1/ Recently a team reached out to me for assistance after $1.3M was stolen from the treasury after malicious code had been pushed.
Unbeknownst to the team they had hired multiple DPRK IT workers as devs who were using fake identities.
I then uncovered 25+ crypto projects with related devs that have been active since June 2024.
2/ The laundering path for the incident can be described as:
1) Transfer $1.3M to theft address 2) Bridge $1.3M from Solana to Etheruem via deBridge 3) Deposit 50.2 ETH to Tornado 4) Transfer 16.5 ETH to two exchanges
3/ Using multiple payment addresses for 21 devs I was able to map out a cluster with the most recent batch of payments for ~$375K over the last month.
0xb721adfc3d9fe01e9b3332183665a503447b1d35
In the past week you may have seen me tagging projects telling them to DM me.
4/ Prior to this $5.5M flowed into an exchange deposit address with payments DPRK IT workers were receiving from July 2023 - 2024 and connections to Sim Hyon Sop who is OFAC sanctioned.
0x8f0212b1a77af1573c6ccdd8775ac3fd09acf014
5/ Some funny moments from the investigation include:
- Russia Telecom IP overlap between devs supposedly in US and Malaysia.
-Recorded dev and they accidentally leaked their other identities on a notepad
-Dev payment addresses a few hops from Sang Man Kim and Sim Hyon Sop who are on the OFAC sanctions list
-Some devs were placed by recruitment companies
-Multiple projects with 3+ IT workers who referred each other
6/ A number of experienced teams have hired these devs so it’s not fair to them single as the ones to blame.
Some indicators teams can look out for in the future includes:
1) They refer each other for roles 2) Good looking resumes / GitHub activity although sometimes lie about work history. 3) Typically are happy to KYC but submit fake IDs in hopes teams do not investigate further 4) Ask specific questions about locations they claim to be from. 5) Dev is fired and immediately new accounts appear looking for work 6) May be good devs initially but typically start to underperform 7) Review logs 8) Like using popular NFT pfps 9) Asia accent
In case you are one of the people who calls everything attributed to North Korea a giant conspiracy.
Regardless this research proves:
A single entity in Asia is receiving $300K - $500k / month from working at 25+ projects at once by using fake identities.
Update: Shortly after posting another project found out they had hired one of the DPRK IT worker (Naoki Murano) listed in my table and shared my post in their chat.
Immediately within two minutes Naoki left the chat and wiped his Github.
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1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.
1/ Multiple projects tied to Pepe creator Matt Furie & ChainSaw as well as another project Favrr were exploited in the past week which resulted in ~$1M stolen
My analysis links both attacks to the same cluster of DPRK IT workers who were likely accidentally hired as developers.
2/ On Jun 18, 2025 at 4:25 am UTC ownership for ‘Replicandy’ from Matt Furie & ChainSaw was transferred to a new EOA 0x9Fca.
Jun 18, 2025
6:20 pm UTC: 0x9Fca withdrew mint proceeds from the contract
Jun 19, 2025
5:11 am UTC: 0x9Fca unpauses the mint
The attacker then minted NFTs and sold into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
3/ On Jun 23, 2025 the attacker transferred ownership from the ChainSaw deployer to 0x9Fca for Peplicator, Hedz, Zogz.
Similarly the attacker minted NFTs and sold them into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.