NEW: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast amid a generally slower tempo of Ukrainian operations as Russian forces continue attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area.
Kursk Tactical Update 🧵(1/15)
2/ Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on August 14 that its sources in the Ukrainian military stated that the tempo of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast has slowed due to the increasing Russian resistance in the direction of Kursk City.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually stabilizing the frontline in Kursk Oblast and that unspecified Russian reinforcements are arriving from unspecified areas and are establishing communications with Russian units already in the area.
4/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into Krasnooktyabrskoye (southwest of Korenevo and 15km from the international border).
5/ Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Zhuravli (west of Korenevo and 20km from the international border), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the eastern part of the settlement.
6/ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Skrylevka, Levshinka, Semenovka, and Alekseevsky (all northeast of Korenevo near Kauchuk, which is 27km from the international border).
7/ Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed that Ukrainian forces do not control Sudzha, although several other Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing in and around Sudzha and that neither side fully controls the settlement.
8/ Geolocated footage published on August 14 showing a Ukrainian journalist reporting from central Sudzha indicates that Ukrainian forces control at least part of the settlement and like parts of its surroundings.
9/ Suspilne's sources in the Ukrainian military stated that Ukrainian forces advanced beyond Martynovka (just northeast of Sudzha), although Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is still ongoing in the settlement.
10/ A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Mikhailovka (also northeast of Sudzha) remains under Ukrainian control, implying that Ukrainian forces had seized Mikhailovka at an unspecified previous date.
11/ Geolocated footage published on August 14 showing Ukrainian forces operating just northwest of Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha) indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.
12/ Additional geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western Kamyshnoye (southeast of Sudzha).
13/ Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows a Russian journalist reporting from Giri and Ozerki (both southeast of Sudzha and just east of Kamyshnoye), although Russian sources later claimed on August 14 that Ukrainian forces began operating near Giri and Belitsa (just north of Giri), suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be contesting the area east of Kamyshnoye.
14/ Geolocated footage published on August 13 and 14 showing Ukrainian forces operating well within the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances indicates that Ukrainian forces also continue operating closer to the international border within Kursk Oblast.
15/ Russian milbloggers claimed on Aug. 14 that Russian forces cont'd to repel Ukrainian attempts to cross the Kolotilovka border checkpoint in Belgorod Oblast (on the international border SE of Sudzha & NW of Belgorod City).
The Kremlin can absorb enormous costs but not without risk or limits. US incrementalism strengthens Putin’s ability to absorb risk, granting the Kremlin time to normalize an increasingly worse reality within Russia. 🧵(1/8)
2/ The next 2–3 years are critical for the Kremlin in this war, however. If US support to Ukraine persists and gains momentum, the Kremlin will have to reckon with its accumulating problems.
3/ The West must abandon its reactive mentality that seeks to contain Russia through countermeasures in favor of a strategy that focuses not only on imposing multiple dilemmas on the Kremlin but also on imposing the most painful ones.
NEW: Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk has the potential to generate momentum for Ukraine, argues @nataliabugayova. If it does, the US can help Ukraine build on rather than dampen that momentum to regain control over the tempo of the war by targeting Russia's unexploited weaknesses.🧵
2/ Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting. On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask its weaknesses.
3/ The Kremlin’s weaknesses include its inability to pivot rapidly, dependence on others for Russia’s capability to sustain the war, and years of risk accumulation that Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to reckon with.
2/ Commercially available satellite imagery collected by @Maxar on August 12 shows a newly dug series of field fortifications, including trenches and anti-vehicle ditches southwest of Lgov along the E38 Lgov-Rylsk-Hlukhiv highway (northwest of Sudzha).
3/ Additional satellite imagery published on August 13 and collected between August 6 and 11 shows the recent appearance of field fortifications near the 38K-024 highway just south of Lgov.
What is the Tactical Reconnaissance and Strike Complex? 🧵(1/9)
The main obstacle to resorting maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine is the integration of offensive and defensive electronic warfare (EW) and the use of unmanned systems integrated with ground-based fires and attack drones, a phenomenon we have coined the Tactical Reconnaissance and Strike Complex (TRSC).
2/ The TRSC is the combination of pervasive tactical reconnaissance, primarily by drone; drone-corrected precision artillery fire; precision munitions delivered by fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft; drone-launched precision munitions; and large numbers of FPV loitering munitions.
3/ Extensive offensive and defensive electronic warfare supports the TRSC, which also draws on operational and strategic reconnaissance assets.
The Russian military command may be pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.⬇️🧵(1/5)
2/ The Russian military command could also be redeploying units that were previously intended to relieve or reinforce frontline units from rear areas in Donetsk Oblast to Kursk Oblast.
3/ Such a redeployment could affect the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Russian military's assessed priority sectors over time.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and outlined several Ukrainian objectives of the operations in the area. 🧵
2/ Zelensky stated on August 3 that Ukrainian forces "control" 74 localities in Kursk Oblast. It is unclear if Zelensky meant that Ukrainian forces are operating in 74 settlements or if he was referring to another type of geographic administrative unit.
3/ ISW has observed claims and geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces are operating in or near roughly 41 settlements in Kursk Oblast as of August 13, although there are many extremely small settlements and localities within this area that ISW has not included in this count.