts to torpedo the cease-fire talks ahead of his visit to the US next week. It also comes against the backdrop of Israel's shift to "phase 3" of its Gaza operations, which is characterised by an intensification of targeted assassinations and aerial bombardment, that has resulted in 7 massacres this week alone. 2/
The Houthis have engaged in horizontal escalation by expanding their reach through an undetected drone attack on Tel Aviv, geographically widening the conflict zone. They simultaneously achieved a vertical escalation through the use of their newly unveiled Yafa drone with a 2000 km range, demonstrating a significant leap in their technological capabilities and operational reach. 3/
THREAD: It's hard to deny that Israel's assassination of Hizbullah commanders over the past 9 months affects the organisation, as today's killing of senior commander, Abu Nehme, likely will. But viewed from a historical and developmental perspective, this long-standing policy has paradoxically only enhanced Hizbullah's capabilities, effectiveness and size 1/
The assassinations of Hamas' Yehya Ayyash in 1996, IJ's Fathi Shikaki in 1995, and Hizbullah's Imad Mughnieh in 2008, along with many others like them, has not only failed to weaken or slow down the growth of these organisations, but has had the opposite effect, as demonstrated by their military prowess and fast-growing number of fighters 2/
Israel's assassination campaign in this current war has also failed to deter attacks against its forces and only serves to invite further escalation and qualitative strikes against its military bases and outposts. Rather than demonstrate its supremacy and lower morale, each assassination only emphasises the need for this threat to be neutralised. As such, the only morale Israel has weakened is that of its own troops 3/
THREAD: While the likelihood of an Israeli offensive against Lebanon in the coming weeks remains uncertain, what's clearer is that Israel's threats of attack, coupled with US pledges of support, are part of a coordinated media strategy to pressure and intimidate Hizbullah 1/
The US and Israel hope that a planned scaling down to a less intense "phase 3" operation in Gaza will create a diplomatic "off-ramp" that encourages Hizbullah to stop it attacks. Media-channeled warnings aim to pressure Hizbullah towards embracing this diplomatic "solution" 2/
But it's very unlikely that Hizbullah would agree to close its solidarity front without a cease-fire. This condition for ending attacks has been Hizbullah's consistent stance for the past 9 months. Given that Nasrallah has repeatedly tied Hizbullah's attacks to Hamas' fate on the battlefront, its improbable that Hizbullah will abandon its ally while Israel continues to wage war against it 3/