NEW: Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance southeast of Sudzha on August 16 amid continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast.
Tactical Updates 🧵(1/7)
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Mirny and south of Spalnoye (both southeast of Sudzha), and geolocated imagery published on August 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently operated within Borki (southeast of Sudzha).
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued north of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye, east of Sudzha near Agronom, and southeast of Sudzha along the Giri-Kamyshnoye-Krupets-Spalnoye line.
4/ Russian milbloggers noted that small Ukrainian mobile groups continued limited assaults behind the existing line of contact in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Korenevo and west of Snagost (south of Korenevo).
5/ The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian armored assault in the Gordeevka direction (south of Korenevo) and Ukrainian attacks west of Anastasyevka and SE of Kauchuk (both northeast of Korenevo and roughly 27km from the international border).
6/ Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian forces operating near Otruba (southwest of Korenevo and along the international border).
7/ Geolocated footage published on August 15 and 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces continue to operate throughout the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances within Kursk Oblast, including near Sudzha.
The Kremlin can absorb enormous costs but not without risk or limits. US incrementalism strengthens Putin’s ability to absorb risk, granting the Kremlin time to normalize an increasingly worse reality within Russia. 🧵(1/8)
2/ The next 2–3 years are critical for the Kremlin in this war, however. If US support to Ukraine persists and gains momentum, the Kremlin will have to reckon with its accumulating problems.
3/ The West must abandon its reactive mentality that seeks to contain Russia through countermeasures in favor of a strategy that focuses not only on imposing multiple dilemmas on the Kremlin but also on imposing the most painful ones.
NEW: Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk has the potential to generate momentum for Ukraine, argues @nataliabugayova. If it does, the US can help Ukraine build on rather than dampen that momentum to regain control over the tempo of the war by targeting Russia's unexploited weaknesses.🧵
2/ Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting. On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask its weaknesses.
3/ The Kremlin’s weaknesses include its inability to pivot rapidly, dependence on others for Russia’s capability to sustain the war, and years of risk accumulation that Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to reckon with.
2/ Commercially available satellite imagery collected by @Maxar on August 12 shows a newly dug series of field fortifications, including trenches and anti-vehicle ditches southwest of Lgov along the E38 Lgov-Rylsk-Hlukhiv highway (northwest of Sudzha).
3/ Additional satellite imagery published on August 13 and collected between August 6 and 11 shows the recent appearance of field fortifications near the 38K-024 highway just south of Lgov.
NEW: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast amid a generally slower tempo of Ukrainian operations as Russian forces continue attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area.
Kursk Tactical Update 🧵(1/15)
2/ Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on August 14 that its sources in the Ukrainian military stated that the tempo of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast has slowed due to the increasing Russian resistance in the direction of Kursk City.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually stabilizing the frontline in Kursk Oblast and that unspecified Russian reinforcements are arriving from unspecified areas and are establishing communications with Russian units already in the area.
What is the Tactical Reconnaissance and Strike Complex? 🧵(1/9)
The main obstacle to resorting maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine is the integration of offensive and defensive electronic warfare (EW) and the use of unmanned systems integrated with ground-based fires and attack drones, a phenomenon we have coined the Tactical Reconnaissance and Strike Complex (TRSC).
2/ The TRSC is the combination of pervasive tactical reconnaissance, primarily by drone; drone-corrected precision artillery fire; precision munitions delivered by fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft; drone-launched precision munitions; and large numbers of FPV loitering munitions.
3/ Extensive offensive and defensive electronic warfare supports the TRSC, which also draws on operational and strategic reconnaissance assets.
The Russian military command may be pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.⬇️🧵(1/5)
2/ The Russian military command could also be redeploying units that were previously intended to relieve or reinforce frontline units from rear areas in Donetsk Oblast to Kursk Oblast.
3/ Such a redeployment could affect the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Russian military's assessed priority sectors over time.