Weaponising Demographics - a deep dive into the democratic time-bomb in Russia, the targeting of democratic minorities and the commissioning of war crimes using forced population migration into occupied territories of Ukraine.
This is another long thread, consider listening to the audio narration I always include for my visually impaired. The link to the audio version is in the reply to the last tweet in this thread. Great segment to listen to while commuting or multi-tasking!
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated Russia’s daunting demographic crisis.
Though Putin has spoken frequently about Russia’s demographic problems since the early 2000s, scattered and ineffectual policy since then has failed to recognize Russia’s new demographic reality—ensuring that for generations to come, Russia’s population will be smaller, older, and less well-educated.
Despite spending trillions of rubles on high-profile “national projects” to remedy the situation, population decline continued. Putin’s choice of timing for military aggression in Ukraine might have reflected an understanding that Russia’s demographic (and economic) situation would not improve in the next two decades.
However, the war is turning a growing crisis into a catastrophe.
The demographic consequences from the Russian war against Ukraine, like those from World War II and the health, birth rate and life expectancy impact from Russia’s protracted transition in the 1990s, will echo for generations.
Russia’s population will decline for the rest of the twenty-first century, and ethnic Russians will be a smaller proportion of that population. The ethnic and religious groups that embrace the “traditional family values” Putin favors are predominantly non-Russian.
United Nations scenarios project Russia’s population in 2100 to be between 74 million and 112 million compared with the current 146 million. The most recent UN projections are for the world’s population to decline by about 20 percent by 2100. The estimate for Russia is a decline of 25 to 50 percent.
While Russia is hardly unique in facing declining birth rates and an aging population, high adult mortality, and infertility among both men and women, increasingly limited immigration and continuing brain drain make Russia’s situation particularly challenging.
Population size is determined by a combination of natural factors—birth rates and life expectancy, along with the emigration-immigration balance. Putin’s war on Ukraine has undermined all the potential sources of population growth.
1/9
Next 👉 War time demographics time bomb
This is another long thread, consider listening to the audio narration I always include for my visually impaired. The link to the audio version is in the reply to the last tweet in this thread. Great segment to listen to while commuting or multi-tasking!
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated Russia’s daunting demographic crisis.
Though Putin has spoken frequently about Russia’s demographic problems since the early 2000s, scattered and ineffectual policy since then has failed to recognize Russia’s new demographic reality—ensuring that for generations to come, Russia’s population will be smaller, older, and less well-educated.
Despite spending trillions of rubles on high-profile “national projects” to remedy the situation, population decline continued. Putin’s choice of timing for military aggression in Ukraine might have reflected an understanding that Russia’s demographic (and economic) situation would not improve in the next two decades.
However, the war is turning a growing crisis into a catastrophe.
The demographic consequences from the Russian war against Ukraine, like those from World War II and the health, birth rate and life expectancy impact from Russia’s protracted transition in the 1990s, will echo for generations.
Russia’s population will decline for the rest of the twenty-first century, and ethnic Russians will be a smaller proportion of that population. The ethnic and religious groups that embrace the “traditional family values” Putin favors are predominantly non-Russian.
United Nations scenarios project Russia’s population in 2100 to be between 74 million and 112 million compared with the current 146 million. The most recent UN projections are for the world’s population to decline by about 20 percent by 2100. The estimate for Russia is a decline of 25 to 50 percent.
While Russia is hardly unique in facing declining birth rates and an aging population, high adult mortality, and infertility among both men and women, increasingly limited immigration and continuing brain drain make Russia’s situation particularly challenging.
Population size is determined by a combination of natural factors—birth rates and life expectancy, along with the emigration-immigration balance. Putin’s war on Ukraine has undermined all the potential sources of population growth.
1/9
Next 👉 War time demographics time bomb
👉 War time demographics time bomb
Russia’s natural population growth has been curtailed by mobilization, casualties, emigration, and widespread reluctance to have children. Illegally annexing Crimea added 2.4 million people to Russia’s population, but significantly reduced immigration from Ukraine and Moldova.
After 2014, labor migration to Russia was limited to five countries in Central Asia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stalled, the Kremlin has consistently needed more troops, forcing increasing numbers of these workers into military service.
Offering high salaries has attracted mercenaries from Cuba, Syria and elsewhere, but devious tactics have discouraged many labor migrants. In 2023, half of Russia’s labor migrants came from Tajikistan.
The Crocus City Hall terror attack in March 2024, which Russian law enforcement alleges was carried out by Tajiks, is curtailing this pipeline. Tajiks have been rounded up for deportation and subjected to physical violence. Efforts to develop new sources of labor migration from Southeast Asia have been undermined by Russia continuing to send labor migrants to Ukraine.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine also provoked another large exodus of Russians from Russia. Some families had their bags packed and were ready to leave when Russian troops crossed the border in February 2022. Mobilization in September 2022 caused an additional exodus, primarily by young men. Many information technology (IT) specialists left, believing they could continue to work while abroad.
Emigration by hundreds of thousands of young men, and an unknown number of young women, is reducing the already small cohort of Russians in prime reproductive years. Hundreds of thousands of men being sent to serve in Ukraine further limits reproductive potential.
Russian women have increasingly opted to avoid pregnancy in the face of economic difficulties and growing uncertainty. In the first half of 2023, a record number of Russians applied for passports for travel abroad “just in case” (na vsyaki sluchi).
The regime has responded with efforts to prevent abortion and limit birth control. This comes at a time when abortions are less frequent. Some Russian women are choosing sterilization instead.
This represents an ironic shift from the Soviet-era legacy of many women being unable to have children due to multiple abortions. Births in 2023 reflected the lowest fertility rate in the past two or three centuries.
The declining value of the ruble and raids on immigrant communities to conscript workers to fight in Ukraine have reduced the number of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. The number willing to become paid mercenaries is limited.
Russia’s leadership apparently did not anticipate the need to recruit additional soldiers for a protracted war in 2022. Doing so now represents a serious challenge. Data in 2015 indicated that Russians were pleased that Crimea was under Russian control.
However, fewer than 20 percent of Russians surveyed thought their government should spend large sums to rebuild occupied areas of Ukraine, especially the Donbas region. Fewer than 10 percent said it was worth risking Russian lives to keep these territories.
The Russian government’s polling consistently reports approval for the war as high as 70–80 percent. Some Western analysts accept these numbers, and some have commissioned their own polling that confirms strong support for the war. Others are dubious, reporting data similar to those of 2015, when respondents were asked about financing reconstruction or the need to suffer casualties.
2/9
Next 👉 The effects on mobilisation
Russia’s natural population growth has been curtailed by mobilization, casualties, emigration, and widespread reluctance to have children. Illegally annexing Crimea added 2.4 million people to Russia’s population, but significantly reduced immigration from Ukraine and Moldova.
After 2014, labor migration to Russia was limited to five countries in Central Asia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stalled, the Kremlin has consistently needed more troops, forcing increasing numbers of these workers into military service.
Offering high salaries has attracted mercenaries from Cuba, Syria and elsewhere, but devious tactics have discouraged many labor migrants. In 2023, half of Russia’s labor migrants came from Tajikistan.
The Crocus City Hall terror attack in March 2024, which Russian law enforcement alleges was carried out by Tajiks, is curtailing this pipeline. Tajiks have been rounded up for deportation and subjected to physical violence. Efforts to develop new sources of labor migration from Southeast Asia have been undermined by Russia continuing to send labor migrants to Ukraine.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine also provoked another large exodus of Russians from Russia. Some families had their bags packed and were ready to leave when Russian troops crossed the border in February 2022. Mobilization in September 2022 caused an additional exodus, primarily by young men. Many information technology (IT) specialists left, believing they could continue to work while abroad.
Emigration by hundreds of thousands of young men, and an unknown number of young women, is reducing the already small cohort of Russians in prime reproductive years. Hundreds of thousands of men being sent to serve in Ukraine further limits reproductive potential.
Russian women have increasingly opted to avoid pregnancy in the face of economic difficulties and growing uncertainty. In the first half of 2023, a record number of Russians applied for passports for travel abroad “just in case” (na vsyaki sluchi).
The regime has responded with efforts to prevent abortion and limit birth control. This comes at a time when abortions are less frequent. Some Russian women are choosing sterilization instead.
This represents an ironic shift from the Soviet-era legacy of many women being unable to have children due to multiple abortions. Births in 2023 reflected the lowest fertility rate in the past two or three centuries.
The declining value of the ruble and raids on immigrant communities to conscript workers to fight in Ukraine have reduced the number of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. The number willing to become paid mercenaries is limited.
Russia’s leadership apparently did not anticipate the need to recruit additional soldiers for a protracted war in 2022. Doing so now represents a serious challenge. Data in 2015 indicated that Russians were pleased that Crimea was under Russian control.
However, fewer than 20 percent of Russians surveyed thought their government should spend large sums to rebuild occupied areas of Ukraine, especially the Donbas region. Fewer than 10 percent said it was worth risking Russian lives to keep these territories.
The Russian government’s polling consistently reports approval for the war as high as 70–80 percent. Some Western analysts accept these numbers, and some have commissioned their own polling that confirms strong support for the war. Others are dubious, reporting data similar to those of 2015, when respondents were asked about financing reconstruction or the need to suffer casualties.
2/9
Next 👉 The effects on mobilisation
👉 The effects on mobilisation:
One indication that Russia’s leadership understands the problem of sending Russians to fight in Ukraine is an increasingly desperate and shortsighted attempt to find alternatives to mobilizing more Russians.
After the February 2022 invasion provoked a large exodus of Russians of all ages, the “partial” mobilization conducted in September 2022 resulted in tens of thousands more, primarily young men, leaving the country.
No one has precise data, and many of these Russian citizens have moved on from their initial refuge. If seven hundred thousand Russians now registered as living in Dubai is any indication, the émigrés may number far more than one million.
The people mobilized are overwhelmingly from low-income rural and non-Russian regions. Stories have emerged about recruits needing to provide their own equipment, including bandages in case of injury. Some received less than a week of training before being sent into combat.
These conditions confirm the belief that the authorities view them as expendable cannon fodder. The result is widespread efforts to evade serving.
In an attempt to reduce the need for mobilization, other tactics were developed. Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the paramilitary Wagner Group, toured Russian prisons to offer convicts the opportunity to serve six months in Ukraine in return for presidential pardons.
Tens of thousands took him up on the offer and died at the front. Survivors have returned to Russia, with some resuming their criminal activity, including rape and murder.
Prigozhin perished when his plane was shot down a few months after he staged an aborted march to Moscow to convince Putin to fire military commanders the Wagner leader deemed incompetent. But his program lives on, and recent reports indicate it is being expanded to include female prisoners.
Ironically, while the convicts who survive their six-month contracts have been allowed to return home, Russians who have been fighting for two years or more are still on active duty.
Their families are furious. One of the few significant protest groups left in Russia, “the Council of Wives and Mothers,” that has protested the length of time their husbands and sons have been forced to serve, was declared a foreign agent in July 2023 in an effort by Putin to stifle public awareness of the treatment of soldiers and overall casualties in the war.
Despite major recruitment efforts, Russia is not experiencing a major influx of new immigrants or returning compatriots. The full-scale war has further limited the already diminishing prospects of inducing a large share of the 30 million Russians living outside of Russia to return home.
In 2006, Putin signed a decree establishing a program to encourage Russians to return, and some eight hundred thousand did so between 2006 and 2018. The number of both applications and returns declined in 2020 due to COVID-19.
The numbers recovered slightly in 2021 but declined after the start of the full-scale war in 2022. In 2023 the number applying to return was the lowest in a decade. The number who did return dropped below the 2020 COVID-19 level:
3/9
Next 👉 The Crimea demographic skewer template
One indication that Russia’s leadership understands the problem of sending Russians to fight in Ukraine is an increasingly desperate and shortsighted attempt to find alternatives to mobilizing more Russians.
After the February 2022 invasion provoked a large exodus of Russians of all ages, the “partial” mobilization conducted in September 2022 resulted in tens of thousands more, primarily young men, leaving the country.
No one has precise data, and many of these Russian citizens have moved on from their initial refuge. If seven hundred thousand Russians now registered as living in Dubai is any indication, the émigrés may number far more than one million.
The people mobilized are overwhelmingly from low-income rural and non-Russian regions. Stories have emerged about recruits needing to provide their own equipment, including bandages in case of injury. Some received less than a week of training before being sent into combat.
These conditions confirm the belief that the authorities view them as expendable cannon fodder. The result is widespread efforts to evade serving.
In an attempt to reduce the need for mobilization, other tactics were developed. Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the paramilitary Wagner Group, toured Russian prisons to offer convicts the opportunity to serve six months in Ukraine in return for presidential pardons.
Tens of thousands took him up on the offer and died at the front. Survivors have returned to Russia, with some resuming their criminal activity, including rape and murder.
Prigozhin perished when his plane was shot down a few months after he staged an aborted march to Moscow to convince Putin to fire military commanders the Wagner leader deemed incompetent. But his program lives on, and recent reports indicate it is being expanded to include female prisoners.
Ironically, while the convicts who survive their six-month contracts have been allowed to return home, Russians who have been fighting for two years or more are still on active duty.
Their families are furious. One of the few significant protest groups left in Russia, “the Council of Wives and Mothers,” that has protested the length of time their husbands and sons have been forced to serve, was declared a foreign agent in July 2023 in an effort by Putin to stifle public awareness of the treatment of soldiers and overall casualties in the war.
Despite major recruitment efforts, Russia is not experiencing a major influx of new immigrants or returning compatriots. The full-scale war has further limited the already diminishing prospects of inducing a large share of the 30 million Russians living outside of Russia to return home.
In 2006, Putin signed a decree establishing a program to encourage Russians to return, and some eight hundred thousand did so between 2006 and 2018. The number of both applications and returns declined in 2020 due to COVID-19.
The numbers recovered slightly in 2021 but declined after the start of the full-scale war in 2022. In 2023 the number applying to return was the lowest in a decade. The number who did return dropped below the 2020 COVID-19 level:
3/9
Next 👉 The Crimea demographic skewer template
The Crimea demographic skewer template
Since illegally annexing Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, Russia has been forcibly shifting the region’s demographic composition and trying to replace the native Crimean population with its own loyal citizens.
Moreover, these transformative migration flows enable the occupying authorities to create a Trojan Horse against any future efforts by Kyiv to return the peninsula to its control.
The saturation of Crimea with siloviki and military personnel is also done intentionally, helping further militarize the region and populate Crimea with trusted armed people. Since the occupation of Crimea 10 years ago, Russia has sought to change the peninsula’s ethnic makeup and suppress the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities.
The imposition of Russian Federation citizenship on residents of Crimea (nearly all residents of the peninsula had Russian citizenship less than a year after the annexation), forced deportations, the unlawful conscription of local men into the Russian military, persecutions and imprisonments of pro-Ukrainian activists who stand against the occupation, repressions against the Ukrainian Church, as well as closures of Ukrainian schools triggered a mass departure of Ukrainians (including Crimean Tatars) from Crimea.
According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, almost 48,000 people left the peninsula for Ukraine during the last seven years (Krymr. com, January 6, 2021). The number of those who moved to other countries may be higher.
At the same time, Russia has been actively trying to increase the size of its “loyal” population by promoting and encouraging the in-migration of its citizens to Crimea. According to the Office of the Federal State Statistics Service in Crimea and Sevastopol, since 2014, 205,559 Russians moved to Crimea, of whom 88,445 settled in Sevastopol (Crimeahrg. org, January 6).
As of January 2021, the population of Sevastopol was 513,149 (Goroda Rossii, accessed March 14). Ukrainian authorities from the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories and representatives of the Crimean Human Rights Group believe the real figures of such new settlers are much greater (Informator. ua, January 6).
A large number of military personnel, employees of the federal government, local and federal executive branch agencies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Investigative Committee, the Customs Service, prosecutor’s offices, the Border Service, the National Guard, the Tax Service, the Treasury, the Pension Fund), and members of their families are moving to Crimea without changing their permanent registration in Russian passports (because of the fear of being sanctioned), and thus they are not included in official statistics.
Russian official statistics include only those who registered their place of residence in Crimea. The joint “Monitoring Group” of BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies suggests that the real number of migrants who came to Crimea may be between 800,000 and 1 million people (BlackSeaNews, August 29, 2020).
“Russia has systematically sought to eradicate Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar identities by disrupting, restricting or banning the use of Ukrainian and Crimean Tartar languages in education, media, national celebrations and other spheres of life, and oppressing religious and cultural practices that do not conform to those endorsed by Moscow.
It has also forcibly transferred population out of Crimea and transferred the Russian civilian population in,” said Patrick Thompson, Amnesty International’s Ukraine Researcher.
Russia must end its practices of suppression and eradication of non-Russian identities in the territories it occupies and stop its violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
4/9
Next 👉 The practices of Putin’s suppresion
Since illegally annexing Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, Russia has been forcibly shifting the region’s demographic composition and trying to replace the native Crimean population with its own loyal citizens.
Moreover, these transformative migration flows enable the occupying authorities to create a Trojan Horse against any future efforts by Kyiv to return the peninsula to its control.
The saturation of Crimea with siloviki and military personnel is also done intentionally, helping further militarize the region and populate Crimea with trusted armed people. Since the occupation of Crimea 10 years ago, Russia has sought to change the peninsula’s ethnic makeup and suppress the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities.
The imposition of Russian Federation citizenship on residents of Crimea (nearly all residents of the peninsula had Russian citizenship less than a year after the annexation), forced deportations, the unlawful conscription of local men into the Russian military, persecutions and imprisonments of pro-Ukrainian activists who stand against the occupation, repressions against the Ukrainian Church, as well as closures of Ukrainian schools triggered a mass departure of Ukrainians (including Crimean Tatars) from Crimea.
According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, almost 48,000 people left the peninsula for Ukraine during the last seven years (Krymr. com, January 6, 2021). The number of those who moved to other countries may be higher.
At the same time, Russia has been actively trying to increase the size of its “loyal” population by promoting and encouraging the in-migration of its citizens to Crimea. According to the Office of the Federal State Statistics Service in Crimea and Sevastopol, since 2014, 205,559 Russians moved to Crimea, of whom 88,445 settled in Sevastopol (Crimeahrg. org, January 6).
As of January 2021, the population of Sevastopol was 513,149 (Goroda Rossii, accessed March 14). Ukrainian authorities from the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories and representatives of the Crimean Human Rights Group believe the real figures of such new settlers are much greater (Informator. ua, January 6).
A large number of military personnel, employees of the federal government, local and federal executive branch agencies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Investigative Committee, the Customs Service, prosecutor’s offices, the Border Service, the National Guard, the Tax Service, the Treasury, the Pension Fund), and members of their families are moving to Crimea without changing their permanent registration in Russian passports (because of the fear of being sanctioned), and thus they are not included in official statistics.
Russian official statistics include only those who registered their place of residence in Crimea. The joint “Monitoring Group” of BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies suggests that the real number of migrants who came to Crimea may be between 800,000 and 1 million people (BlackSeaNews, August 29, 2020).
“Russia has systematically sought to eradicate Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar identities by disrupting, restricting or banning the use of Ukrainian and Crimean Tartar languages in education, media, national celebrations and other spheres of life, and oppressing religious and cultural practices that do not conform to those endorsed by Moscow.
It has also forcibly transferred population out of Crimea and transferred the Russian civilian population in,” said Patrick Thompson, Amnesty International’s Ukraine Researcher.
Russia must end its practices of suppression and eradication of non-Russian identities in the territories it occupies and stop its violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
4/9
Next 👉 The practices of Putin’s suppresion
👉 The practices of Putin’s suppresion:
🚫 Culture, Language and Identity
Russia has attempted to legitimize its occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea by introducing policies that aim to suppress non-Russian identities throughout the peninsula.
Immediately after the annexation, Russia imposed its own school curriculum in Crimea resulting in indoctrination and threats of reprisals against teachers, students and parents who objected. At the same time the Russian authorities have been systematically dismantling Ukrainian language education.
This has come on top of the illegal imposition of Russian laws and practices, including suppression of the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and of cultural events and religious practices.
It looks like this is Russia’s blueprint for the other Ukrainian territories it has occupied.”
🚫 Religious freedoms crushed
Russia has severely restricted the right to freedom of religion and belief in Crimea, including the introduction of legislation according to which praying, preaching or disseminating religious materials outside specifically designated places or without an official permission a punishable offence.
As of 2023, dozens of administrative cases have been brought against individuals for “illegal” missionary activity, and in more than 50 those targeted paid hefty fines for these “violations”, according to information from freedom of religion watchdog Forum 18.
Crimea’s Muslim population, the majority of whom are Crimean Tatars, have faced severe reprisals. Russian law enforcement agencies have, on repeated occasions, disrupted Friday prayers in Crimean mosques by carrying out passport checks of all those present. Targeting mostly Crimean Tatars, Russian authorities have also carried out house searches looking for religious literature.
More than 100 Crimean Muslims have been prosecuted on unfounded terrorism-related charges and given prison sentences of up to 24 years, which they are serving in Russia.
In April 2017, the Russian Supreme Court designated Jehovah’s Witnesses “extremist” and banned the religion in Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea, following which all 22 of their congregations in Crimea were de-registered, affecting an estimated 8,000 believers. At least 12 Crimean Jehovah’s Witnesses have been sentenced to six years in prison or more solely for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (after 2018, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine) refused to re-register as a religious organization under Russian law. Several of its clergy refused to take Russian passports and were forced to leave Crimea.
By the first year of the occupation it had lost 38 of its 46 parishes, and all of them by now. In May 2023, the de facto authorities unlawfully evicted it from its cathedral in the regional capital Simferopol.
5/9
Next 👉 Restricting the media, and social media
🚫 Culture, Language and Identity
Russia has attempted to legitimize its occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea by introducing policies that aim to suppress non-Russian identities throughout the peninsula.
Immediately after the annexation, Russia imposed its own school curriculum in Crimea resulting in indoctrination and threats of reprisals against teachers, students and parents who objected. At the same time the Russian authorities have been systematically dismantling Ukrainian language education.
This has come on top of the illegal imposition of Russian laws and practices, including suppression of the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and of cultural events and religious practices.
It looks like this is Russia’s blueprint for the other Ukrainian territories it has occupied.”
🚫 Religious freedoms crushed
Russia has severely restricted the right to freedom of religion and belief in Crimea, including the introduction of legislation according to which praying, preaching or disseminating religious materials outside specifically designated places or without an official permission a punishable offence.
As of 2023, dozens of administrative cases have been brought against individuals for “illegal” missionary activity, and in more than 50 those targeted paid hefty fines for these “violations”, according to information from freedom of religion watchdog Forum 18.
Crimea’s Muslim population, the majority of whom are Crimean Tatars, have faced severe reprisals. Russian law enforcement agencies have, on repeated occasions, disrupted Friday prayers in Crimean mosques by carrying out passport checks of all those present. Targeting mostly Crimean Tatars, Russian authorities have also carried out house searches looking for religious literature.
More than 100 Crimean Muslims have been prosecuted on unfounded terrorism-related charges and given prison sentences of up to 24 years, which they are serving in Russia.
In April 2017, the Russian Supreme Court designated Jehovah’s Witnesses “extremist” and banned the religion in Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea, following which all 22 of their congregations in Crimea were de-registered, affecting an estimated 8,000 believers. At least 12 Crimean Jehovah’s Witnesses have been sentenced to six years in prison or more solely for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (after 2018, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine) refused to re-register as a religious organization under Russian law. Several of its clergy refused to take Russian passports and were forced to leave Crimea.
By the first year of the occupation it had lost 38 of its 46 parishes, and all of them by now. In May 2023, the de facto authorities unlawfully evicted it from its cathedral in the regional capital Simferopol.
5/9
Next 👉 Restricting the media, and social media
🚫 Restricting the media, and social media.
Independent media and journalists have been targeted by the occupying authorities. Several journalists were abducted by pro-Russian paramilitaries already in the first days of occupation, as part of a campaign of violence which targeted pro-Ukrainian activists.
As early as March 2014, Ukrainian language television and radio channels were taken off air and replaced by Russian media. Following the annexation, Russia mandated that all media outlets in Crimea should re-register in accordance with Russian legislation within 10 months, and warned against “provocative acts.”
Crimean Tatar-language outlets have been targeted, with the popular ATR TV channel and others having their requests for registration rejected.
On 26 January 2015, dozens of masked men stormed the ATR offices and removed their computer servers.
Editors told Amnesty International that they had received unofficial warnings over the phone from influential individuals in response to some of its coverage of events affecting the Crimean Tatar community. ATR was eventually forced to relocate to mainland Ukraine and lost its ability to broadcast into Crimea.
Access to online media that have been exiled from Crimea has been arbitrarily blocked in Crimea, without any judicial authorisation.
Russia must immediately stop all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Crimea, and other Ukrainian territories it occupies.
All those responsible for all crimes under international law must be brought to justice in fair trial proceedings, while victims of these crimes should be able to fully realize their rights to truth, justice, and reparations.
6/9
Next 👉 Putins Crimean Playbook
Independent media and journalists have been targeted by the occupying authorities. Several journalists were abducted by pro-Russian paramilitaries already in the first days of occupation, as part of a campaign of violence which targeted pro-Ukrainian activists.
As early as March 2014, Ukrainian language television and radio channels were taken off air and replaced by Russian media. Following the annexation, Russia mandated that all media outlets in Crimea should re-register in accordance with Russian legislation within 10 months, and warned against “provocative acts.”
Crimean Tatar-language outlets have been targeted, with the popular ATR TV channel and others having their requests for registration rejected.
On 26 January 2015, dozens of masked men stormed the ATR offices and removed their computer servers.
Editors told Amnesty International that they had received unofficial warnings over the phone from influential individuals in response to some of its coverage of events affecting the Crimean Tatar community. ATR was eventually forced to relocate to mainland Ukraine and lost its ability to broadcast into Crimea.
Access to online media that have been exiled from Crimea has been arbitrarily blocked in Crimea, without any judicial authorisation.
Russia must immediately stop all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Crimea, and other Ukrainian territories it occupies.
All those responsible for all crimes under international law must be brought to justice in fair trial proceedings, while victims of these crimes should be able to fully realize their rights to truth, justice, and reparations.
6/9
Next 👉 Putins Crimean Playbook
👉 Putins Crimean Playbook: A template for demographic support alignment, to the Kremlin
Putin’s Decree No. 201 came into effect on March 20, 2021. The executive edict adds Crimea and Sevastopol to “the list of Russia’s border territories where foreign citizens, stateless persons, and foreign legal entities cannot own land.”
As such, non-Russians, including Ukrainian citizens who still reside in occupied Crimea but who refused to obtain a Russian passport, can now be stripped of their property.
One year ago, Putin imposed a ban on land ownership in Crimea, thereby legitimizing the state’s appropriation of Ukrainian government assets and private property there.
Foreign citizens legally had one year to sell or re-register their property based in Crimea; but Russia, under the pretext of anti-pandemic restrictions, significantly limited outside access to Crimea, especially for those trying to enter the peninsula from Ukraine (Krymr. com, March 11).
Decree No. 201 is not only a violation of Ukrainian legislation (Crimea remains overwhelmingly recognized as de jure part of Ukraine) and international humanitarian law, but also represents another illegal step forward for Russia’s recolonization strategy in Crimea.
The Russian authorities are trying to clear the occupied territory of “disloyal” residents and to erect a kind of “iron curtain” between Crimea and Ukraine.
Since 2014, Russia has been employing traditional Soviet resettlement practices and forcibly changing the demographic composition of the population in Crimea.
The imposition of Russian Federation citizenship on residents of Crimea (nearly all residents of the peninsula had Russian citizenship less than a year after the annexation), forced deportations, the unlawful conscription of local men into the Russian military, persecutions and imprisonments of pro-Ukrainian activists who stand against the occupation, repressions against the Ukrainian Church, as well as closures of Ukrainian schools triggered a mass departure of Ukrainians (including Crimean Tatars) from Crimea.
According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, almost 48,000 people left the peninsula for Ukraine during the last seven years (Krymr. com, January 6, 2021). The number of those who moved to other countries may be higher.
At the same time, Russia has been actively trying to increase the size of its “loyal” population by promoting and encouraging the in-migration of its citizens to Crimea. According to the Office of the Federal State Statistics Service in Crimea and Sevastopol, since 2014, 205,559 Russians moved to Crimea, of whom 88,445 settled in Sevastopol (Crimeahrg. org, January 6).
As of January 2021, the population of Sevastopol was 513,149 (Goroda Rossii, accessed March 14). Ukrainian authorities from the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories and representatives of the Crimean Human Rights Group believe the real figures of such new settlers are much greater (Informator. ua, January 6).
A large number of military personnel, employees of the federal government, local and federal executive branch agencies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Investigative Committee, the Customs Service, prosecutor’s offices, the Border Service, the National Guard, the Tax Service, the Treasury, the Pension Fund), and members of their families are moving to Crimea without changing their permanent registration in Russian passports (because of the fear of being sanctioned), and thus they are not included in official statistics.
Russian official statistics include only those who registered their place of residence in Crimea.
7/9
Next 👉 Contd..
Putin’s Decree No. 201 came into effect on March 20, 2021. The executive edict adds Crimea and Sevastopol to “the list of Russia’s border territories where foreign citizens, stateless persons, and foreign legal entities cannot own land.”
As such, non-Russians, including Ukrainian citizens who still reside in occupied Crimea but who refused to obtain a Russian passport, can now be stripped of their property.
One year ago, Putin imposed a ban on land ownership in Crimea, thereby legitimizing the state’s appropriation of Ukrainian government assets and private property there.
Foreign citizens legally had one year to sell or re-register their property based in Crimea; but Russia, under the pretext of anti-pandemic restrictions, significantly limited outside access to Crimea, especially for those trying to enter the peninsula from Ukraine (Krymr. com, March 11).
Decree No. 201 is not only a violation of Ukrainian legislation (Crimea remains overwhelmingly recognized as de jure part of Ukraine) and international humanitarian law, but also represents another illegal step forward for Russia’s recolonization strategy in Crimea.
The Russian authorities are trying to clear the occupied territory of “disloyal” residents and to erect a kind of “iron curtain” between Crimea and Ukraine.
Since 2014, Russia has been employing traditional Soviet resettlement practices and forcibly changing the demographic composition of the population in Crimea.
The imposition of Russian Federation citizenship on residents of Crimea (nearly all residents of the peninsula had Russian citizenship less than a year after the annexation), forced deportations, the unlawful conscription of local men into the Russian military, persecutions and imprisonments of pro-Ukrainian activists who stand against the occupation, repressions against the Ukrainian Church, as well as closures of Ukrainian schools triggered a mass departure of Ukrainians (including Crimean Tatars) from Crimea.
According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, almost 48,000 people left the peninsula for Ukraine during the last seven years (Krymr. com, January 6, 2021). The number of those who moved to other countries may be higher.
At the same time, Russia has been actively trying to increase the size of its “loyal” population by promoting and encouraging the in-migration of its citizens to Crimea. According to the Office of the Federal State Statistics Service in Crimea and Sevastopol, since 2014, 205,559 Russians moved to Crimea, of whom 88,445 settled in Sevastopol (Crimeahrg. org, January 6).
As of January 2021, the population of Sevastopol was 513,149 (Goroda Rossii, accessed March 14). Ukrainian authorities from the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories and representatives of the Crimean Human Rights Group believe the real figures of such new settlers are much greater (Informator. ua, January 6).
A large number of military personnel, employees of the federal government, local and federal executive branch agencies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Investigative Committee, the Customs Service, prosecutor’s offices, the Border Service, the National Guard, the Tax Service, the Treasury, the Pension Fund), and members of their families are moving to Crimea without changing their permanent registration in Russian passports (because of the fear of being sanctioned), and thus they are not included in official statistics.
Russian official statistics include only those who registered their place of residence in Crimea.
7/9
Next 👉 Contd..
The joint “Monitoring Group” of BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies suggests that the real number of migrants who came to Crimea may be between 800,000 and 1 million people (BlackSeaNews, August 29, 2020).
Refat Chubarov, a politician and leader of the Crimean Tatar national movement, stated a few years ago that during the period of annexation, new or expanded military towns appeared in Dzhankoi, Saki, Yevpatoria and Sevastopol (Radio Svoboda, May 28, 2018).
According to Gayan Yuksel, a member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, the Russian government launched a special resettlement program for siloviki (security services personnel). They reportedly receive a one-time payment of $30,000 to move their families to Crimea (Espreso. tv, March 17, 2019).
Additionally, Russian retirees from Moscow, the High North, Siberia and other wealthy areas have been actively buying up real estate in Crimea. The Simferopol-based Russian National Commercial Bank considers Siberians a key target audience for the development of real estate mortgage programs in Crimea.
The bank initiated a large-scale remote mortgage program in Siberia. Buyers from Krasnoyarsk will be able to make a real estate purchase in Crimea and obtain a mortgage remotely (Krymr. com, January 25, 2019).
Individuals from the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” (LPR, DPR) have also contributed to migration flows into Crimea. Prior to the annexation, many Ukrainians from these eastern provinces had already invested in the Crimean real estate market.
In Russian official statistics, they are presently indicated as “migrants from CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries.” Moreover, most of them moved to Crimea during the first year of occupation and now have Russian passports. Consequently, it is difficult to adequately assess the scale of their migration (BlackSeaNews, August 29, 2020).
Migrant workers from the Caucasus, Central Asia and Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh are also not uncommon in Crimea. This diverse environment sometimes provokes ethnic tensions and conflicts on the peninsula.
Reportedly, such migration flows led to the formation of ethnically based organized crime groups. In 2019, Russian police arrested a dozen Chechens, including Murad Saidov, the deputy permanent representative of Chechnya in Crimea.
The detained men were suspected of extortion, kidnapping and involvement in a Chechen criminal group in Crimea. But Isa Khachukaev, Chechen governor Ramzan Kadyrov’s permanent envoy to the peninsula, and Kadyrov himself stood up for the apprehended Saidov (Lenta, February 7, 2019).
Since illegally annexing Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, Russia has been forcibly shifting the region’s demographic composition and trying to replace the native Crimean population with its own loyal citizens.
Moreover, these transformative migration flows enable the occupying authorities to create a Trojan Horse against any future efforts by Kyiv to return the peninsula to its control.
8/9
Next 👉 Forced Population Migration war crimes by Putin
Refat Chubarov, a politician and leader of the Crimean Tatar national movement, stated a few years ago that during the period of annexation, new or expanded military towns appeared in Dzhankoi, Saki, Yevpatoria and Sevastopol (Radio Svoboda, May 28, 2018).
According to Gayan Yuksel, a member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, the Russian government launched a special resettlement program for siloviki (security services personnel). They reportedly receive a one-time payment of $30,000 to move their families to Crimea (Espreso. tv, March 17, 2019).
Additionally, Russian retirees from Moscow, the High North, Siberia and other wealthy areas have been actively buying up real estate in Crimea. The Simferopol-based Russian National Commercial Bank considers Siberians a key target audience for the development of real estate mortgage programs in Crimea.
The bank initiated a large-scale remote mortgage program in Siberia. Buyers from Krasnoyarsk will be able to make a real estate purchase in Crimea and obtain a mortgage remotely (Krymr. com, January 25, 2019).
Individuals from the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” (LPR, DPR) have also contributed to migration flows into Crimea. Prior to the annexation, many Ukrainians from these eastern provinces had already invested in the Crimean real estate market.
In Russian official statistics, they are presently indicated as “migrants from CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries.” Moreover, most of them moved to Crimea during the first year of occupation and now have Russian passports. Consequently, it is difficult to adequately assess the scale of their migration (BlackSeaNews, August 29, 2020).
Migrant workers from the Caucasus, Central Asia and Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh are also not uncommon in Crimea. This diverse environment sometimes provokes ethnic tensions and conflicts on the peninsula.
Reportedly, such migration flows led to the formation of ethnically based organized crime groups. In 2019, Russian police arrested a dozen Chechens, including Murad Saidov, the deputy permanent representative of Chechnya in Crimea.
The detained men were suspected of extortion, kidnapping and involvement in a Chechen criminal group in Crimea. But Isa Khachukaev, Chechen governor Ramzan Kadyrov’s permanent envoy to the peninsula, and Kadyrov himself stood up for the apprehended Saidov (Lenta, February 7, 2019).
Since illegally annexing Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, Russia has been forcibly shifting the region’s demographic composition and trying to replace the native Crimean population with its own loyal citizens.
Moreover, these transformative migration flows enable the occupying authorities to create a Trojan Horse against any future efforts by Kyiv to return the peninsula to its control.
8/9
Next 👉 Forced Population Migration war crimes by Putin
Forced migration - A unique Russian war crime repeated:
The saturation of Crimea with siloviki and military personnel is also done intentionally, helping further militarize the region and populate Crimea with trusted armed people.
According to Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), “the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” is completely prohibited and considered a war crime (Crimeahrg. org, January 6).
August 2024 - following Ukraines stunning and victorious invasion of Russian territory in Kursk, The governor of Kursk region has announced that evacuated Russian citizens from his region will be transferred to occupied Zaporizhzhia. Upwards of 120,000 could be moved, potentially more.
This is the commissioning of another War Crime, with Putin’s direction and authority. Here’s a reminder why this constitutes a war crime under the Geneva Convention and other international treaties and agreements:
According to Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), “the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” is completely prohibited and considered a war crime.
According to Section 6(1)(b)(viii), “[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory
👉 Geneva Convention IV:
Article 49, sixth paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 49, sixth para.
Additional Protocol I
Article 85(4)(a) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides that “the transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” is a grave breach of the Protocol.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 85(4)(a). Article 85 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 291.
👉 ICC Statute:
Under Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.
9/9
———————————————————————————-
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The saturation of Crimea with siloviki and military personnel is also done intentionally, helping further militarize the region and populate Crimea with trusted armed people.
According to Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), “the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” is completely prohibited and considered a war crime (Crimeahrg. org, January 6).
August 2024 - following Ukraines stunning and victorious invasion of Russian territory in Kursk, The governor of Kursk region has announced that evacuated Russian citizens from his region will be transferred to occupied Zaporizhzhia. Upwards of 120,000 could be moved, potentially more.
This is the commissioning of another War Crime, with Putin’s direction and authority. Here’s a reminder why this constitutes a war crime under the Geneva Convention and other international treaties and agreements:
According to Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), “the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” is completely prohibited and considered a war crime.
According to Section 6(1)(b)(viii), “[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory
👉 Geneva Convention IV:
Article 49, sixth paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 49, sixth para.
Additional Protocol I
Article 85(4)(a) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides that “the transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” is a grave breach of the Protocol.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 85(4)(a). Article 85 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 291.
👉 ICC Statute:
Under Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.
9/9
———————————————————————————-
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Sources and references for this work:
atlanticcouncil.org/content-series…
youtube.com/live/zkpIgQUoD…
sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-…
amnesty.org/en/latest/news…
jamestown.org/program/demogr…
iwm.org.uk/history/why-wa…
atlanticcouncil.org/content-series…
youtube.com/live/zkpIgQUoD…
sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-…
amnesty.org/en/latest/news…
jamestown.org/program/demogr…
iwm.org.uk/history/why-wa…
@Trinityaudiobot audio
For my visually impaired followers and for easy listening on your daily commute, my threads are narrated too! - see the reply to this tweet for an audio narration of the thread:
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Typo correction - should read “demographic”, not “democratic”.
Some additional history:
👉 Russia has a long history of forced migration for de graphic reshaping and crushing regional powers.
1934: Josef Stalin, who had ruled the USSR with an iron hand since the end of the 1920s, launched the Great Purge in January 1934 to consolidate his power.
1935: Between 7,000 and 9,000 Finns from Lembovo and Nikoulias districts, in the Leningrad region, becaome the first group to be massively deported based on ethnicity. Falsely accused of betrayal, the Finns were expelled to secure the Soviet frontiers. The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), forerunner of the Committee for State Security (KGB) orchestrated the operation, as it did for all subsequent mass deportations.
** (Gelb, 1996:237-269; Matley, 1979:1-16)
1936, April: About 35,700 Poles living alongside the Ukrainian frontier and some 20,000 Finnish peasants were deported to Kazakhstan for the same reasons as those previously mentioned. The deportation was class-based in the sense that it targeted specific economic categories; but it was also ethnically motivated, as it aimed to secure the frontiers.
1937, September-October: The first large-scale operation of massive deportation occurred in the Soviet Far East. About 175,000 Koreans living along the Chinese and Korean borders were relocated by force to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. They were charged with espionage, spying for the Japanese. After a brutal expulsion, the Koreans experienced severe living conditions. Moscow did not inform the local Uzbek and Kazakh authorities about the arrival of a large population of “administrative settlers.” Nothing was prepared to accommodate or provide them with basic supplies such as food, clothes and shoes. Although there was no reliable data regarding the Korean death toll, testimonies and NKVD documents indicate that many of them died from disease, starvation and lack of housing. By 1945, they joined the long list of “special settlers,” among other punished peoples.
1939, August 23: Germany and the Soviet Union signed a Nonaggression Pact, known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.
1939, September 17: (Poland) The Red Army invaded Poland.
1940, February to April: (The Red Army annexed territories in the eastern parts of Poland) About 250,000 Poles and thousands of Ukrainians and Byelorussians were deported in three major waves to Siberia and to Central and Far Eastern Asia in order to remove the most active populations from the annexed territories. Although based on ethnic criteria, these forced expulsions mainly targeted families of military colonists, prisoners-of-war and foresters. They were dispatched to labor camps or executed. The deportees who survived the journey experienced very hard living conditions in exile. Most of the Polish citizens were allowed to return home when the USSR and Poland reached an agreement on July 30th, 1941.
1941, June 13-14: (Baltic countries) In the aftermath of the Baltic States’ conquest, about 39,395 persons – Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians but also Poles, Finns, and Germans – were deported to the Soviet Far East. Ivan Serov coordinated the operation under the command of Lavrenti Beria.
1941, June 22: The Nazi army invaded the Soviet Union.
1941, August: The Finns, or Ingrians, inhabiting the Leningrad region and who had not been deported in 1932-1934, were expelled by force to Central Asia. The USSR took this measure to prevent them from assisting the Finnish army that had just invaded the Soviet Karelia region.
Contd.. 👇
👉 Russia has a long history of forced migration for de graphic reshaping and crushing regional powers.
1934: Josef Stalin, who had ruled the USSR with an iron hand since the end of the 1920s, launched the Great Purge in January 1934 to consolidate his power.
1935: Between 7,000 and 9,000 Finns from Lembovo and Nikoulias districts, in the Leningrad region, becaome the first group to be massively deported based on ethnicity. Falsely accused of betrayal, the Finns were expelled to secure the Soviet frontiers. The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), forerunner of the Committee for State Security (KGB) orchestrated the operation, as it did for all subsequent mass deportations.
** (Gelb, 1996:237-269; Matley, 1979:1-16)
1936, April: About 35,700 Poles living alongside the Ukrainian frontier and some 20,000 Finnish peasants were deported to Kazakhstan for the same reasons as those previously mentioned. The deportation was class-based in the sense that it targeted specific economic categories; but it was also ethnically motivated, as it aimed to secure the frontiers.
1937, September-October: The first large-scale operation of massive deportation occurred in the Soviet Far East. About 175,000 Koreans living along the Chinese and Korean borders were relocated by force to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. They were charged with espionage, spying for the Japanese. After a brutal expulsion, the Koreans experienced severe living conditions. Moscow did not inform the local Uzbek and Kazakh authorities about the arrival of a large population of “administrative settlers.” Nothing was prepared to accommodate or provide them with basic supplies such as food, clothes and shoes. Although there was no reliable data regarding the Korean death toll, testimonies and NKVD documents indicate that many of them died from disease, starvation and lack of housing. By 1945, they joined the long list of “special settlers,” among other punished peoples.
1939, August 23: Germany and the Soviet Union signed a Nonaggression Pact, known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.
1939, September 17: (Poland) The Red Army invaded Poland.
1940, February to April: (The Red Army annexed territories in the eastern parts of Poland) About 250,000 Poles and thousands of Ukrainians and Byelorussians were deported in three major waves to Siberia and to Central and Far Eastern Asia in order to remove the most active populations from the annexed territories. Although based on ethnic criteria, these forced expulsions mainly targeted families of military colonists, prisoners-of-war and foresters. They were dispatched to labor camps or executed. The deportees who survived the journey experienced very hard living conditions in exile. Most of the Polish citizens were allowed to return home when the USSR and Poland reached an agreement on July 30th, 1941.
1941, June 13-14: (Baltic countries) In the aftermath of the Baltic States’ conquest, about 39,395 persons – Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians but also Poles, Finns, and Germans – were deported to the Soviet Far East. Ivan Serov coordinated the operation under the command of Lavrenti Beria.
1941, June 22: The Nazi army invaded the Soviet Union.
1941, August: The Finns, or Ingrians, inhabiting the Leningrad region and who had not been deported in 1932-1934, were expelled by force to Central Asia. The USSR took this measure to prevent them from assisting the Finnish army that had just invaded the Soviet Karelia region.
Contd.. 👇
1941, August 28: A decree from the Supreme Soviet Presidium established that Russian-Germans were collectively responsible for collaboration with the German invaders, and ordered their massive deportation. From the end of August 1941 until June 1942, about 1,200,000 Russian-Germans were removed from their homes and relocated in Siberia and Central Asia. The operation mobilized thousands of soldiers, policemen and NKVD members. Hundreds of trains and vehicles were dedicated to this task at a time of Russian military retreat. No reliable data exists on the death toll among the Russian-German deportees.
1943, October 12: The Supreme Soviet issued a decree ordering the deportation of all the Karachays, a Turkish-speaking people inhabiting the North Caucasus. The USSR accused them of collaboration with the German army, which had been occuping Karachay territory for the previous six months. In November 68,938 persons, mainly disarmed (women, children, elderly people and war veterans) were transported under very hard conditions to Kirghizia and Kazakhstan. The men serving with the Red Army or fighting in partisan movements were demobilized and sent into exile or to labor camps. All the Karachays paid for the relationship that a few of their fellow Karachays had established with the German occupiers. This scenario became a common one for all punished peoples.
1943, December 27: Under Beria’s orders began the brutal deportation of the Kalmyks, a Buddhist people living in southern Russia near the Volga river basin. In three days, about 93,000 persons were expelled to Siberia. The lack of food and disease claimed the lives of thousands of people who had been forced into jam-packed cattle cars. Likewise, the settlements in exile were equally inhospitable. During the first glacial Siberian winter many died, faced with widespread indifference.
1944, February 23: The Soviet government deported the Chechens and the Ingush, two Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus. Although the Germans had only occupied a region in the extreme northwest of the Republic, Chechens and Ingush were accused of betrayal and massive collaboration with the German occupiers, like the other punished peoples. Beria’s administration used methods resembling those of earlier deportations. Yet this operation proved to be more difficult due to the uneven nature of the terrain. Furthermore, the resistance of a few Chechen and Ingush groups slowed down the NKVD soldiers’ agenda. Nonetheless, in seven days nearly 478,000 people, comprised of 387,000 Chechens and 91,000 Ingush, were arrested, loaded into hundreds of convoys and then resettled in Central Asia, mainly in Kazakhstan. It is difficult to set an exact death toll due to the lack of evidence. According to different estimations, between 30% and 50% of the deportees died, either during the journey or in the first years of exile in the special settlements.
1944, March 7: The deportation of the 38,000 Balkars, a small Turkish people living near the Elbruz Mountain in Northern Caucasus, began. Three days later, all deportee-convoys were en route to Central Asia. Between 20% and 40% of the Balkars died between 1944 and 1956.
Contd…
1943, October 12: The Supreme Soviet issued a decree ordering the deportation of all the Karachays, a Turkish-speaking people inhabiting the North Caucasus. The USSR accused them of collaboration with the German army, which had been occuping Karachay territory for the previous six months. In November 68,938 persons, mainly disarmed (women, children, elderly people and war veterans) were transported under very hard conditions to Kirghizia and Kazakhstan. The men serving with the Red Army or fighting in partisan movements were demobilized and sent into exile or to labor camps. All the Karachays paid for the relationship that a few of their fellow Karachays had established with the German occupiers. This scenario became a common one for all punished peoples.
1943, December 27: Under Beria’s orders began the brutal deportation of the Kalmyks, a Buddhist people living in southern Russia near the Volga river basin. In three days, about 93,000 persons were expelled to Siberia. The lack of food and disease claimed the lives of thousands of people who had been forced into jam-packed cattle cars. Likewise, the settlements in exile were equally inhospitable. During the first glacial Siberian winter many died, faced with widespread indifference.
1944, February 23: The Soviet government deported the Chechens and the Ingush, two Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus. Although the Germans had only occupied a region in the extreme northwest of the Republic, Chechens and Ingush were accused of betrayal and massive collaboration with the German occupiers, like the other punished peoples. Beria’s administration used methods resembling those of earlier deportations. Yet this operation proved to be more difficult due to the uneven nature of the terrain. Furthermore, the resistance of a few Chechen and Ingush groups slowed down the NKVD soldiers’ agenda. Nonetheless, in seven days nearly 478,000 people, comprised of 387,000 Chechens and 91,000 Ingush, were arrested, loaded into hundreds of convoys and then resettled in Central Asia, mainly in Kazakhstan. It is difficult to set an exact death toll due to the lack of evidence. According to different estimations, between 30% and 50% of the deportees died, either during the journey or in the first years of exile in the special settlements.
1944, March 7: The deportation of the 38,000 Balkars, a small Turkish people living near the Elbruz Mountain in Northern Caucasus, began. Three days later, all deportee-convoys were en route to Central Asia. Between 20% and 40% of the Balkars died between 1944 and 1956.
Contd…
1944, May 18: The Crimean Tatars, a Muslim Turkish-speaking people originating from the peninsula of Crimea located on the borders of Black Sea, were deported. This forced removal took place one month after the German army, who had occupied the peninsula from 1942 to April 1944, retreated. In two days roughly 190,000 persons, mostly women, children and elderly people, were loaded into freight trains and transferred to an unknown destination. Most of them landed in Uzbekistan, while others arrived either in the Volga basin or Siberia. The forced expulsion, along with thirteen years of exile as special settlers, took a heavy toll among the Crimean Tatars. According to different studies and censuses, between 20% and 46.2% of them died either during the journey or in the first year and a half of exile.
1944, June: Other non-Slavic peoples living in Crimea were deported a few weeks after the Crimean Tatars: 12,075 Bulgarians, 14,300 Greeks and about 10,000 Armenians were expelled from their homes and sent to Central Asia against their will. All of them were accused of treason and more specifically, of having commercial interests that linked them to the German occupiers. At the same time, Greeks from Rostov and Krasnodar were exiled to the eastern regions of the Soviet Union. They were suspected of having a close relationship with Greece, as most of them had refused Soviet citizenship and struggled to maintain their Greek culture.
1944, November: Muslim Turkish-speaking peoples living in Georgia along the Turkish borders (the Meskhetian Turks, the Khemchins and the Kurds) became the next target of the Stalinist national policy. Given that the Nazi army had never reached Georgia, they could not be accused of massive collaboration. Instead they were charged with being Turkish spies. About 90,000 persons were brutally expelled and relocated to Central Asia to “clean” the frontiers. This constituted the last large-scale operation.
The NKVD continued hunting down all members of these groups who might have managed to escape deportation, for some reason.
1945, May 8: End of the Second World War, called the “Great Patriotic War” in the former USSR.
Contd..
1944, June: Other non-Slavic peoples living in Crimea were deported a few weeks after the Crimean Tatars: 12,075 Bulgarians, 14,300 Greeks and about 10,000 Armenians were expelled from their homes and sent to Central Asia against their will. All of them were accused of treason and more specifically, of having commercial interests that linked them to the German occupiers. At the same time, Greeks from Rostov and Krasnodar were exiled to the eastern regions of the Soviet Union. They were suspected of having a close relationship with Greece, as most of them had refused Soviet citizenship and struggled to maintain their Greek culture.
1944, November: Muslim Turkish-speaking peoples living in Georgia along the Turkish borders (the Meskhetian Turks, the Khemchins and the Kurds) became the next target of the Stalinist national policy. Given that the Nazi army had never reached Georgia, they could not be accused of massive collaboration. Instead they were charged with being Turkish spies. About 90,000 persons were brutally expelled and relocated to Central Asia to “clean” the frontiers. This constituted the last large-scale operation.
The NKVD continued hunting down all members of these groups who might have managed to escape deportation, for some reason.
1945, May 8: End of the Second World War, called the “Great Patriotic War” in the former USSR.
Contd..
1948: Confronted with the large insurrection that followed the Baltic States’ annexation, the Soviet central apparatus decided to deport new groups of Lithuanians, Estonians and Latvians: about 48,000 persons were sent to Siberia.
1948, November 26: Stalin issued a decree by which all massive deportations were declared definitive.
1949, March: The previous measures did not stop the revolts in the Baltic States. In response, Stalin ordered the deportation of an additional 30,000 families, that is to say a total of about 95,000 persons, to discourage insurgents and bring all the opponents to heel. All deportees became special settlers and lived under the NKVD’s harsh rule.
1949: About 37,000 Greeks living in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Krasnodar Region were deported to Kazakhstan. Like their fellow Greeks forcibly removed in 1944, they were accused of disloyalty and non-integration.
1950: After the organized famine of 1946-47, the Soviet government decided to deport approximately 100,000 Moldavians from Moldavia, who were suspected of having close ties with their Romanian neighbors. They too joined the long list of special settlers and endured especially difficult conditions in exile.
1953: Stalin died.
1954, July: The USSR Council of Ministers passed a resolution that “liberated” some categories of deportees: those employed in socially useful professions and children under ten.
1956: During the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, Leonid Khrushchev declared that earlier massive deportations were arbitrary and criminal acts. The Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to rehabilitate the majority of the punished peoples, thereby authorizing them to return to their region of origin. But this measure did not include the Crimean Tatars, the Russian-Germans, or the Meskhetian Turks. These three groups were neither collectively rehabilitated nor allowed to return. They were condemned to stay in exile, scattered and deprived of all collective rights.
/end
1948, November 26: Stalin issued a decree by which all massive deportations were declared definitive.
1949, March: The previous measures did not stop the revolts in the Baltic States. In response, Stalin ordered the deportation of an additional 30,000 families, that is to say a total of about 95,000 persons, to discourage insurgents and bring all the opponents to heel. All deportees became special settlers and lived under the NKVD’s harsh rule.
1949: About 37,000 Greeks living in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Krasnodar Region were deported to Kazakhstan. Like their fellow Greeks forcibly removed in 1944, they were accused of disloyalty and non-integration.
1950: After the organized famine of 1946-47, the Soviet government decided to deport approximately 100,000 Moldavians from Moldavia, who were suspected of having close ties with their Romanian neighbors. They too joined the long list of special settlers and endured especially difficult conditions in exile.
1953: Stalin died.
1954, July: The USSR Council of Ministers passed a resolution that “liberated” some categories of deportees: those employed in socially useful professions and children under ten.
1956: During the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, Leonid Khrushchev declared that earlier massive deportations were arbitrary and criminal acts. The Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to rehabilitate the majority of the punished peoples, thereby authorizing them to return to their region of origin. But this measure did not include the Crimean Tatars, the Russian-Germans, or the Meskhetian Turks. These three groups were neither collectively rehabilitated nor allowed to return. They were condemned to stay in exile, scattered and deprived of all collective rights.
/end
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