As Russian forces close in on Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub in Ukraine's Donbas region, concerns about its potential loss are mounting. There is uncertainty about why Pokrovsk is more significant than other recently lost towns. This thread aims to clarify this and other aspects:
2/ Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, Avdiivka was vital for Ukrainian troops, serving as a fortress, protecting key logistical routes in Donetsk Oblast, and a potential foothold for deoccupying Donetsk. Since 2022, Russia has invested heavily in capturing it
3/ Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of ~60,000, lies west of Avdiivka at a key railroad crossroads. It has become a key distribution hub, supporting Ukrainian forces along a broad frontline from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond. The railways are highlighted in red
4/ Currently, only two places in the Donbas serve this vital function - Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk
The significance of Pokrovsk extends beyond its rail connections - it is also located at a key road juncture, serving a similar role in the transportation and distribution of supplies
5/ The road linking Pokrovsk to Kostyantynivka has long been a Russian target. Cutting it off would worsen the resupply of troops in the Bakhmut-Horlivka sector. The potential loss of Pokrovsk poses an operational threat to logistics in the region, from Vuhledar to Horlivka
6/ Another concern is the political one: Pokrovsk is just over 20 kilometers from the Dnipro Oblast border. Given Russia's re-entry into Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, there's little reason to think Putin will stop at Donetsk and Luhansk borders.
7/ Since July, the pace of Russian advancement in this area has quickened, allowing them to bypass most of the defensive lines Ukraine rapidly built after Avdiivka’s fall. This is visible on the map by OSINT group @Black_BirdGroup, which used satellite imagery to map defenses
8/ Satellite imagery of seized UA positions shows signs of artillery shelling, though less extensive than in Ocheretyne. This likely indicates that Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk area retreated multiple times due to insufficient forces and resources for an organized defense
9/ While concerns about the lack of fortifications behind Avdiivka are valid, the major issue is the shortage of manpower and units to defend them. Regardless of how well-constructed the defenses are, if they are staffed at only 10-20% of capacity, they likely will be lost
10/ Typically, both Ukraine and Russia redeploy forces to stabilize critical areas by moving units from quieter sectors. Ukraine’s redeployment to Kharkiv, and then Sumy for the Kursk operation has reduced the available units for stabilization efforts.
11/ Does this mean that the loss of Pokrovsk is imminent? No, but the likelihood is increasing due to the balance of forces. Despite Ukrainian efforts to draw Russian forces away with the Kursk incursion, Russian leadership is hesitant to redeploy significant forces from Pokrovsk
12/ Ukraine has options to stabilize the line, including deploying new brigades, repositioning forces from Kursk and Kharkiv, or reallocating battalions from more stable fronts. However, time is against the defenders, and there is a risk of a serious operational catastrophe.
13/ The full analysis with detailed insights and nuances from Frontelligence Insight will be available soon on the @EuromaidanPress website and our own site. Follow our account to stay updated, and please like and share the opening message to help increase visibility.
14/ The full version of the article with better graphics and more details is available here:
Mobilization, payouts, demographics, and desertions are central factors shaping the war’s trajectory. Thanks to weekly notes by the Conflict Intelligence Team, we have some data to analyze the current state of affairs in Russia. Below are some key points from the past two weeks:
2/ The sign-up bonus for contracts with the Ministry of Defense in the Novosibirsk region will double from 800,000 rubles ($10200), set in December 2024, to 1.6 million rubles ($20400) between July 1 and September 30. An additional 400,000 will be given from the federal budget
3/ The sign-up bonus with the Ministry of Defense in Vladimir region has been raised to 2.1 million rubles ($26,700) for the period from July 1 to September 30. This marks the third increase in 2025, following rises to 1 million rubles in January and 1.6 million in April.
Did you know Russia’s Su-34 and Su-35S jets, used in bombing campaigns, contain over 1,100 microelectronic parts from 11 Global Export Control Coalition countries? A new joint investigation by IPHR, NAKO, and Hunterbrook uncovers the supply chain. 🧵Thread with key takeaways:
2/ Most components come from the US, but the supply chain spans Germany to Japan. Of 891 parts from 138 firms, 59% are under strict export controls. 36.3% of shipments were small-value (less than $10000), pointing at intermediaries and shell companies use to evade sanctions
3/ Despite sweeping sanctions, Russia continues to receive Western semiconductors at industrial scale. An analysis of more than 180,000 customs records from 2023 shows approximately $805.6 million worth of microelectronics arriving from top-tier global suppliers.
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has launched 28,743 Shahed/Geran drones at Ukraine - 2,736 of them in June of this year, according to President Zelensky. Our team took a brief look at the Shahed numbers and noted the following trends and figures🧵:
2/ The 2,736 drones launched in June, many targeting Kyiv, make up nearly 10% of the total, proving growing production. This aligns with earlier warnings from Ukrainian intelligence, which estimated Russia’s monthly output at around 2700 Shahed-type UAVs and roughly 2500 decoys
3/ Ukrainian Air Force data shows 5,438 drones of this type were launched at Ukraine in June 2025 - about twice the number cited by Zelensky. The gap likely comes from the Air Force counting both Geran and decoys UAVs, while Zelensky referred only to strictly Geran drones
As Ukraine marked Naval Forces Day, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet started the morning fending off a joint air and sea drone attack on its base in Novorossiysk. Early footage shows no major damage. Our team reviewed satellite imagery from the day before, here’s what we know🧵:
2/ As of July 5, four Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines were present at the Novorossiysk naval base - which is nearly the entire remaining operational submarine force of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. These submarines are equipped to launch Kalibr cruise missiles.
3/ Valuable naval assets, including an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, minesweepers, patrol boats, and corvettes, were anchored in the bay at the time of the attack. The strike occurred overnight, and by late morning, local authorities declared the situation to be safe
In recent months, Russia has focused on drone strikes deeper behind the front, aiming to disrupt Ukraine’s supply lines. In return, Ukraine has turned to hitting Russian drone teams. In an effort called "Dronocide," Ukrainian troops found 90 suspected drone sites in Zaporizhzhia
2/ The Armed Forces of Ukraine claim that 42 enemy positions were destroyed or heavily damaged in precision strikes. Notably, it does seem that the operation was a coordinated joint efforts between the Air Force, Defense Intelligence, drone units, and a land forces brigade.
3/ Coordination between various branches and units has long been a persistent issue for the Armed Forces. But based on this limited evidence presented in the video, there are optimistic signs that coordination and joint execution is improving to some degree.
On 5 July, Ukrainian forces carried out a strike on the Borysoglebsk airfield in Russia. Reports indicate that a depot with glide bombs, a trainer aircraft, and possibly other aircraft were hit. Our team has conducted a brief analysis of imagery a fire map - here’s what we found:
2/ NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System detected at least three thermal anomalies at the Air Base. While it's not very precise or comprehensive, the heat sources appear to be located in 2 areas: the central part of the airfield and the logistical section
3/ While not conclusive, this serves as a credible independent indicator suggesting a possible strike on the logistical area - where Russian forces may have stored ammo, or fuel. The fire in the central part of the airfield appears to be near the Radar Landing System