With the AGM-158A JASSM now emerging as a viable option for Ukraine, it's a good opportunity to explore the basic capability profile and main advantages of JASSM compared to ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, and Taurus. 🧵👇
1/15
The AGM-158A JASSM is, broadly speaking, the American counterpart to the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD-350 & the British-French Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG.
Due to its significant export success, it's increasingly becoming the standard land-attack cruise missile in Western arsenals. 2/15
The AGM-158A JASSM entered service in 2003. It has an unclassified range of 370 km and carries a 450 kg (1,000 lb) penetrator warhead.
JASSM stands out for its low-observability fuselage, providing a smaller radar cross-section than other cruise missiles in its class.
3/15
The WDU-42/B penetrator warhead inside JASSM is relatively similar in shape and function to the penetrator warheads found inside Taurus and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG.
However, JASSM's payload differs by not including a precursor shaped charge.
4/15
This somewhat limits the effectiveness against heavily hardened targets, especially compared to Taurus, which also has the most shape-optimized penetrator in NATO arsenals.
However, there are likely no Russian targets in Ukraine where this would be relevant.
5/15
Besides the baseline AGM-158A JASSM, other variants have been developed, most notably the AGM-158B JASSM-ER.
The JASSM-ER more than doubles the unclassified range of the baseline variant to 1,000 km. However, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine will receive the JASSM-ER.
6/15
This is because of the critical importance the JASSM-ER would play in a US-China warfighting scenario.
Given the expected effectiveness of China's air & missile defense, JASSM-ER's range advantage is needed to credibly threaten Chinese targets located at strategic depth.
7/15
Due to the limited range and utility of the baseline variant in a conflict with China, officials may be more willing to part with their inventory of AGM-158A JASSMs.
Additionally, early-production JASSM AURs are nearing their expiration dates, further justifying delivery.
8/15
Assuming my accounting is accurate, the U.S. Air Force acquired just over 2,000 AGM-158A JASSMs between 2003 and 2021.
The final production lot for the AGM-158A JASSM was awarded in FY2016.
While some JASSMs have been used, a substantial stockpile should be available.
9/15
If Ukraine receives the AGM-158A JASSM, it will be the first time the AFU has access to two types of Western long-range strike weapons in substantial numbers.
Keep in mind that ATACMS deliveries began when Ukraine's Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG arsenal was virtually exhausted.
10/15
Being able to strike critical targets from ballistic (ATACMS) and ground-skimming (JASSM) attack vectors will significantly complicate Russian missile defense efforts, and facilitate Ukrainian efforts at overwhelming Russian integrated air and missile defense.
11/15
This is important because current ATACMS usage is high. Although this may not be unsustainable in the short term, relying on salvo attacks to penetrate Russian missile defense reduces the efficiency of Ukrainian long-range strikes using ATACMS.
JASSM can help with that.
12/15
It will force Russia to position missile defense systems for air-breathing, low-flying threats alongside those for high-altitude ballistic missile targets.
In any case, if JASSM is delivered, I expect to see an increase in reported S-300/S-400 attrition events.
12/15
JASSM would, of course, also be useful to take out a range of operational-level targets inside Ukraine, such as supply depots and logistics facilities.
The expected utility of JASSM would strongly increase if Ukraine were permitted to use them within Russia.
13/15
Considering the demonstrated challenges the Russians faced in countering Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and the highly survivable design of JASSM, I anticipate high initial effectiveness.
But in part, this will also depend on the extent of Ukraine's access to U.S. targeting data.
14/15
Receiving the AGM-158A JASSM would enhance Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities.
As for Germany, I don't anticipate delivery of JASSM to influence their stance on delivering Taurus. As long as the current government remains in power, Taurus will remain in Germany.
15/15
This thread was fairly surface level. I highly encourage you to follow @John_A_Ridge, @ColbyBadhwar, and @ThrustWR who I'm sure will post more detailed analysis in the future, especially if and when JASSM is confirmed.
Taurus uses a 'smart' fuse that counts the layers and void spaces the warhead penetrates, making sure the warhead explodes at precisely the right moment, rather than relying on a set timer.
Militarily, medium-range missiles provide deterrence benefits by allowing NATO to more credibly hold at risk targets at operational and strategic depth, including those of time-sensitive nature.
Politically, the decision restores NATO's role as a credible arms control actor. 2/5
Although the number of medium-range missiles in Europe may rise in the coming years, an arms race is unlikely.
Financial and political constraints limit Europe and the United States, while Russia lacks the capacity to significantly increase medium-range missile production. 3/5
Six months ago I wrote a viral thread, arguing that NATO has 2-3 years to prepare for Russia challenging NATO Art 5.
I wanted to revisit the topic for a while. In light of @JDVance1's pick as VP, today seems as good as any.
TLDR: panic should set in. 1/15
But first recap, why 2-3 years?
Russia's primary objective in attacking NATO territory would not be to take & hold land - at least initially.
Russia would want to challenge Art. 5 to destroy NATO as a relevant military-political entity, giving it free rain in the future.
2/15
How might 🇷🇺 achieve this?
By initiating small-scale incursions into Eastern Europe, followed by rapid escalation against Western European states to increase the costs of resistance, and coerce them into seeking a settlement.
When people claim medium-range missiles in Germany are destabilizing because they can reach homeland targets deep inside Russia, including Moscow, ask how often they’ve complained about short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles stationed in Kaliningrad.
1/5
For over a decade, Russia has been threatening European capitals and homeland targets with its Iskander-M ballistic and cruise missile systems, both nuclear & conventionally armed, from Kaliningrad.
Russia has also frequently hinted at using them in first-strike scenarios.
2/5
But now that NATO deploys exclusively conventional missile systems, capable of threatening military targets deep inside Russia, escalation risks will suddenly spiral?
Why? NATO only reciprocates the threat that Russia has imposed on Germany and others for years.
3/5
The lack of a public debate on the deployment of INF-range missiles in 🇩🇪 has been criticized.
But such a debate would have been counterproductive. Why?
1) It would have been more damaging than helpful 2) It would have undermined our credibility 3) There was no need for it
1/9
Most importantly, I disagree with the notion that this debate would have been some kind of enlightened discourse on the relative benefits of deterrence, reassurance and arms control.
The opposite: It would have been ugly and damaging to our democratic system and reputation.
2/9
The far left and far right would have hammered home the point that this is another instance of NATO provoking and threatening Russia.
Russian agents would have capitalized on the controversy to further divide our society and undermine support for NATO and Ukraine.
3/9
I saw a few takes today on why deploying INF-range missiles to Europe/Germany might strategically backfire, and that the timing of the decision was overhasty.
I want to present the counter-narrative: this move is strategically sound and the timing is appropriate. 1/8
1. INF-range missiles in Europe will offer NATO substantial military advantages and strengthen our deterrence posture.
To fight wars effectively, you have to be able to threaten the adversary's rear, including time-sensitive targets. 2/8
The missile systems deployed to Germany will provide for both. This will facilitate NATO's stated objective of forward defense and complicate Russian planning efforts both for invasion type and escalation management scenarios. 3/8