Vladimir Putin is unlikely to announce mobilization, but will continue to use conscripts to replenish the army. A survey in Russia showed that the level of public anxiety after Ukraine's entry into Kursk increased less than it was when mobilization was announced.
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Putin considers mobilization even more dangerous for the government than the loss of the Kursk region, even in its entirety. The problems of the Kursk region in the eyes of Russians remain regional problems, and they will even survive the loss of the region as a whole.
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Mobilization will come to almost every home. There are still enough regions in Russia, but mobilization violates the unspoken agreement that was formed under Putin - the people turn a blind eye to the theft of the government, and in exchange, the government does not touch
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the citizens. Putin avoids mobilization, especially since there will be another call-up in October. Most likely, he will wait for it. Conscripts are another system of slavery in Russia. They have almost no rights, they obey the will of those above them. If they do not obey, 4/1
they are given such a life in the barracks that they change their minds. They are beaten, morally abused. They completely belong to the system. They were sent to Chernobyl to eliminate the consequences of the reactor explosion without proper protection and equipment, to
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eliminate the consequences of other disasters. Along with prisoners from prisons, conscripts were used as free labor. Most often, they were sent to construction sites and field work. So, most of the facilities in Tallinn for the 1980 Olympics in the USSR were also built
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using conscripts. The quality of such construction is, of course, very low. By the way, the City Hall building, which was the location of the Kiev Opera in Christopher Nolan's film "Tenet", was also built, including conscripts for the Olympics. Then it was called the "Palace
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of Culture and Sports named after V. I. Lenin". Now it has completely fallen into disrepair and it is unprofitable to renovate it. There are discussions about its fate. Little has changed since the USSR. Only the service life has been reduced from 2 to 1 year. Instead of
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training, recruits are most often busy with construction, cleaning, loading and unloading, and other chores for unit commanders. They are a kind of enslaved peasants, and he is the master. Structure of Russian army is a huge topic and needs to be analyzed separately. It is
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a vertical hierarchy, closely connected with the government, state construction projects, the military industry, and everything is built in such a way as to steal as much as possible from the state budget, and in return provide models and Potemkin villages. If a big guest
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comes to town, along with municipal services, these will be conscripts who will be forced to paint the grass green and hide garbage. In general, inventing useless tasks for soldiers is a long-standing tradition in the Russian army. Rolling a square, plucking grass with
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bare hands, sweeping with crowbars. This is how commanders "instill discipline" and it is believed that if a soldier is not busy with anything, it is imperative to come up with a task for him. Therefore, the Russian army was never conceived as a normal army in function.
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Its main strength has always been simply the number of "peasants" that it could afford to throw at embrasures with machine guns, regardless of losses. But Russia is not the USSR. Its resources are much more modest, mostly left over from the times of the USSR. Deliberately
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keeping the population in poverty the Russian government found those who were ready to sign a contract, but now even payments of 2 million are not attractive. In addition, there was no Internet or communications in the USSR. Now people know a little more about what is
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happening. This is why people are not very eager to join the army. Conscripts also do not have to be paid. Before the Kursk, conscripts were pressured to sign a contract and so that is how they ended up at the war. In Kursk region they are now simply sent to the front.
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The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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