Geospatial analysis from Frontelligence Insight reveals that Russian forces continue to build a defensive line in the Kursk region, located south and southwest of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant in Kurchatov
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2/ The initial stages of constructing a defensive line near the settlement of Dolgii, roughly 10 kilometers south of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, were visible in satellite imagery on August 14. By August 18, the trenches were in the process of being reinforced.
3/ After completing the initial trench digging within the first few days, Russian forces secured the necessary equipment and materials to reinforce the trenches with logs and wood. Satellite imagery shows multiple excavators in the area.
4/ Based on a few indicators that our teams prefer not to disclose publicly, there are clues that Russian forces are also creating defenses within tree lines. Due to the foliage, these defenses are not easily visible on satellite imagery, thus defenses might be more extensive
5/ While fortifications can be a serious obstacle, their effectiveness depends on whether experienced veterans or undertrained conscripts man them. We also don't know to what extent Russian forces plan to mine their own region
6/ Overall, our team expects these fortifications to expand, as Russian forces have gathered resources, taking advantage of the slowdown of Ukrainian troops. It remains to be seen if they have enough time to complete them and build an organized defense to stop the Ukrainians.
7/ Consider supporting the Liberty Ukraine Foundation, which raises funds for Ukrainian troops and provides equipment, such as excavators. Unfortunately, Russia still has a serious advantage in assembling resources for defensive construction
Ukrainian drone strikes in Izhevsk: Russia’s arms heart, and Luhansk using rocket-drone "Peklo" demonstrates Kyiv’s growing technological abilities. The message to Putin is clear: Ukraine’s strike range and warhead size will only continue to expand as the war continues:
2/ Air defense drones are emerging as a promising counter to Russia’s expanding Shahed (Geran) drone output - no longer just a concept, but an increasingly likely solution that could help offset Moscow’s production surge with scalable and relatively cheap response
3/ Russia’s consistent failure to break Ukrainian front, despite a manpower edge, and mounting economic issues, admitted even by Putin, nullify their bravado shown during the latest Istanbul. Achieving Moscow’s stated goals would require far more resources than it's deploying
Our team has been tracking Russia’s recruitment efforts abroad, with a focus on West Africa and Cuba. Some revealing insights follow in this short thread🧵:
1. While some foreign POWs claim they were misled, documents suggest they joined Russia’s military knowingly
2. The reality is quite prosaic: Moscow offers steady pay that far surpasses local wages, along with the lure of adventure - an exciting offer for young men in economically strained countries. In some cases, recruits receive upfront bonuses as high as $20,000 and more
3. The contracts - often written in languages such as Spanish or French - clearly outline terms, including compensation for injury or death, and explicitly mention “Special Military Operation” zone. This makes claims of recruits being unaware highly implausible
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts.
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization