#Hybrid: Durov’s arrest in France is suspicious: 1) he knew he was wanted for the quality of content moderation on Telegram platform, used by Russia for spreading disinformation; 2) Durov appears to have deliberately chosen to fly to Paris, even though he was avoiding Western ⤵️
jurisdiction so far; 3) The French arrest warrant was valid only for French territory, which may explain why Durov chose to fly to France and not another European country, where he was immediately arrested; 4) As a French citizen, he will not be extradited, although Russia ⤵️
would like to have him back; 5) One working theory may be that Durov chose to collaborate with the French police, without being clear in return for what, to show that he is not working with Russian states to destabilize France/the West;⤵️
6) This event will likely have an impact on Telegram content (1 billion users worldwide); 7) It is a signal to @elonmusk and others that they are not immune from punishment for contributing to disinformation, with destabilizing effects on Western states.
Russia is disoriented and doesn’t know how to intervene in Durov's case. Moscow plans to speak to the French opposition about it. Russian Duma Committee on International Relations Chairman Slutzky announced he will hold talks on Durov's arrest with @MLP_officiel.
@MLP_officiel The ‘power’ and ‘fear’ of setting a precedent, applied to those who do not comply despite their wealth and connections.
@MLP_officiel Tomorrow the French prosecutor's office will make a statement. Durov risks 20 years in prison on all the charges taken together. The biggest mystery is why Durov decided to travel to France. I suggested the theory that he did it deliberately.⤵️
@MLP_officiel Should the theory that Durov deliberately headed to Paris prove wrong, Moscow could try to broker a swap deal. Russia has already launched an info campaign in support of Durov, calling him a “political prisoner.” This is another Assange-style narrative for Moscow’s propaganda.
@MLP_officiel Experts explained that Telegram has an emergency plan in case of Durov's arrest. The access key to the Telegram operating system will be changed immediately. To gain access to the necessary docs to build a solid case against Durov, a diplomatic cooperation with UAE is required.
@MLP_officiel Ukrainian sources claim that Telegram is being used by Russian military and intelligence services abroad. If access to it is lost, military and hybrid operations (and the people behind them) could be unveiled and compromised.
@MLP_officiel Meanwhile, Russian-linked cyber groups have carried out massive DDoS attacks against several French public services websites (health, etc.). This is a response by non-state actors, something Russia has neither denied nor self-attributed.
@MLP_officiel The case is highly political (cross-border) in nature. @EmmanuelMacron did not hold back without commenting: 1) Durov's arrest is not "political" (as Russia claims); 2) this case was opened because of France's rule of law, not an attempt to use censorship (as @elonmusk claims).
@MLP_officiel @EmmanuelMacron @elonmusk The EU says this issue is beyod its competence. However, Brussels is one of the strongest actors in countering Russian hybrid interference in the media sphere. If Telegram is regulated as a result of Durov's deals with Paris, it will help the EU fight Russian disinfo & more. 👇
#Georgia: This Sunday's elections will be crucial for the future of the political and social fabric of this country, still a EU candidate state. Both voters and the EU are faced with a dilemma: the continuity of the oligarchic regime or a political rejuvenation. A 🧵:
1) The oligarchic regime of Ivanishvili has not shown any fear of the threats of sanctions from the U.S. and the EU. Nor is the freezing of the EU candidate status perceived as a real risk, as local political interests prevail in the calculations of the Georgian Dream.⤵️
2) Georgian security forces launched investigations into experts from civil society organizations to fuel the narrative that the West would interfere in Georgia's internal affairs. ⤵️
#Moldova: Voting has begun. Around 160,000 voters have cast their ballots in the country (6% turnout so far). Around 15,000 voted in the diaspora. A thread 🧵:
1) The Central Election Commission publishes the turnout for the presidential elections. It is not yet clear whether the figure matches that of the referendum.⤵️
2) Queues are reported at two polling stations in Moscow. At the suggestion of Moldovan intelligence services, only two polling stations were allowed, while the number of people abroad is estimated to be 350,000.⤵️
#Moldova_Elections2024: In 15 days, Moldova will hold presidential elections and a constitutional referendum. Some pro-Russian proxies are vying to enter office. I open a thread related to Russian hybrid interference in Moldovan elections. A🧵:⤵️
1) More than 130,000 Moldovan citizens have received money from Russia through accounts at Sberbank, which is subject to Western sanctions (since 2022). More than 50,000 are directly linked to the Shor Group/“Victory” ⤵️
Bloc (a self-exiled businessman convicted in absentia for the 2010-14 banking fraud). It could mean that another 80,000 people are either Shor supporters or pensioners receiving social payments from Russia;⤵️
#EU_Neighborhood: The three main narratives employed by the current govts in Georgia, Moldova & Armenia envisage the following: 1) War: The Georgian govt speaks of the risk of the “opening of a second front”, attributed to the West and local opposition forces.⤵️
In Moldova, Russian aggression against Ukraine is at the forefront of govt discourse. Some official narratives in Armenia hint at the danger of a war that could be started by Azerbaijan. 2) External interference: The Georgian govt frequently refers to the “Global War Party”⤵️
(indirectly the West) that gets involved in domestic politics. In Moldova and Armenia, Russia and pro-Russian “proxies” are the usual suspects of interfering to destabilise. 3) European integration: It follows from the Georgian govt narratives that the EU would not be impartial⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: They have many things in common, but the most important is the presence of Russian occupation forces. Drawing parallels between the negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict and the peace talks that Kyiv would have to hold with Russia can be misleading. A🧵:
1) Negotiations on the Transnistria conflict in the 2000s were carried out with the mediation of the EU and the US, which rather accepted the terms set by Russian diplomacy (because it is unlikely that both they will be fooled). The conditions were dictated by the context in⤵️
which the West and Russia were looking for platforms on which they could cooperate and the “5+2” format was one of them (not the only one); 2) After the failure of the Minsk agreements and large-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, neither the West is willing to mediate⤵️
#Moldova_Russia: The implications of Russian aggression against Ukraine are qualitatively changing the symmetry in the Moldova-Russia relations in favor of Chisinau. This is one of the underlying conclusions reached by Ch. Smith (@StateDept) on Moldova. A 🧵:⤵️
1) The US recognizes that there is no real threat from Russia, mainly because its capabilities in Ukraine are at the limit. This has always been the case since the full-scale war began because the Russian military has never come close to reaching the Ukraine-Moldova borders; ⤵️
2) According to the US, Russia is using disinformation in an attempt to destabilize Moldova. Even as the Moldovan govt closed (suspended their licenses) 13 TV channels and is closely monitoring media content, disinformation is continually invoked as one of Russia's main levers.⤵️