2/ Commercially available satellite imagery collected by @Maxar on August 12 shows a newly dug series of field fortifications, including trenches and anti-vehicle ditches southwest of Lgov along the E38 Lgov-Rylsk-Hlukhiv highway (northwest of Sudzha).
3/ Additional satellite imagery published on August 13 and collected between August 6 and 11 shows the recent appearance of field fortifications near the 38K-024 highway just south of Lgov.
4/ These new fortifications are about 17 kilometers north of the furthest claimed limit of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, which suggests that Russian forces are concerned about potential continued and rapid Ukrainian mechanized northward advances within Kursk Oblast.
5/ Russian forces appear particularly concerned about major highways and are likely trying to preemptively safeguard important ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to inhibit Ukrainian maneuver, particularly along the E38 and 38K routes.
6/ Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast are also reportedly impacting Russian railway logistics.
The Belarusian Railway Workers Community claimed on August 13 that its internal sources are reporting that Russian state-owned railway company Russian Railways informed Belarusian state-owned railway company Belarusian Railways to stop directing trains from all Belarusian Railway stations to stations along the Oryol-Kursk branch of the Moscow Railway starting on August 12 due to a "large-scale operational transfer of troops in the direction of Kursk Oblast" and the movement of freight trains for military logistical purposes.
7/ Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov also announced a state of emergency in Belgorod Oblast on August 14, which will empower authorities to restrict movement within emergency areas likely either to secure Russian logistical support for Belgorod Oblast border areas or Russian defensive measures within Kursk Oblast. isw.pub/UkrWar081424
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NEW: Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance southeast of Sudzha on August 16 amid continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast.
Tactical Updates 🧵(1/7)
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Mirny and south of Spalnoye (both southeast of Sudzha), and geolocated imagery published on August 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently operated within Borki (southeast of Sudzha).
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued north of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye, east of Sudzha near Agronom, and southeast of Sudzha along the Giri-Kamyshnoye-Krupets-Spalnoye line.
The Kremlin can absorb enormous costs but not without risk or limits. US incrementalism strengthens Putin’s ability to absorb risk, granting the Kremlin time to normalize an increasingly worse reality within Russia. 🧵(1/8)
2/ The next 2–3 years are critical for the Kremlin in this war, however. If US support to Ukraine persists and gains momentum, the Kremlin will have to reckon with its accumulating problems.
3/ The West must abandon its reactive mentality that seeks to contain Russia through countermeasures in favor of a strategy that focuses not only on imposing multiple dilemmas on the Kremlin but also on imposing the most painful ones.
NEW: Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk has the potential to generate momentum for Ukraine, argues @nataliabugayova. If it does, the US can help Ukraine build on rather than dampen that momentum to regain control over the tempo of the war by targeting Russia's unexploited weaknesses.🧵
2/ Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting. On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask its weaknesses.
3/ The Kremlin’s weaknesses include its inability to pivot rapidly, dependence on others for Russia’s capability to sustain the war, and years of risk accumulation that Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to reckon with.
NEW: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast amid a generally slower tempo of Ukrainian operations as Russian forces continue attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area.
Kursk Tactical Update 🧵(1/15)
2/ Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on August 14 that its sources in the Ukrainian military stated that the tempo of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast has slowed due to the increasing Russian resistance in the direction of Kursk City.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually stabilizing the frontline in Kursk Oblast and that unspecified Russian reinforcements are arriving from unspecified areas and are establishing communications with Russian units already in the area.
What is the Tactical Reconnaissance and Strike Complex? 🧵(1/9)
The main obstacle to resorting maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine is the integration of offensive and defensive electronic warfare (EW) and the use of unmanned systems integrated with ground-based fires and attack drones, a phenomenon we have coined the Tactical Reconnaissance and Strike Complex (TRSC).
2/ The TRSC is the combination of pervasive tactical reconnaissance, primarily by drone; drone-corrected precision artillery fire; precision munitions delivered by fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft; drone-launched precision munitions; and large numbers of FPV loitering munitions.
3/ Extensive offensive and defensive electronic warfare supports the TRSC, which also draws on operational and strategic reconnaissance assets.
The Russian military command may be pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.⬇️🧵(1/5)
2/ The Russian military command could also be redeploying units that were previously intended to relieve or reinforce frontline units from rear areas in Donetsk Oblast to Kursk Oblast.
3/ Such a redeployment could affect the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Russian military's assessed priority sectors over time.