Ukraine continues to destroy Russian fuel logistics. New reports of the destruction of a ship with fuel tanks in the port of Kavkaz in Kerch. Details are being clarified. The oil depot in Proletarsk, Rostov Region, has been burning for the fifth day. After the attack on
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Proletarsk, a sale of oil depots has begun in the Rostov Region, local media write. Several oil depots in different areas of the region are up for sale. In addition, two more oil refineries and an inactive oil depot are up for sale in the Rostov Region. Ukraine is
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confronting a much larger enemy and the tactics that Ukraine has successfully used many times during this war are to methodically destroy logistics and attack when the army has supply problems. There is nothing new in the tactics themselves, but new technologies provide new
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opportunities. Such tactics also work at a small level, when the Russians are allowed to enter a populated area, then cut off from supplies with drones and artillery, and then destroyed one by one. So, on a general level - Ukraine methodically took out air defense, after
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which it was easier to attack oil storage facilities and airfields. Solving one problem after another. It is unlikely that the operation in the Kursk region is the place of Ukraine's main attack. Its goal is to liberate territory, not to seize new ones. While Putin is not
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ready to withdraw forces from the Pokrovsk direction, parts of the troops have already been sent from the Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions to stop the Ukrainians in Kursk. Is it possible that Ukraine is planning a new offensive in the Zaporizhzhya region? It is possible,
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but this is not certain. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have not yet introduced into battle most of the brigades formed by the new mobilization. Not all Western equipment has been introduced either. Ukraine is accumulating resources. A maximum of 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers are
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operating in Kursk. Some of whom are still in Ukraine as reinforcements. During the war, theories have repeatedly surfaced that it would be most advantageous to strike in the Zaporizhzhya region, but inflated expectations led to failure. The offensive in 2023 did not work
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out. Will the Ukrainians be able to do it now and will they risk going through the heavily mined and fortified areas of the Zaporizhia region now with larger forces and different tactics? It still remains a very difficult task. The Kursk operation is ongoing, and we have
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even gotten used to the idea that Ukrainian troops are occupying Russian territory. Who would have thought of this a month ago? Ukraine has begun to advance into the Glushkovsky district, where they have cut off up to 2,000 Russian troops from supplies across the Seim River
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Another 300 square kilometers of territory may soon be taken by Ukraine. The total area of the Kursk region, where fighting is currently underway, already exceeds 1,350 square kilometers. The operation is going well. We must remember that Ukraine is also suffering losses,
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the Ukrainian civilian population is constantly under shelling. Russia is trying to stop the offensive in Kursk, this time by bombing its own cities. However, autumn is approaching and in about 2 months the fighting will be more difficult to conduct due to the weather and
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muddy roads. Is Ukraine preparing another blow? Most likely, but at the moment no one except the Ukrainian General Staff knows where the next strike will be. And that's for the best. Let Ukraine surprise us once again.
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Putin is losing the game he himself started. His bet was placed on a return to the world of the 19th and early 20th centuries - a world of empires and spheres of influence, where Europe, America, Africa, and Asia are divided among several “superpowers.” In Putin’s vision of
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the world, there were supposed to be three such powers: the United States, Russia, and China. However, the real transformation of the global order is unfolding in a completely different way. The key failure is Ukraine. At the end of the fourth year of war, Russia has still
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been unable to subjugate it. The army is visibly degrading, human and technological resources are being exhausted, the economy is held together by military spending and gray schemes, and the state increasingly resembles an overextended empire losing its ability to govern
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Within NATO, the possibility of conducting a special joint mission in Greenland is being considered in order to accommodate the interests of US President Donald Trump. This week, the US president once again stated that he wants Greenland. Military intervention is not being 1/8
ruled out. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen previously said that this would mean the end of the Alliance if the United States were to begin military action against her country. On Thursday morning, the 32 ambassadors of the Alliance gathered for their weekly meeting. 2/8
It took place in a "calm atmosphere." Denmark raised the Greenland issue in a "positive and forward-looking manner," NOS insiders reported. The US ambassador to NATO, Whitaker, also reportedly spoke in a conciliatory tone. As became clear during the meeting, almost all 3/8
Russia has once again staged a media stunt with the story about a drone attack on Putin’s residence. In the Novgorod region no one heard air raid sirens, yet according to Lavrov, 91 drones were launched from Ukraine and all of
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them were shot down. There is not a single video and not a single piece of evidence. Why is this needed? This entire performance was staged specifically for Trump. Putin personally called the American president and told him about it. Russia has long convinced Trump that it
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is Zelensky together with the “warmongering shadow government of Europe” who allegedly do not want the war to end. This show was played out so that Ukraine would be blamed for the failure of peace talks. Unfortunately, with Trump, this works. Meanwhile, Lavrov declares that
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Daily strikes by Ukrainian drones and missiles on Russian oil depots, warehouses and refineries have created an image in the information space of a “leaky” Russian air defense system. This image sharply contrasts with what Russian propaganda had been instilling in its audience🧵
for decades, namely the idea of an “impenetrable shield” capable, according to Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, of intercepting up to 97 percent of targets. The reality of a full scale war has proven far more complex. Ukraine has not managed to destroy Russian air defense as a
single integrated system, but it has succeeded in exposing its real limits. As analysis by the Royal United Services Institute shows, the strength of Russian air defense depends not only on missiles and radars, but also on industry, logistics and the ability to replenish losses
Seven German journalism students tracked Russian-crewed freighters lurking off the Dutch and German coast and connected them to drone swarms over military bases. Using public tracking tools, their own drones and even driving 2500 kilometers while following a ship, they produced🧵
a far more coherent picture of the Germany and Netherlands drone mystery than months of official hand-wringing and coordinated stonewalling. “Our trail leads to Russia,” the team concludes. “Not beyond doubt, but it’s currently the most probable explanation. We systematically
laid both things side by side: the secret reports about drone incidents and the routes of the ships. You can at least recognize a pattern.” They did not find a drone on any ship and they cannot prove causation, but they established the following: ships with Russian crews showed
Brussels has found a way to make decisions on blocking Russian assets without the consent of all EU member states, the Financial Times reports. This would allow the assets to be frozen indefinitely rather than having the blockade renewed every six months as is currently 1/9
the case. According to the publication, this is made possible by one of the EU treaty provisions stating that unanimous approval is not required in situations of economic shocks, which Brussels considers the war in Ukraine to be. Until now, when extending the freeze, there 2/9
was a risk that one EU country, for example Hungary, could oppose it, and without unanimous agreement the assets would be unfrozen. In early December, the European Commission approved two options for financing Ukraine for 2026 and 2027. The first plan involves providing 3/9