Thread by @WarintheFuture

Ukrainian objectives for the #Kursk operation have gained some recent clarity with statements by the Ukrainian President, as well as other Ukrainian officials. What are these objectives, and what are the Russian options to respond to the Ukrainian Kursk campaign? 1/24 🧵🇺🇦

2/ The first Ukrainian objective is political. Zelenskyy has described how "we’ve already expanded and will continue to expand the circle of those who support a just end to this war. It's essential that Ukraine enters this fall even stronger than before." Ukraine must be stronger as the year tapers off into Winter & it must also be seen as such by its supporters and those who support Russia.

3/ Another element of this political objective is to pierce the Russian bluffing about escalation. #Ukraine has demonstrated, again, that the various red lines projected by the Russian president are nothing but a chimera designed to reinforce Western political timidity about decision-making on the war, and shape Western decisions about provision of weapons.

4/ The creation of a buffer zone is another objective described by Zelenskyy. This appropriates Russian language, which the Russian president used to justify its invasion of #Kharkiv oblast earlier this year. But it is throwing down a gauntlet to the Russians by stating that Ukraine intends to hold at least some of the territory it has seized in #Kursk, and that this will be an ongoing military and political problem for Russia.

5/ Finally, Zelenskyy mentions the Kursk operation being part of a larger effort to destroy Russia’s war-making capacity. While this includes the full range of military operations across #Ukraine, as well as its strikes on strategic energy and military targets in Russia, #Kursk is designed by the Ukrainians to lure the Russians into a fight that they were not expecting on their own territory. kyivindependent.com/zelensky-we-ne…

6/ The operation thus far has demonstrated an effective orchestration of close and deep operations. These deep operations, such as interdiction of Russian reinforcement convoys, airfield strikes and dropping bridges over the Seim River to secure the Ukrainian flank and potentially shape Ukrainian operations south of the river, have all enabled the Ukrainian advance and complicated Russia’s response.

7/ But the initial shock of surprise experienced by the Russians has begun to wear off. They are slowly assembling their response to the Ukrainian #Kursk offensive, although this Russian response remains insufficient in scale and coordination.

8/ Russia faces some tough choices now that Ukraine has established itself on Russian territory. The most important one is where on its frontline is it willing to take more tactical and operational risk?

9/ If the fighting in Kursk continues for an extended period, and pushing the Ukrainians out is harder and more costly for the Russians than anticipated (which is very likely), even tougher choices will need to be made by the Russian military leadership and Putin. I think they have variations on four main courses of action.

10/ Option 1: Sustain the main effort in the Donbas with Kursk a secondary effort. This would see Russia focused on seizing key Ukrainian cities in the Donbas, compromising the overall Ukrainian scheme of defence.

11/ Option 2: Sustain the main effort in the Donbas but at a lower tempo and step up Kursk response operations. This might compromise the Russian ability to seize key cities in eastern Ukraine but force an earlier culmination of the Ukrainian Kursk offensive. Like the other options, this presents the Ukrainians with opportunities to target Russian forces in transit to Kursk and identify new weak points in the Russian frontline which might be exploited.

12/ Option 3: Designate the response in Kursk as the Russian military main effort for the war. This would see a major shift in Russian forces from Russia and Ukraine to seal off the Kursk incursion and push the Ukrainians back into Ukraine. However, it would probably see the Russian attempts to seize Pokrovsk and other strategic cities halted, or at least paused until 2025.

13/ This option would also present many more targeting opportunities to the Ukrainians in their deep operations to destroy Russian war making capacity, while also presenting additional weaknesses on the Russian frontline that Ukraine might exploit (assuming it has the forces remaining with which to do so).

14/ Option 4: Designate the Kursk and Donbas operations as ‘equal’ main efforts. While this doesn’t make a lot of military sense, and probably is not able to be fully resourced, this might be the option that Putin directs out of political expediency.

15/ At this point, the nuclear issue should also be raised briefly. Is it possible that Putin could consider the employment of tactical nuclear weapons to defend Russia and expel Ukrainian troops from ‘the motherland’. The key question that Putin would ask his generals would be whether the use of such weapons would fundamentally change the course of the Ukrainian campaign in #Kursk, and the war in general.

16/ The answer at this point is probably ‘no’. And given all of the political, strategic and humanitarian downsides of using nuclear weapons, the prospect of their use by Russia at present appears very limited.

17/ Ultimately, the Russian decision will be one that makes most sense politically to Putin. Military realities are important to him but the survival of his regime is an existential matter. Putin will need to decide which is the most dangerous to his regime – giving up on taking Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 or not regaining control of Russian territory quickly.

18/ The current situation is somewhat new. Both sides are now undertaking two concurrent major campaigns that are consuming large quantities or manpower (especially for the Russians), munitions and supporting arms such as EW, drones, logistics and air defence.

19/ While both might be able to surge their forces for short periods, it is unclear if the Ukrainians or Russians can sustain such an approach for months at a time. One side or the other will have to make a difficult choice about their priorities and significantly reduce their resourcing for one of their major campaigns.

20/ There are a range of strategic and military considerations. But ultimately the choice of which ground campaign will be the focus for Ukraine and Russia will hinge on political considerations.

21/ For #Ukraine, the question of how much territory can be ceded in the Donbas, casualties in the Kursk operation, the Russian response, use of Ukrainian offensive capability elsewhere, and the feedback from allies will influence their decision. As Zelenskyy noted in his recent speech, “it's essential that Ukraine enters this fall even stronger than before.”

22/ This is not just a statement of military strategy. It is also a statement of political necessity. As such, Ukraine will be aiming for the #Kursk offensive to deliver a shift in the political momentum in the war, just as the Ukrainians have seized the battlefield initiative.

23/ You can read my full analysis of the two concurrent ground campaigns dilemma that Ukraine and Russia face in my new article at Futura Doctrina. End. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-kursk-of…

24/ Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread: @KyivIndependent @Militarylandnet @DefenceU @ZelenskyyUa @CinC_AFU @TheStudyofWar