With the AGM-158A JASSM now emerging as a viable option for Ukraine, it's a good opportunity to explore the basic capability profile and main advantages of JASSM compared to ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, and Taurus. 🧵👇
1/15
The AGM-158A JASSM is, broadly speaking, the American counterpart to the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD-350 & the British-French Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG.
Due to its significant export success, it's increasingly becoming the standard land-attack cruise missile in Western arsenals. 2/15
The AGM-158A JASSM entered service in 2003. It has an unclassified range of 370 km and carries a 450 kg (1,000 lb) penetrator warhead.
JASSM stands out for its low-observability fuselage, providing a smaller radar cross-section than other cruise missiles in its class.
3/15
The WDU-42/B penetrator warhead inside JASSM is relatively similar in shape and function to the penetrator warheads found inside Taurus and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG.
However, JASSM's payload differs by not including a precursor shaped charge.
4/15
This somewhat limits the effectiveness against heavily hardened targets, especially compared to Taurus, which also has the most shape-optimized penetrator in NATO arsenals.
However, there are likely no Russian targets in Ukraine where this would be relevant.
5/15
Besides the baseline AGM-158A JASSM, other variants have been developed, most notably the AGM-158B JASSM-ER.
The JASSM-ER more than doubles the unclassified range of the baseline variant to 1,000 km. However, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine will receive the JASSM-ER.
6/15
This is because of the critical importance the JASSM-ER would play in a US-China warfighting scenario.
Given the expected effectiveness of China's air & missile defense, JASSM-ER's range advantage is needed to credibly threaten Chinese targets located at strategic depth.
7/15
Due to the limited range and utility of the baseline variant in a conflict with China, officials may be more willing to part with their inventory of AGM-158A JASSMs.
Additionally, early-production JASSM AURs are nearing their expiration dates, further justifying delivery.
8/15
Assuming my accounting is accurate, the U.S. Air Force acquired just over 2,000 AGM-158A JASSMs between 2003 and 2021.
The final production lot for the AGM-158A JASSM was awarded in FY2016.
While some JASSMs have been used, a substantial stockpile should be available.
9/15
If Ukraine receives the AGM-158A JASSM, it will be the first time the AFU has access to two types of Western long-range strike weapons in substantial numbers.
Keep in mind that ATACMS deliveries began when Ukraine's Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG arsenal was virtually exhausted.
10/15
Being able to strike critical targets from ballistic (ATACMS) and ground-skimming (JASSM) attack vectors will significantly complicate Russian missile defense efforts, and facilitate Ukrainian efforts at overwhelming Russian integrated air and missile defense.
11/15
This is important because current ATACMS usage is high. Although this may not be unsustainable in the short term, relying on salvo attacks to penetrate Russian missile defense reduces the efficiency of Ukrainian long-range strikes using ATACMS.
JASSM can help with that.
12/15
It will force Russia to position missile defense systems for air-breathing, low-flying threats alongside those for high-altitude ballistic missile targets.
In any case, if JASSM is delivered, I expect to see an increase in reported S-300/S-400 attrition events.
12/15
JASSM would, of course, also be useful to take out a range of operational-level targets inside Ukraine, such as supply depots and logistics facilities.
The expected utility of JASSM would strongly increase if Ukraine were permitted to use them within Russia.
13/15
Considering the demonstrated challenges the Russians faced in countering Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and the highly survivable design of JASSM, I anticipate high initial effectiveness.
But in part, this will also depend on the extent of Ukraine's access to U.S. targeting data.
14/15
Receiving the AGM-158A JASSM would enhance Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities.
As for Germany, I don't anticipate delivery of JASSM to influence their stance on delivering Taurus. As long as the current government remains in power, Taurus will remain in Germany.
15/15
This thread was fairly surface level. I highly encourage you to follow @John_A_Ridge, @ColbyBadhwar, and @ThrustWR who I'm sure will post more detailed analysis in the future, especially if and when JASSM is confirmed.
I published a new Missile Matters post today, offering an initial battle damage assessment of Flamingo’s first combat use.
Proof of concept was established, but the strike also revealed likely shortcomings.
Access the post via the link in my bio. Summary below.
1/6
High-resolution satellite imagery shows two impacts.
Depending on the nominal aimpoints, missile one probably missed by 15 to 40 meters and missile two by 80 to 200 meters.
Missile three did not reach the target area, whether due to outside influence or internal failure.
2/6
Fire Point stated that the Flamingo has a CEP of 14 meters, meaning 50 percent of missiles should land within 14 meters of their aimpoint, about 93 percent within 28 meters, and the remainder outside the 28-meter radius.
3/6
With recent focus on Ukrainian missiles, from Flamingo to "Long Neptune" and others, I thought I'd provide context by tracing the evolution of Ukraine's missile programs.
Link in bio, short summary below.
1/6
Ukraine’s missile industry has moved through several distinct phases since 2014, from modest post-Soviet capabilities and problem-ridden pre-war programs to wartime improvisation, foreign reliance, and now ambitious attempts at independent production.
2/6
From relying almost entirely on Western partners in 2023 for long-range strike capabilities, Ukraine by 2025 fields a diverse but still imperfect missile arsenal, with lighter drones and mini-cruise missiles forming the backbone.
3/6
I published my latest newsletter post earlier today, offering an initial assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo’s specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications.
You can find the full post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/6
The FP-5 Flamingo is the first "heavy" missile system in Ukraine's indigenous missile arsenal, combining long range with a large payload.
This offers significant advantages in terms of missile lethality through improved warhead penetration and greater explosive yield.
2/6
The ultimate impact of the Flamingo on the battlefield will depend on Ukrainian production levels and its survivability against Russian missile defenses.
Ukrainian output goals of more than 200 units per month by the end of the year are certainly ambitious.
3/6
I estimate U.S. and European production of ballistic missile interceptors and compare it to Russia’s output of conventional ballistic missiles.
Access the post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/7
Russia is currently estimated to produce a total of 840 to 1,020 ground-launched 9M723 and air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- to medium-range ballistic missiles annually, or 70 to 85 per month.
This represents roughly a 15 to 40 percent increase compared to 2024.
2/7
In contrast, combined Patriot interceptor production (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) stands at 850 to 880 in 2025.
By 2027, this will increase to over 1,100 interceptors, and to over 1,400 by 2029 (if Rheinmetall starts producing PAC-3 MSE interceptors).
3/7
I sent out my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the state and viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent in 2025.
You can access the post via the link my bio.
Below a short summary.
1/5
Russia's nuclear arsenal faces two primary challenges: maintaining its nuclear warheads and sustaining a viable fleet of delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs.
While both pose difficulties, warhead maintenance is likely the lesser challenge for Russia.
2/5
In contrast, Russia’s inability to move beyond Soviet-era technology and field a next-generation ICBM presents a more serious challenge over the medium to long term.
To be clear, several nuclear-armed states face difficulties in replacing Cold War-era systems.
3/5
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
After the attack, Iraq shifted its strategy, dispersing facilities and focusing on secret, military-oriented nuclear development. The attack also increased Iraq's determination, driven by national pride, the desire for a security deterrent, and fear of future strikes.
3/6