Around August 16th, a video circulated on Telegram, showing a Ukrainian soldier's severed head on a pole, reportedly filmed by a member of the 155th Brigade. This should be seen not just as an isolated act of cruelty but as part of a larger, systematic approach.
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2/ Before discussing the issue, let's clarify several points. The video went viral after the notorious Russian unit "Rusich" posted it on their Telegram channel on August 16th. They praised the 155th Brigade, stating that this was an appropriate response to "pigs."
3/ This is not the first instance of the 155th Brigade engaging in such cruelty. In March 2022, the same brigade was involved in the occupation of Bucha, an event documented in the official report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
4/ While isolated cruelty can occur in a war involving over a million troops, encouragement of such crimes is a different level of severity. For instance, following the notorious Bucha massacre, Putin awarded the 155th Brigade an honorary title after their withdrawal from Bucha.
5/ The issue extends beyond the 155th Brigade itself. There are multiple reports and videos of acts of torture, execution, dismemberment, sexual violence, and castration committed by other Russian forces. These actions occur with minimal or no repercussions at all.
6/ One aspect of this approach is that violence is not just intended to terrorize Ukrainians into submission - few would be swayed to surrender by such brutality. Instead, the goal is to provoke a violent response from Ukrainians, thus discouraging RU troops from surrendering
7/ Despite the cruelty and torture endured by Ukrainians, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have shown remarkable restraint. This is evident in the Kursk region, where, unlike the Russian actions in Izyum, Bucha, and other towns, there have been no acts of revenge or massacres.
8/ This not only debunks the "bothsidesing" fallacy but also shows the world that Ukraine holds the moral high ground and remains committed to its international legal obligations. Unfortunately, this significant fact seems to be frequently overlooked.
9/ States that encourage systematic violence and crimes should be treated similarly to ISIS, with a comparable response to completely stop such behavior.
Verbal condemnations have proven ineffective against ISIS and are unlikely to be effective against Russia.
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1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories