Neither an Antenna Mast Group nor Communications Relay Group and Electric Power Unit are visible.
The CRG acting as the RLG's Launcher Control Station plus AMG and EPU are emplaced at a different site. RL1 enables the CRG/LCS to communicate with LS up to 10 km away via VHF.
2|6
Remote launchers optimize PATRIOT's defended area against tactical ballistic missiles but create dead zones for airbreathing threats.
Remoting launchers in this instance is unusual as the RLG does not have Dnipro within its defended area for TBMs with PAC-3 or PAC-3 MSE.
3|6
Claimed Ukrainian PATRIOT fire unit with two LS and an MPQ-65 Radar Set.
Given its location, this cannot be the RS supporting the RLG as their separation is greater than 30 km allowed by AMG's UHF link.
It is likely this fire unit is a decoy based on its emplacement and the lack of certain equipment.
The LS are emplaced >80 degrees from the Primary Threat Line. This places them in a dead zone and the RS will be unable to establish missile communication at launch.
5|6
Neither an Engagement Control Station, an AMG, nor an Electric Power Plant are visible. These provide power to the MPQ-65 RS and links to the M903 LS, as the RS cannot directly communicate with LS, plus C2.
This is wholly inconsistent with a correctly emplaced PATRIOT.
6|6
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I won't detail the complete program history of S-300P/F/V as @ChungTzuW has already written excellent threads about them which I strongly recommend reading for context.
In short, all three systems emerged from a joint VKS/VMF/SV procurement program.
2|23
VKS/VMF requirements were focused on ABTs (air-breathing threats) while SV requirements were focused on TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles). This led to a divergence into S-300P/F and S-300V using radically different missiles and radars.
3|23
GLSDB has a range of >150 km while SDB has a range of ~110 km from a ~12 km release altitude and ~270 m/s release airspeed.
Position error due to accumulated inertial measurement unit drift is quadratically proportional to time of flight and range by extension.
2|5
Per interviews with Ukrainian pilots, they are typically releasing JDAM-ER at ~8 km. As SDB's employment profile is likely extremely similar, this is going to bring its range to <100 km.
3|5
So what is 3M22 Tsirkon (SS-N-33)? I have some thoughts based on written Russian sources, published test footage, and conversations with Ukrainian colleagues.
Is Tsirkon a “hypersonic (anti-ship) cruise missile? The answer is “yesn’t”👇🏻
1|20
While renders from the past decade depict it as a rocket-assisted scramjet vehicle, similar to X-51 Waverider, this is not accurate to the system that has been fielded.
I suspect that they potentially depict an earlier Tsirkon concept that was abandoned or not pursued.
2|20
Since the first live fire test in 2020, all published images and video have indicated a design substantially different design.
Rather than a scramjet vehicle, Tsirkon bore a striking resemblance to 3M55 Oniks (third image), Russia’s existing supersonic ASCM system.
3|20
This is going to be a spicy 🧵, especially for Ukrainians.
But people need to realize that there was no feasible way for Ukraine to have retained its Soviet nuclear weapons in the 1990s. And attempting to would not have ensured Ukraine’s sovereignty.
1|7
Russia had the codes for the weapons’ Permissive Action Links. Ukraine had no way to arm them without rebuilding the weapons and replacing their PALs.
Moreover, Ukraine could not maintain the warheads, which required regular servicing, without Russian assistance.
2|7
Even if Ukraine was willing to spend the money and time to build a nuclear weapons industry to overcome these challenges, both the U.S. and Russia were fundamentally unwilling to accept the existence of a nuclear-armed Ukraine.
3|7
Good overview of the challenges facing the Marine. Some additional context for SM-2 production. The SM-2 Block IIIAZ All-Up Rounds ordered from Raytheon are new build as far as I am aware. They are modifications of existing USN SM-2 Block IIIA stock.
The USN ordered 94 SM-2IIIAZ MODs and does not appear to be pursuing additional orders and there are no pending FMS orders. SM-2 Block IIIC MODS will likely continue through 2035 for the USN's Acquisition Objective for 1,000 SM-2IIIC AURs as well as FMS actions.
Upon the completion of the Netherlands', Denmark's, Chile's, and Taiwan's SM-2IIIA orders, the only new production AURs will be SM-2IIIBs for South Korea, Japan, and Australia as well as SM-2IIICs for Canada and an expected future Australian order.
Getting some pushback on my comments concerning @MriyaReport last night.
To clarify for those that aren’t familiar, myself and about 50% of the MR team (and 100% of MR’s subject matter experts) left in January 2023 because we were uncomfortable with the direction it was taking.
We became deeply uncomfortable with the volume of misinformation about the frontline and other topics that was being aired by MR’s leadership, @BalticSnowTiger (Axel) and @YAmzallagh (Joe), as well as frequent guests such as @ChuckPfarrer.
We took these concerns explicitly to Joe and Axel repeatedly. However, we were given a cold shoulder and our concerns were ignored. We also raised security and governance concerns regarding the incorporation of MR as a NGO with 501(c)3 status, but were likewise ignored.