Zelensky initially approved the plan, according to one officer who participated and three people familiar with it. But later, when the CIA learned of it and asked the Ukrainian president to pull the plug, he ordered a halt.
Zaluzhniy, who was leading the effort, nonetheless forged ahead.
“An attack of this scale is a sufficient reason to trigger the collective defense clause of NATO, but our critical infrastructure was blown up by a country that we support with massive weapons shipments and billions in cash,” said a senior German official familiar with the probe.
In May of 2022, a handful of senior Ukrainian military officers and businessmen had gathered to toast their country’s remarkable success in halting the Russian invasion. Buoyed by alcohol and patriotic fervor, somebody suggested a radical next step: destroying Nord Stream.
The Journal spoke to four senior Ukrainian defense and security officials who either participated in or had direct knowledge of the plot. All of them said the pipelines were a legitimate target in Ukraine’s war of defense against Russia.
Following the May 2022 pact between the businessmen and the military officers, it was agreed that the former would finance and help execute the project, because the army had no funds and was increasingly relying on foreign financing
A sitting general with experience in special operations would oversee the mission, which one participant described as a “public-private partnership.” He would report directly to the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, the four-star Gen. Zaluzhniy.
Within days, Zelensky approved the plan, according to the four people familiar with the plot. All arrangements were made verbally, leaving no paper trail.
But the next month, the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD learned of the plot and warned the CIA, according to several people familiar with the Dutch report. U.S. officials then promptly informed Germany, according to U.S. and German officials.
The CIA warned Zelensky’s office to stop the operation, U.S. officials said. The Ukrainian president then ordered Zalyzhniy to halt it, according to Ukrainian officers and officials familiar with the conversation as well as Western intelligence officials. But the general ignored the order, and his team modified the original plan, these people said.
One crew member, a military officer on active duty who was fighting in the war, was a seasoned skipper, and four were experienced deep-sea divers, people familiar with the German investigation said. The crew included civilians, one of whom was a woman in her 30s who had trained privately as a diver. She was handpicked for her skills but also to lend more plausibility to the crew’s disguise as friends on holiday, according to one person familiar with the planning.
Witnesses on other yachts moored in Sandhamn noted that the Andromeda was the only boat with a small Ukrainian flag hoisted on its mast.
#OpSec
Polish officials initially refused to hand over the CCTV footage of the port. This year, they told their German colleagues that the footage had been routinely destroyed shortly after the Andromeda departed.
The Polish internal security agency ABW said that no such footage exists
The Netherlands built deep intelligence-gathering capacity in Ukraine and Russia after Russian-backed paramilitaries downed a Malaysia Airlines flight originating from Amsterdam over eastern Ukraine, two Dutch officials said.
Zelensky took Zaluzhniy to task, but the general shrugged off his criticism, according to three people familiar with the exchange. Zaluzhniy told Zelensky that the sabotage team, once dispatched, went incommunicado and couldn’t be called off because any contact with them could compromise the operation
In June, German officials issued a confidential arrest warrant for a Ukrainian citizen who the Germans believe was one of the crew members. Authorities in Poland didn’t act on the warrant. The instructor is believed to have since returned to Ukraine. Poland’s failure to arrest him is a major blow to the German probe, because he and other suspects have now been tipped off and will avoid travelling outside Ukraine, people familiar with the investigation said. Ukraine doesn’t extradite its own citizens.
The general tasked with commanding the operation enlisted some of Ukraine’s top special-operations officers with experience in orchestrating high-risk clandestine missions against Russia to help coordinate the attack.
One of them was Roman Chervinsky, a decorated colonel who previously served in Ukraine’s main security and intelligence service, the SBU.
In a subsequent interview, Chernivsky said that the sabotage had two positive effects for Ukraine:
It helped loosen Russia’s grip on the European countries supporting Kyiv, and it left Moscow with only one main avenue for channeling gas to Europe, pipelines traversing Ukraine (for which it collects transit fees)
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With the concerted effort by the SBU with the participation of the Ukrainian Navy (and later GUR) since mid 2022, Ukraine was able to develop more and more capable maritime drones that showed their capabilities against Russian military ships and land infrastructure
It is interesting to see how strategically they are thinking about the development of capabilities of these drones:
"We want to decompose a large warship into its functions - air defense, weapons, protection - and put these weapons on several drones," Hunter (SBU) explains.
The more important question to ask is what would bring about that improved position for an eventual negotiation with Moscow
The only one that’s being discussed as at all plausible is having Ukraine get to the Sea of Azov, destroy the Kerch Bridge and put fire pressure on Crimea🧵
Putting aside the feasibility and likelihood of success of each of those elements of the strategy, I think it’s worth questioning the assumption that Putin would be driven to the negotiation table even if all of the above conditions come to pass
A big assumption in this strategy is that without the Kerch bridge and under constant fires from the Azov coast, Crimea would be difficult to resupply
But the Kerch bridge didn’t exist until 2018 and the rail part until 2019, yet occupied Crimea was just fine since 2014
Good article on the challenges seen in the early days of the Ukrainian counteroffensive back in June. Some key points: washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/…
“The goal for the first 24 hours was to advance nearly nine miles, reaching the village of Robotyne — an initial thrust south toward the larger objective of reclaiming Melitopol, a city near the Sea of Azov, and severing Russian supply lines”
“Rather than making a nine-mile breakthrough on their first day, the Ukrainians in the nearly six months since June have advanced about 12 miles and liberated a handful of villages. Melitopol is still far out of reach”
Putin/Defense Ministry/GRU were muscling in to take over Prigozhin’s Africa business and he dared to resist. He did not get the message after the June mutiny—that it was time to apologize and disappear, go to Belarus or wherever. Not fight for control of business in Africa
That is what doomed him
If he had just gone away to sip margaritas in the Maldives and turned over all his businesses to Putin and Co. as penance instead of fighting to preserve them, he would probably still be alive today
Putin had personally told Touadera, the Central African Republic president, that the time had come to distance himself from Prigozhin. When Touadera visited St. Petersburg last month, he abstained from taking a selfie with the Russian warlord
Since June, the Kremlin had been trying to assert control over that shadowy web of murky arrangements. The Defense Ministry had been dispatching delegations to inform foreign governments that they would henceforth do business directly with the Russian state
Prigozhin’s mutiny had left Haftar, the Libyan warlord who had paid Wagner for securing its oil wells and territory, and his close circle nervous about Wagner’s presence in Libya
“They felt that if they do it in Russia, they can do it in Benghazi”
My thoughts on the implications of Prigozhin's mutiny this weekend: 🧵
First, what have we learned from this?
1. That a hostile armed column of about 5,000 troops can just drive across Russia for hours to within 200km of Moscow and no one in the MoD, Rosgvardia, MVD or FSB seems capable or willing to stop them.
(Ukraine take note)
2. That another armed column of a few thousand troops (some of them former convicts!) can just drive into a major Russian city of a million people and take it over without firing a shot, including a major military command center and an airbase