Thread by @Combination_K

A thread discussing the training, and conditioning of Soviet soldiers:

To understand the individual within the Soviet military, one must understand the goals of the Soviet military, this is an often forgotten progression in regards to critiques of the Soviet infantryman and how he fights.

The USSR and its military system were entirely focused on the possibility of a land war in Europe, this heightened concern of the East being threatened in such a regard led to rather unique military developments, one of those being the means in which the individual was trained.

Within a conventional war against a near peer rival, the Soviets believed the most effective means in which one could ablate the capabilities of the enemy was to disrupt their ability to coordinate and communicate effectively.

The means in which one could actualize this, in the eyes of the USSR was speed, aggression, and surprise. This system was designed with the express purpose of catching NATO at its weakest, which would be the first few days of a third European war.

Many fail to realize that surprise in regards to the Soviet definition of the word is more complex than simply catching the enemy off guard, the Soviets believe that it is instead ones ability to mobilize and strike decisively prior to the enemy fully mobilizing.

If the USSR was to conduct an offensive on Western Europe they would ensure deception measures destroy NATOs ability to react effectively, and that smaller nations within the alliance are slower to deploy, leaving fatal gaps in their defensive effort.

To ensure this surprise is properly advantageous the Soviet military sacrifices tactical flexibility and individual initiative in the opening hours of a conflict in favor of speed and the preservation of momentum.

This is something the Soviets learned from their experiences in WW2, leading to an emphasis on the operational level of warfare, while individual initiative was indeed important the USSR believed that what produced results was the skilled commander.

During consistent study of WW2, those within the USSR noted that while at the tactical level the German military was indeed superior, it was the operational level in which they suffered, this formed the basis for the modern Soviet army.

The Soviet military is one of drill for this reason, working to prepare their combatants for each situation and construct normative responses for those under stress which were to be engaged as instinct in the field. Many fail to realize how extensive this process was.

Soldiers had to meet performance standards which were graded on ones ability to execute actions in a quick and effective manner.

Including the digging of a trench, moving from a march to skirmish line, to complex tactics such as rapidly discerning the ideal route to maintain cover and concealment. Ideally such actions would become muscle memory within high stress environments.

Many of these performance standards are denoted numerically as norms, which work to define the performance of an individual under certain conditions, this not only gives the soldier a high combat readiness but prepares each commander with knowledge of how their units will operate

The Soviet concept of tactical initiative under this model is markedly different than what one would observe in Western military systems, in Soviet thinking initiative is ones ability to find a solution through the pre-defined norms the soldier is taught.

Though this is not always the case, as previously stated the importance placed on the operation means initiative scales exponentially with ones position in the chain of command.

Extreme dedication to drilling detail oriented tasks ensured higher ups knew both how long a given operation would take, and what considerations would need to be taken beforehand.

This system is rather unique when contrasted against a Western model, due to the international nature of the US and its allies at this time the terrain and tasks one may encounter while enlisted vary greatly.

Soldiers must cope with this, which is done through encouraging individual inventiveness, and initiative.

Because of this, the scope of what is expected of each soldier is polarizing, the US military could never rely on Soviet style drilling and vice versa.

Furthermore, the integration of Warsaw Pact members into this hypothetical European war reduces the burden on the Soviet military significantly, notably the concern that is urban combat within an industrialized Western Europe.

While Soviet soldiers, specifically those within Guards divisions who receive higher degrees of training and flexibility, prepare for fighting within these locations, the armed forces of both Poland and East Germany specialize in such actions.

In regards to organization, the average Soviet squad when factoring dismounts is almost always 7 men, while technically apart of this unit, the crew operating their transport (BTR or BMP in regards to motor rifles) stays with the vehicle, to provide fire support and mobility.

The squad leader, Senior Rifleman/Asst. Squad Leader, Assistant Grenadier, Medic and Rifleman are all armed with AK-74s, the Machine Gunner operates an RPK-74, and the Grenadier a PM and RPG.

One squad in each platoon will have access to an SVD in place of an AK-74. A platoon consists of 3 squads.

Anyways the thread concludes here, expect a follow up post in the near future concerning preparatory training.