Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on August 23. Geolocated footage published on August 22 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Orlivka (southeast of Pokrovsk). Additional geolocated footage published on August 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced within eastern Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 400 meters within eastern Novohrodivka, up to 500 meters within southern Novohrodivka, and within southeastern Novohrodivka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating southeast of Pokrovsk seized Krutyi Yar and advanced further west of Orlivka, within southeastern Krasnyi Yar, south of Mykolaivka, west of Skuchne, towards Mykhailivka, and southwest and southeast of Ptyche. A Russian source claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces seized Kalynove (southeast of Pokrovsk). ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however.
2/ Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on August 23. Geolocated footage published on August 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Krasnohorivka during a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault. The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the Russian attack stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and five infantry fighting vehicles. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka on August 22 and 23.
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NEW: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid reports of continued Ukrainian attacks in the area on Aug. 25.
Russian forces recently advanced near and within Toretsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
More key takeaways⬇️
2/ The Russian military likely continues to redeploy forces from lower priority sectors of the frontline in Ukraine to the frontline in Kursk Oblast.
3/ French authorities arrested Telegram founder Pavel Durov on August 24, prompting concern among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers about their ability to report freely on the war in Ukraine.
The United States currently prohibits Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS missiles to strike military targets in Russia and only allows strikes using US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS — at maximum permitting Ukraine to strike only 20 out of the 250 objects it could strike with ATACMS.
Only 17 of these 250 objects are airfields, and it is unlikely that the Russian military has redeployed assets away from all the other 233 objects to the same degree as it has reportedly done with aviation assets. 🧵(1/6)
2/ US officials’ comments centered on Russia’s redeployment of air assets have so far largely ignored the majority of targets in range of ATACMS that Ukrainian forces could strike if US prohibitions were lifted.
3/ Many of the 233 military and paramilitary objects in range of ATACMS are large military bases, communications stations, logistics centers, repair facilities, fuel depots, ammunition warehouses, and permanent headquarters that would be extremely difficult or impossible to quickly redeploy assets from or rapidly harden.
NEW: Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater, and the lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons would allow Ukrainian forces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding Russia’s war effort. 🧵(1/8)
An unnamed senior Biden administration national security official reportedly stated that Ukrainian strikes with Western-provided weapons against targets within Russia would not be effective because the Russian military has redeployed military aircraft from Russian airbases near Ukraine — but this assessment ignores how Russian forces are leveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia for a wide array of infrastructure besides airfields to support military operations against Ukraine.
2/ Politico reported on August 23 that an unnamed senior Biden administration national security official stated that Russian officials have moved some targets out of range of Western-provided Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles and that Ukrainian forces only have a limited supply of these missiles.
An unnamed administration official also reportedly stated that Russian forces have moved 90 percent of the aircraft that conduct glide bomb strikes from Russian airspace away from airfields within range of Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles.
3/ ISW has observed confirmation of redeployments of Russian aircraft to airfields out of range of Western-provided long-range weapons; and the reported decreased Russian aviation activity throughout the theater is consistent with reports that Russian forces have been redeploying aviation assets.
NEW: Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance near Sudzha amid continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast on August 23.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
More Key Takeaways ⬇️🧵(1/7)
2/ Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukrainian forces can leverage tactical and technological advantages to offset Russian materiel advantages.
3/ US President Joe Biden announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine following a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 23.
NEW: Ukrainian forces marginally advanced throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 22.
The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts. 🧵(1/5)
2/ The scale of the redeployment of the 56th VDV Regiment is unclear from available information in the open source but is consistent w/ ISW’s observation that Russia has been pulling forces from less critical sectors of the frontline such as Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.
3/ ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military will likely continue prioritizing Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine – namely in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions.
NEW: Iranian interest in the progress of Gaza Strip ceasefire-hostage negotiations suggests that elements of the Iranian regime are likely delaying a retaliatory strike on Israel until ceasefire talks conclude. 🧵(1/8)
2/ The Iranian security establishment may calculate that a continued delay will generate operational surprise while forgoing strategic surprise, though the continued Iranian delay has also enabled the United States to move more assets into the theater to defend against an attack.
3/ Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 21. Hezbollah launched two separate one-way attack drone attacks targeting IDF surveillance infrastructure Jal al Alam and Israeli forces at Kiryat Shmona. Hezbollah also launched Katyusha rockets targeting Israeli forces in Ramot Naftali, northern Israel.