The Ukrainian attack into #Kursk, now into its 3rd week, was a tactical & operational surprise for the Russians. But the Ukrainians also surprised their supporters in the West. And part of the reason is that many Western nations can’t conceive of such audacity in the modern world. 1/14 🧵engelsbergideas.com/notebook/ukrai…
2/ Ukraine also surprised their supporters in the West in large part because #Ukraine deliberately withheld details of the #Kursk attack to preserve operational security, avoid second guessing by talkative bureaucrats in the West, and avoid the inflated expectations of the build up to their failed 2023 counteroffensive.
3/ The operation is not without risks. The Russian advances in the Donbas, particularly on their Pokrovsky axis of advance, are taking ground and threatening a key line of defended cities in eastern Ukraine. Losing these would cause significant challenges for the Ukrainian defensive campaign in the Donbas and political challenges for the Ukrainian president.
4/ Ukraine is also in the process of reconstituting its forces in the wake of the 2023 counteroffensive and nearly nine months of Russian offensives in eastern Ukraine. Many assumed they simply did not have the forces available for such an operation. By not using their reserves to reinforce troops in the Donbas, and instead using them in Kursk, #Ukraine has taken a major risk.
5/ But it appears to be an informed and calculated risk. No outside observer of the war has all the data available to the Ukrainian general staff that is making such decisions.
6/ Why was this Ukrainian audacity required? In short, the status quo of the war in #Ukraine, before the offensive, was not sustainable for Ukraine. It is incurring unacceptable humanitarian and strategic costs.
7/ Ukraine assessed that #NATO strategy for supporting Ukraine is unlikely to shift beyond its ‘defend Ukraine’ approach, and that no significant shift in U.S. policy is likely before next year. Putin is not changing, and retains his aspiration to exterminate the sovereignty & culture of #Ukraine.
8/ Ukraine knew that it was the only actor that could change the status quo in the war. The surprise attack into #Kursk, with its political, strategic and military objectives, is the result.
9/ Western politicians and bureaucrats, having been able to assume a posture of ‘strategic slumber’ since the end of the Cold War, can no longer imagine such battlefield & strategic audacity. From the perspective of western politics, it is very risky behavior, and certainly would not poll well.
10/ None of the challenges faced in the past 30 years, not even the wars spawned by 9/11, have required the mobilization of people, industry and new ideas – or taking massive strategic risks. We have lapsed into strategic timidity.
11/ This strategic timidity has been on display since the start of this war in 2014. It was also on display in Afghanistan. Very few countries of those involved were willing to commit significant resources to the campaign, and almost all had significant caveats on the employment of their forces there.
12/ Until Kursk, we had assumed the Ukrainians think just like we do. Thank goodness they do not.
13/ The West’s strategic timidity prevents it from imagining, let alone conducting, the kind of high risk & high reward actions that #Ukraine is now taking. The #Kursk offensive, which is yet to draw Russian forces from its advance in the Donbas, may well fail to achieve its some of its objectives. But if it does, it won't be because the Ukrainians didn’t try.
14/ Western politicians and bureaucrats have much to learn from the audacity shown by #Ukraine in recent weeks. Let us hope they have the character, humility & risk tolerance to do so. You can read my full article on this at @EngelsbergIdeas. End. engelsbergideas.com/notebook/ukrai…
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