1/ Recently a team reached out to me for assistance after $1.3M was stolen from the treasury after malicious code had been pushed.
Unbeknownst to the team they had hired multiple DPRK IT workers as devs who were using fake identities.
I then uncovered 25+ crypto projects with related devs that have been active since June 2024.
2/ The laundering path for the incident can be described as:
1) Transfer $1.3M to theft address 2) Bridge $1.3M from Solana to Etheruem via deBridge 3) Deposit 50.2 ETH to Tornado 4) Transfer 16.5 ETH to two exchanges
3/ Using multiple payment addresses for 21 devs I was able to map out a cluster with the most recent batch of payments for ~$375K over the last month.
0xb721adfc3d9fe01e9b3332183665a503447b1d35
In the past week you may have seen me tagging projects telling them to DM me.
4/ Prior to this $5.5M flowed into an exchange deposit address with payments DPRK IT workers were receiving from July 2023 - 2024 and connections to Sim Hyon Sop who is OFAC sanctioned.
0x8f0212b1a77af1573c6ccdd8775ac3fd09acf014
5/ Some funny moments from the investigation include:
- Russia Telecom IP overlap between devs supposedly in US and Malaysia.
-Recorded dev and they accidentally leaked their other identities on a notepad
-Dev payment addresses a few hops from Sang Man Kim and Sim Hyon Sop who are on the OFAC sanctions list
-Some devs were placed by recruitment companies
-Multiple projects with 3+ IT workers who referred each other
6/ A number of experienced teams have hired these devs so it’s not fair to them single as the ones to blame.
Some indicators teams can look out for in the future includes:
1) They refer each other for roles 2) Good looking resumes / GitHub activity although sometimes lie about work history. 3) Typically are happy to KYC but submit fake IDs in hopes teams do not investigate further 4) Ask specific questions about locations they claim to be from. 5) Dev is fired and immediately new accounts appear looking for work 6) May be good devs initially but typically start to underperform 7) Review logs 8) Like using popular NFT pfps 9) Asia accent
In case you are one of the people who calls everything attributed to North Korea a giant conspiracy.
Regardless this research proves:
A single entity in Asia is receiving $300K - $500k / month from working at 25+ projects at once by using fake identities.
Update: Shortly after posting another project found out they had hired one of the DPRK IT worker (Naoki Murano) listed in my table and shared my post in their chat.
Immediately within two minutes Naoki left the chat and wiped his Github.
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1/ Meet the threat actor John (Lick), who was caught flexing $23M in a wallet address directly tied to $90M+ in suspected thefts from the US Government in 2024 and multiple other unidentified victims from Nov 2025 to Dec 2025.
2/ Earlier today John got into a heated argument with another threat actor known as Dritan Kapplani Jr. in a group chat to see who had more funds in crypto wallets.
In 'The Com' this is known as a band for band (b4b).
However the entire interaction was fully recorded.
3/ In part 1 of the recording Dritan mocks John however John screenshares Exodus Wallet which shows the Tron address below with $2.3M:
TMrWCLMS3ibDbKLcnNYhLggohRuLUSoHJg
1/ Meet Haby (Havard), a Canadian threat actor who has stolen $2M+ via Coinbase support impersonation social engineering scams in the past year blowing the funds on rare social media usernames, bottle service, & gambling.
2/ On Dec 30, 2024 Haby posted a screenshot in a group chat showing off a 21K XRP ($44K) theft from a Coinbase user.
rN7ddvk4DrGHZUrBfNARJEEAbPkky9Mwcz
3/ On Jan 3, 2025 Haby posted a screenshot from his Exodus wallet showing his Telegram & IG accounts.
I matched up the historical balances to the screenshot and found the XRP address linked to two other Coinbase user thefts for ~$500K total.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”