1/ Recently a team reached out to me for assistance after $1.3M was stolen from the treasury after malicious code had been pushed.
Unbeknownst to the team they had hired multiple DPRK IT workers as devs who were using fake identities.
I then uncovered 25+ crypto projects with related devs that have been active since June 2024.
2/ The laundering path for the incident can be described as:
1) Transfer $1.3M to theft address 2) Bridge $1.3M from Solana to Etheruem via deBridge 3) Deposit 50.2 ETH to Tornado 4) Transfer 16.5 ETH to two exchanges
3/ Using multiple payment addresses for 21 devs I was able to map out a cluster with the most recent batch of payments for ~$375K over the last month.
0xb721adfc3d9fe01e9b3332183665a503447b1d35
In the past week you may have seen me tagging projects telling them to DM me.
4/ Prior to this $5.5M flowed into an exchange deposit address with payments DPRK IT workers were receiving from July 2023 - 2024 and connections to Sim Hyon Sop who is OFAC sanctioned.
0x8f0212b1a77af1573c6ccdd8775ac3fd09acf014
5/ Some funny moments from the investigation include:
- Russia Telecom IP overlap between devs supposedly in US and Malaysia.
-Recorded dev and they accidentally leaked their other identities on a notepad
-Dev payment addresses a few hops from Sang Man Kim and Sim Hyon Sop who are on the OFAC sanctions list
-Some devs were placed by recruitment companies
-Multiple projects with 3+ IT workers who referred each other
6/ A number of experienced teams have hired these devs so it’s not fair to them single as the ones to blame.
Some indicators teams can look out for in the future includes:
1) They refer each other for roles 2) Good looking resumes / GitHub activity although sometimes lie about work history. 3) Typically are happy to KYC but submit fake IDs in hopes teams do not investigate further 4) Ask specific questions about locations they claim to be from. 5) Dev is fired and immediately new accounts appear looking for work 6) May be good devs initially but typically start to underperform 7) Review logs 8) Like using popular NFT pfps 9) Asia accent
In case you are one of the people who calls everything attributed to North Korea a giant conspiracy.
Regardless this research proves:
A single entity in Asia is receiving $300K - $500k / month from working at 25+ projects at once by using fake identities.
Update: Shortly after posting another project found out they had hired one of the DPRK IT worker (Naoki Murano) listed in my table and shared my post in their chat.
Immediately within two minutes Naoki left the chat and wiped his Github.
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2/ The theft address I will start from is 0x6ee which was doing test transactions on July 10th from 0x09b multisig with SHIB and was funded with 6 X 0.1 ETH from Tornado.
0x6eedf92fb92dd68a270c3205e96dccc527728066
A technical breakdown of the attack by Mudit can be found below
3/ With the 6 X 0.1 ETH withdrawals from Tornado Cash on July 10th I was able to demix this and find 6 X 0.1 ETH matching deposits made the day before.
0xc6873ce725229099caf5ac6078f30f48ec6c7e2e
The demix is accurate as 0xc68 was also doing tests with 0x304 multisig on July 9th with SHIB.
For those who are confused and need additional context.
Earlier today Arkham announced a $150K bounty for the identity of the DJT creator
11:49 pm UTC I reply to Arkham saying I submitted for the bounty
11:57 pm UTC Martin Shkreli panic DM’s me
12:27 am UTC Martin Shkreli creates a spaces and announces he is the creator of DJT
One of the large DJT insiders verso.sol dumping $832K worth of DJT and then depositing USDC to CEX ~1 hr ago
Coincidentally also a large holder on Martin’s other project Shoggoth
1/ Here is an overview of one of the better executed scams I have seen in recent times so I figured I would share with the community as a cautionary tale.
A few weeks ago I received a DM from a follower who lost $245K after accidentally downloading malware onto their computer.
2/ It started as an account purporting to be Peter Lauten from a16z, messaging a team to inquire about a potential podcast partnership.
3/ The attacker noticed that the real Peter Lauten had changed his X (Twitter) username from ‘peter_lauten’
to ‘lauten’ at a point in time and then had claimed his old username.
3/ At first the attacker communicated with the Prisma deployer the attack was whitehat.
Later that day all of the funds were deposited to Tornado Cash contradicting that statement.
The exploiter began making outrageous demands and asked for a $3.8M (34%) whitehat bounty
This amount is significantly higher than the industry standard 10% essentially extorting the team as the treasury does not have sufficient assets to reimburse users.