NEW: Ukrainian forces continued assaults throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 18 and marginally advanced southeast of Sudzha.
Kursk Tactical Updates 🧵(1/10)
2/ Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian armored vehicle in northern Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into northern Martynovka.
3/ A Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 that Ukrainian forces seized Troitskoye (south of Korenevo and roughly two kilometers from the international border) and advanced to Semenovka (north of Sudzha and roughly 24 kilometers from the international border).
4/ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults on the outskirts of Korenevo, southwest of Korenevo near Komarovka; east of Korenevo near Olgovka; northeast of Korenevo near Alekseevsky, Safonovka, Kromskiiye Byki, Kauchuk, and Sheptukhovka; north of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Russkoye Porechnoye; and southeast of Sudzha near Ozerka, Giri, and Borki.
5/ Geolocated footage published on August 17 and 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces continue to operate throughout the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances within Kursk Oblast.
6/ A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces entered Otruba (north of Tetkino and on the west [right] bank of the Seim River), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Tetkino.
7/ Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk posted geolocated footage on August 18 showing Ukrainian forces conducting an airstrike against a bridge across the Seim River in Zvannoye (southeast of Korenevo), creating a large hole along the roadway.
8/ Russian milbloggers and opposition media disagreed about the impact of the damage on Russian logistics, with some sources claiming that the strike only partially damaged the bridge, while others claimed that the strike rendered the bridge unpassable and that there is only one other usable bridge left in the area near Karyzh (west of Zvannoye).
9/ Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge across the Seim River in Glushkovo (southeast of Zvannoye) and reportedly struck but did not destroy the Zvannoye bridge on August 16.
The Kremlin can absorb enormous costs but not without risk or limits, writes @nataliabugayova. US incrementalism strengthens Putin’s ability to absorb risk, as it grants the Kremlin time to normalize an increasingly worse reality within Russia. If US support to Ukraine persists and gains momentum, the Kremlin will have to reckon with its accumulating problems.
2/ The Kremlin is eroding Russia’s future capabilities. Materiel is a decisive capability for Russia in this war. Russia is burning through a lot of its equipment in pursuit of limited tactical gains.
3/ Putin’s control over Russia is strong, but it is built on fragilities and conflicting structures. For years, Putin has been cohering Russian society and his regime around those who are willing to get in line with his agenda.
NEW: Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance in Kursk Oblast on August 19 amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient in the area.
Kursk Tactical Updates 🧵(1/10)
2/ Geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in Vishnevka (southwest of Koronevo). The Russian MoD claimed that Russian aviation and artillery struck Ukrainian forces operating near Vishnevka.
3/ A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced within Russkoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha), east of Agronom (just east of Sudzha), and east of Spalnoye (south of Sudzha).
Key findings from Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War: 🧵(1/7)
Positional warfare is not stalemate. The current front lines are not static, nor are they stable. Both sides are trying to use various combinations of technological innovation, tactical adaptation, and mass to restore maneuver at the operational level of war. Neither has yet been able to convert tactical advances into operational maneuver, but one side or the other will likely succeed in doing so.
2/ The current positional character of the war results from a combination of factors. Both sides are large and powerful enough to cover the entire current front lines with forces adequate to make penetrations costly and bring up reserves necessary to stop the exploitation of those penetrations. The drone-electronic warfare-artillery complexes developed by both sides currently favor the defense. Restoring operational maneuver requires suppressing the defender’s drone-EW-artillery complex while retaining the ability to use one’s own.
3/ The offense-defense competition between drones and electronic warfare iterates very rapidly—sometimes over the span of a few weeks. This rapid innovation cycle offers opportunities to deploy new capabilities providing temporary advantages in support of planned ground offensive maneuver.
Russian forces have overall occupied 1,175 square kilometers of territory throughout the entire Ukrainian theater in the seven months from January and July 2024, as ISW recently assessed. In stark contrast, ISW has observed claims that Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast advanced roughly 800 square kilometers over six days from August 6 to 12 and advanced roughly 28 kilometers deep as of August 17. (1/7)
2/ Again, the size of the area seized by Ukrainian forces is not an indicator of the success of that operation--it is offered here to show that restoring maneuver can produce much more rapid advances than positional warfare.
3/ The initial Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast attacked largely unprepared, unequipped, and unmanned Russian defensive positions along the border, but Ukraine has continued to leverage maneuver to make rapid advances in Kursk Oblast following the deployment of Russian reinforcements to the area.
The Russian military command appears to have abandoned its efforts to make rapid tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction and embraced positional warfare. 🧵(1/12)
2/ The Russian military command tasked the Central Grouping of Forces with identifying and exploiting weaknesses in Ukraine's defensive line following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024.
3/ Mechanized elements of the Central Grouping of Forces achieved a notable tactical breakthrough northwest of Avdiivka in mid-April 2024 by exploiting exhausted and poorly equipped Ukrainian forces...
The scale of the war in Ukraine prevents either side from resolving the war in a single decisive campaign.
Effective campaign design requires forethought and planning for multiple successive operations that each set conditions for the subsequent operation.
🧵(1/13)
2/ In "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War," ISW noted that both sides can establish deep defensive positions and reserves that will prevent any single campaign from achieving strategic war aims before it culminates.
3/ Russia's and Ukraine's ability to generate enough combat power to man continuous defensive positions with no open flanks and establish tactical depth at significant points along the frontline has forced both sides to attempt penetration battles that are so costly that subsequent exploitation is often not feasible.