1/ QUICK TAKE: A Russian TG commentary on how historical and personal interpretation of WW2 is affecting Russians society's and its military leadership's views on Ukraine combat. Main points translated below: t.me/russ_orientali…
2/ "Many problems of a military and political nature are directly related to the cult of the Great Patriotic War (WW2). About 20s ago... I would not have said this, but now, from the height of my current experience, it is obvious."
3/ "The long-standing, almost religious, cult of (WW2) Victory is fixed in the consciousness of the broad masses of Russian people, and even the authorities - this image of war with mass casualties, destruction and abstract, poorly explained, ideological motives."
4/ "In every song, film, poem and slogan from childhood, we heard the slogans "we will not stand for the price", "at any cost", "everything for the front, everything for victory", "not a step back" and the famous "we can do it again" reflecting the myth of invincibility."
5/ "These slogans reflected the reality of that war - threatening mass destruction and population replacement and the liquidation of statehood. And the waste of millions of lives could be rationally explained. The enemy was advancing..."
6/ "...was near Moscow, it was necessary to stop him at any cost. Back then, women, as is well known, gave birth, and people could be treated as an inexpensive resource in case of great need. But now this is a problem. No people, millions of soldiers are not birthed."
7/ "And (today) the threat of liquidation of statehood and population replacement is not accompanied by the invasion of tank columns. The (current MOD) disregard for the lives of soldiers and civilians in the 21st century has no rational explanation."
8/ "Moreover, the (Soviet) films we watched since childhood about infantrymen dying in the trenches with a rifle in hand left ineradicable images of what a "real war" should look like: gritting our teeth, holding our position while the enemy plows it with artillery fire, and then..."
9/ "...if we survive, we throw ourselves under the enemy tank with a grenade. Right?? Is this what a "real war" looks like? The kind that people are supposed to be proud of. And you won't have any questions about how the enemy managed to..."
10/ "...concentrate so much artillery, why they are sitting in a crowd in one trench, and where are their anti-tank weapons? These are questions that we should have today - but we don't. "It's always like this in war", we remember it from childhood. And not these rides in mobile groups for the sake of photos on Telegram."
11/ "The problem is that both the Russian officer and the general today have also watched these films since childhood. And they were just waiting for an opportunity to prove themselves, like the hero of a film about Generals Zhukov or Rokossovsky."
12/ "And this general does not understand what claims can be made against him, if the war looks exactly like he memorized, and has always looked exactly like this. Well, they did not evacuate civilians during the retreat, but this is a war with "fascism", and what did you expect?"
13/ "The conscripts were surrounded - well, this is the enemy who came to our holy land, during the Great Patriotic War, schoolchildren went as volunteers, and these conscripts today are also paid money under the contract. Artillerymen were transferred to assault units and wiped out in a week? Well, all for the sake of victory."
14/ "In such an atmosphere, it is very difficult to carry out military reforms and even comprehend the change in military thought. The very rational discussion of military expediency is already heresy! What is the point..."
15/ "...of taking a regional center, losing more people in the assault than there were residents in that regional center? Such a question cannot be asked, it discredits the symbols of faith. The land under dead cities is priceless. Everyone must die for it."
16/ "That's how it was in the war movies. And then it turns out that in this new, modern war, everything works differently. If you fight for every piece of land, then the army quickly wears out, and the women do not give birth to new soldiers. It turns out..."
17/ "...that the enemy will spit on you and go around you to another location. That if you gather forces for a decisive throw, missiles will fly there. And while you produce everything for the front, everything for victory, you fall into technological and financial dependence on geopolitical players."
18/ This is one opinion on TG - there are many Russian officers who went through different military rotations, including in Syria, and who do not want to waste soldiers, like Gen. Surovikin, who withdrew from parts of Kherson rather than face a strong Ukrainian response.
19/ On balance, the translated opinion above is a civilian view of massive casualties sustained by the Russian military to date, especially massive "meat assaults" of 2023.
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1/ QUICK THEAD: Russia’s Aleksey Chadaev, a key promoter of “people’s VPK” on the “valley of death” for domestic volunteer drone development: “The problem is not that the “devils in uniforms(generals)” just want one drone supplier since…” t.me/chadayevru/3097
2/ “..,that is all they can handle and manage (a swipe at the Sudoplatov effort) - the problem is that domestic “garage manufacturers” cannot provide a technological ecosystem to support their drones that has the full cycle of technical, developmental…”
3/ “…software and other support alongside of training the pilots and operators and tech support specialists in their specific drone product. This is the “valley of death” not just for small developers in Russia, but also for some larger enterprises.”
1/ Russian military bloggers' continued attempt to understand Ukraine's successful "EW offensive": "What did our enemy do based on the knowledge of our modest capabilities in low-altitude air (drones, etc) and EW (on the Kursk border)? First, he developed a strategy ..."
2/ "...for the step-by-step advancement of his armored columns under his own EW coverage, while perfectly understanding that our drones in this direction would be few in numbers. Second, he did what we had only planned (but not executed)..."
3/ "(Ukr. military) closed all frequency control ranges (via EW), leaving only one or two frequencies for his drones. All of the enemy's low-altitude air (UAVs) was sent on a frequency against which we did not have EW stations, or they (EW) did not have time to reach the troops."
1/ The Russian government and the MOD are making significant changes to its annual ARMY military forum and expo - the event will no longer feature regular visitors, but will be limited to the military, industry and foreign visitors from other countries' MODs. The event will...
2/ ...also run for just 3 days rather than a week-long expo in years past. Unsurprisingly, ARMY-2024's main topic will be the war in Ukraine and technologies and systems deployed there or developed for this invasion. The Aug 12-14 forum will also feature volunteer R&D.
3/ Expect all kinds of quadcopters, UAVs, EW, CUAS, UGVs and related technologies to take center stage at this event. There will be open and classified discussions as well dealing with military tech, especially AI and ML.
1/ THREAD: Yesterday, Russian Defense Minister Belousov's comments about how many drones are at the front caused a slight confusion. Russian state media outlet RIA first reported him saying that "domestic FPV drone production has grown to 4000 per day." But then...
2/ ...RIA edited the original article so that he was quoted saying that the "number of FPV drones on the line of contact has sharply increased to 4000 per day" (see screenshots above). Russia's Lenta media outlet did not help either - it has him saying that every day, "4,000 FPV drones are delivered to the front in response to the wish of one of the soldiers to have a certain number of drones in each detachment."
3/ Russian military's bloggers seized on these numbers, assuming Belousov's original comment was the right one: "About 4,000 FPV drones delivered per day means a production rate of about 1.4 million drones per year. At the same time, if you divide this figure by the number..."
1/ QUICK THREAD on the Ukrainian thoughts about future combat technologies. Main translated points below: "There is a current trend to improve the effectiveness of FPV drones by increasing their flight range and weight of the transported munition." focus.ua/opinions/65741…
2/ "But this automatically leads to an increase in the drone size and its visibility, which makes it more vulnerable to CUAS. However, these are the conditions of positional battles, dictated by current tactics. But the strategic drone development..."
3/ "...will most likely follow the opposite path, which sci-fi writers predicted long ago - through maximum miniaturization. That is, the combat drone will shrink to the size of a bee to deliver a small dose of poison to paralyze enemy fighters, or..."
1/ Last year, Russian MOD tried to promote the "Sibiryachok" combat quadcopter made by one of its defense companies - the military users noted its poor quality, lambasting it on social media (below). This drone is back - recent uses point to continued bad quality (it crashed).
2/ Many reviews are downright brutal, with Russian solders not holding back expletives to describe it, and some are saying they are not using it altogether due to its poor quality. t.me/mil_hub/61207
3/ Other users are more "kind", noting that before this "sophisticated" quadcopter can be flown, it requires a lot of adjustments, including software updates. Other responses point out that this "sophisticated" drone needs proper training and background work before its flown.