Ukraine continues to destroy Russian fuel logistics. New reports of the destruction of a ship with fuel tanks in the port of Kavkaz in Kerch. Details are being clarified. The oil depot in Proletarsk, Rostov Region, has been burning for the fifth day. After the attack on
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Proletarsk, a sale of oil depots has begun in the Rostov Region, local media write. Several oil depots in different areas of the region are up for sale. In addition, two more oil refineries and an inactive oil depot are up for sale in the Rostov Region. Ukraine is
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confronting a much larger enemy and the tactics that Ukraine has successfully used many times during this war are to methodically destroy logistics and attack when the army has supply problems. There is nothing new in the tactics themselves, but new technologies provide new
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opportunities. Such tactics also work at a small level, when the Russians are allowed to enter a populated area, then cut off from supplies with drones and artillery, and then destroyed one by one. So, on a general level - Ukraine methodically took out air defense, after
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which it was easier to attack oil storage facilities and airfields. Solving one problem after another. It is unlikely that the operation in the Kursk region is the place of Ukraine's main attack. Its goal is to liberate territory, not to seize new ones. While Putin is not
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ready to withdraw forces from the Pokrovsk direction, parts of the troops have already been sent from the Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions to stop the Ukrainians in Kursk. Is it possible that Ukraine is planning a new offensive in the Zaporizhzhya region? It is possible,
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but this is not certain. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have not yet introduced into battle most of the brigades formed by the new mobilization. Not all Western equipment has been introduced either. Ukraine is accumulating resources. A maximum of 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers are
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operating in Kursk. Some of whom are still in Ukraine as reinforcements. During the war, theories have repeatedly surfaced that it would be most advantageous to strike in the Zaporizhzhya region, but inflated expectations led to failure. The offensive in 2023 did not work
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out. Will the Ukrainians be able to do it now and will they risk going through the heavily mined and fortified areas of the Zaporizhia region now with larger forces and different tactics? It still remains a very difficult task. The Kursk operation is ongoing, and we have
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even gotten used to the idea that Ukrainian troops are occupying Russian territory. Who would have thought of this a month ago? Ukraine has begun to advance into the Glushkovsky district, where they have cut off up to 2,000 Russian troops from supplies across the Seim River
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Another 300 square kilometers of territory may soon be taken by Ukraine. The total area of the Kursk region, where fighting is currently underway, already exceeds 1,350 square kilometers. The operation is going well. We must remember that Ukraine is also suffering losses,
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the Ukrainian civilian population is constantly under shelling. Russia is trying to stop the offensive in Kursk, this time by bombing its own cities. However, autumn is approaching and in about 2 months the fighting will be more difficult to conduct due to the weather and
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muddy roads. Is Ukraine preparing another blow? Most likely, but at the moment no one except the Ukrainian General Staff knows where the next strike will be. And that's for the best. Let Ukraine surprise us once again.
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The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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