Ukraine continues to destroy Russian fuel logistics. New reports of the destruction of a ship with fuel tanks in the port of Kavkaz in Kerch. Details are being clarified. The oil depot in Proletarsk, Rostov Region, has been burning for the fifth day. After the attack on
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Proletarsk, a sale of oil depots has begun in the Rostov Region, local media write. Several oil depots in different areas of the region are up for sale. In addition, two more oil refineries and an inactive oil depot are up for sale in the Rostov Region. Ukraine is
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confronting a much larger enemy and the tactics that Ukraine has successfully used many times during this war are to methodically destroy logistics and attack when the army has supply problems. There is nothing new in the tactics themselves, but new technologies provide new
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opportunities. Such tactics also work at a small level, when the Russians are allowed to enter a populated area, then cut off from supplies with drones and artillery, and then destroyed one by one. So, on a general level - Ukraine methodically took out air defense, after
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which it was easier to attack oil storage facilities and airfields. Solving one problem after another. It is unlikely that the operation in the Kursk region is the place of Ukraine's main attack. Its goal is to liberate territory, not to seize new ones. While Putin is not
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ready to withdraw forces from the Pokrovsk direction, parts of the troops have already been sent from the Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions to stop the Ukrainians in Kursk. Is it possible that Ukraine is planning a new offensive in the Zaporizhzhya region? It is possible,
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but this is not certain. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have not yet introduced into battle most of the brigades formed by the new mobilization. Not all Western equipment has been introduced either. Ukraine is accumulating resources. A maximum of 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers are
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operating in Kursk. Some of whom are still in Ukraine as reinforcements. During the war, theories have repeatedly surfaced that it would be most advantageous to strike in the Zaporizhzhya region, but inflated expectations led to failure. The offensive in 2023 did not work
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out. Will the Ukrainians be able to do it now and will they risk going through the heavily mined and fortified areas of the Zaporizhia region now with larger forces and different tactics? It still remains a very difficult task. The Kursk operation is ongoing, and we have
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even gotten used to the idea that Ukrainian troops are occupying Russian territory. Who would have thought of this a month ago? Ukraine has begun to advance into the Glushkovsky district, where they have cut off up to 2,000 Russian troops from supplies across the Seim River
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Another 300 square kilometers of territory may soon be taken by Ukraine. The total area of the Kursk region, where fighting is currently underway, already exceeds 1,350 square kilometers. The operation is going well. We must remember that Ukraine is also suffering losses,
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the Ukrainian civilian population is constantly under shelling. Russia is trying to stop the offensive in Kursk, this time by bombing its own cities. However, autumn is approaching and in about 2 months the fighting will be more difficult to conduct due to the weather and
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muddy roads. Is Ukraine preparing another blow? Most likely, but at the moment no one except the Ukrainian General Staff knows where the next strike will be. And that's for the best. Let Ukraine surprise us once again.
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The Russian army is facing a gasoline shortage in the occupied regions of Ukraine. About two weeks ago, a shortage of gasoline at gas stations began, and sales to private individuals were restricted. However, the Russian army in these areas often uses civilian gas stations,
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frequently even refueling at its own expense. The reason is constant Ukrainian strikes on logistics. When a fuel truck arrives at the rear, a rush and crowd form, which Ukrainian reconnaissance drones detect and coordinate strikes on. On top of this, there are frequent cases
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of fuel theft and resale on the black market. Resellers take advantage of the gasoline shortage and sell “under the table” for more than 200 rubles per liter, while the usual price at gas stations is 60–70 rubles per liter. The occupation authorities happily integrated into
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The economic crisis in Russia is worsening. The budget deficit already amounts to 5 trillion rubles for the first seven months of the year, or 3.4% of GDP. This figure is twice the planned value for the entire year, 1.7% of GDP. Today or tomorrow, data for August will be
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published, and the number will be even higher. The main reason is the decline in oil and gas revenues. For the second month in a row, revenues remain at a record minimum of about 500 billion rubles per month, while 1 trillion rubles are needed to cover planned expenditures.
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The problem for Russia is that they have nothing to cover this deficit. There is increasing talk about the need to lower the key interest rate to revive the economy. Proposals are being made to reduce it to 16%. However, lowering the rate never happens without consequences -
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit has shown that a power capable of posing an economic challenge to the US and the EU has taken shape in the world, and it is directed from Beijing. Putin arrived in China for a four-day visit. Such a long trip by the Russian
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dictator is called, on the one hand, a triumph after his return from Alaska, where US President Trump solemnly welcomed him on the red carpet and did not impose sanctions. On the other hand, relations between Beijing and Moscow are not equal: China benefits from preventing
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rapprochement between Putin and Trump, but Xi also does not want Russia to grow stronger. The SCO is seen as China’s attempt to contain the US in the Indo-Pacific region and as Russia’s response to NATO expansion. However, experts acknowledge that this is not an alliance or
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Europe once again demonstrates its toothlessness towards Russia. The incident with von der Leyen’s plane is a serious event, where the lives of everyone on board were put at risk. An excellent comment on this matter was written by Former Foreign Minister of Lithuania
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Gabrielius Landsbergis: "Deeply concerned to hear about the deeply concerning GPS interference that diverted @vonderleyen 's flight. Europe stands united in expression of deep concerns and must commit to the deployment of ever-deepening concerns moving forward." Expressing
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deep concern is the main tactic of the EU in times when decisive action is needed. I feel like a parrot repeating the same phrase – a tough response to Russia is needed. It understands only the language of force, and if this force is demonstrated, Russia will retreat. It is
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Russia’s budget deficit has surged to around ₽5 trillion (about $62.5 billion). That’s 130% of what was planned, and there are still four months left in the year. Another round of inflation is expected this autumn. The central bank’s decision to cut the key interest rate
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in June has triggered a new problem—a sharp increase in household debt. Russian consumers typically lack financial literacy, and in hard times they don’t cut back or save; instead, they live day to day, as if it’s their last, without thinking of the future. It’s the classic
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Russian “avos’” mentality. Once the key rate fell from 21% to 18%, people snapped up new loans without much concern about how they’d repay them later. Everyone irrationally hopes that it’s temporary and will somehow resolve itself. This is all before even accounting for the
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Russia has carried out its first successful naval drone attack on the Ukrainian ship Simferopol. The Simferopol is a medium-sized Ukrainian reconnaissance vessel. The Russians struck the ship in the Danube River estuary. One sailor has been confirmed dead, while several 1/6
others are reported missing. A breach opened in the ship’s hull, causing it to capsize. The vessel was built on the hull of a Project 502EM fishing trawler and was launched in 2019. According to military sources, the strike was conducted by a newly formed unit of the Russian 2/6
Ministry of Defense (We should call it Ministry of Offense) — the “Division of Uncrewed Naval Systems of the Rubicon Advanced Drone Technology Center.” This marks the emergence of a new and very serious threat to Ukraine’s fleet and coastal infrastructure. It is yet another 3/6