Franz-Stefan Gady Profile picture
Aug 17 9 tweets 2 min read Read on X
Interesting & informative piece. wsj.com/world/behind-u…
„At around 3 a.m. on Aug. 6, they unleashed an intense barrage from six M777 howitzers, supplied by Ukraine’s Western backers, which were set up along a stretch of the border aiming into Russia.“
„Ukrainian electronic-warfare units went into Russian territory ahead of the main mechanized assault forces to jam Russian equipment to stop Russian forces from pinpointing Ukrainian positions or intercepting their communications.“
„Leading the charge were the 80th and 82nd air assault brigades, among Ukraine’s most powerful units, which are equipped with U.S. Stryker and German Marder armored vehicles.“
“On the fourth day of the incursion, a convoy of Russian military trucks laden with soldiers near the town of Rylsk was struck by rockets fired from a U.S.-provided Himars rocket system.”
“Western military estimates suggest Ukraine has committed as many as 6,000 soldiers to Kursk and has up to 4,000 additional troops in support roles in the Sumy region.”
“To avoid weakening the front line, a substantial number of the troops came from a reserve force Ukraine had been building with Western encouragement for operations later this year and in 2025, according to the person familiar with the operation.”
“Russia has pulled several understrength brigades from Ukraine in response, totaling up to 5k troops as of the middle of this past week, the person said. 1 brigade was from the Donetsk region, the focus of Russia’s current offensives, but others were from less essential areas.”
“Still, Russia might have to pull more troops out of Ukraine if it wants to take the territory back, which would require a larger force than the Ukrainians and would probably need to number more than 20,000 properly trained personnel, the person said.”

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Franz-Stefan Gady

Franz-Stefan Gady Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @HoansSolo

Jul 22
It looks like that some politicians in Germany only now seem to grasp that there are specific escalatory risks involved when relying on warfighting concepts built around conventional long-range strike capabilities to deter future Russian aggression.
Escalatory risks that can be managed I should add with with fine-tuning concepts & doctrine among other things. Deterrence does require some calculated risk taking. De-facto silence in Germany by both civilian & military leaders on this subject was quite unhelpful.
Side note: Any vertical escalatory risks do not exclusively have to do with payload & range of new 🇺🇸 strike systems in 🇩🇪 but rather with the need to create optimal battlespace conditions for their successful employment which can involve blinding/paralyzing enemy C4ISR systems.
Read 5 tweets
Jul 15
The public debate on the stationing of new ground-based US long-range strike capabilities in Germany as part of a US Army Multi-Domain Task Force (MTDF) is interesting as it neatly illustrates the vertical escalatory potential of emerging conventional US warfighting concepts.
These US warfighting concepts, in part based on conventional long-range precision fires (& information advantage/superiority), can blur the line of conventional & nuclear deterrence, especially when used against the military forces of a nuclear-armed state.
The knee-jerk reaction in Germany (& 🇷🇺) that the deployment is primarily to counter nuclear-capable Iskander's & other Russian strike capabilities in Kaliningrad is a good case in point in this regard. One can come to that conclusion easily, but that's not the purpose of MTDFs.
Read 7 tweets
Jun 12
“There are other serious challenges in the current efforts to train Ukrainian soldiers. The most consistent among those EUMAM trainers cite are language and culture issues.” mwi.westpoint.edu/what-does-euro…
“Some of the older German officers mention that their knowledge of East German military institutions helps them understand most of the organizational and doctrinal issues the Ukrainians face due to their shared Soviet legacies.”
“The other common problem is a lack of Ukrainian transparency. Western trainers and apparently Ukrainian military leaders do not have adequate mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of specific training efforts… inside Ukraine.”
Read 7 tweets
May 13
“In the past six months, Ukraine intercepted around 46% of Russian missiles, compared with 73% in the preceding six-month period, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of daily data from the Ukrainian Air Force Command.”
“Last month the interception rate fell to 30% of missiles. The interception rate for long-range Shahed drones, which are easier to shoot down, fell just 1 percentage point to 82% in the past six months.”
“Over the past six months, Russia fired around 45% more drones and missiles than in the proceeding six-month period, according to the data.” wsj.com/world/russias-…
Read 7 tweets
Feb 6
. @KofmanMichael and I have a new piece out in @SurvivalEditors 👇

In it we argue that the operative factor in this war is attrition, inflicted primarily through artillery/strike drones, & consequently needs to be included in any theory of success.

tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
While Western countries should continue to help Ukrainian forces improve their overall quality & their ability to scale up combined-arms operations, prevailing conditions in Ukraine still favor attritional & positional approaches rather than those suitable for maneuver warfare.
The operative factor is attrition, inflicted primarily through artillery and strike drones. The West is therefore best served by focusing on resourcing Ukraine’s fires-centered approach & helping Ukraine scale offensive operations to exploit a fires advantage when it is attained.
Read 9 tweets
Jan 19
‘The western official says that a strategy of “active defence” — holding defensive lines but probing for weak spots to exploit coupled with long-range air strikes — would allow Ukraine to “build out its forces” this year…’ h/t @ChristopherJM

ft.com/content/d2f3b2…
…and prepare for 2025, when a counteroffensive would have a better chance.’

‘Oleksandr Syrsky…suggested this week that the strategy does not amount to a drastic shift. “Our goals remain unchanged: holding our positions . . .exhausting the enemy by inflicting maximum losses.”’
‘There are some reasons for Ukrainian forces to remain upbeat. Since it launched its offensive around Avdiivka in October, US intelligence estimates that the Russian military has suffered more than 13,000 casualties and over 220 combat vehicle losses…’
Read 5 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(