As Russian forces close in on Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub in Ukraine's Donbas region, concerns about its potential loss are mounting. There is uncertainty about why Pokrovsk is more significant than other recently lost towns. This thread aims to clarify this and other aspects:
2/ Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, Avdiivka was vital for Ukrainian troops, serving as a fortress, protecting key logistical routes in Donetsk Oblast, and a potential foothold for deoccupying Donetsk. Since 2022, Russia has invested heavily in capturing it
3/ Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of ~60,000, lies west of Avdiivka at a key railroad crossroads. It has become a key distribution hub, supporting Ukrainian forces along a broad frontline from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond. The railways are highlighted in red
4/ Currently, only two places in the Donbas serve this vital function - Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk
The significance of Pokrovsk extends beyond its rail connections - it is also located at a key road juncture, serving a similar role in the transportation and distribution of supplies
5/ The road linking Pokrovsk to Kostyantynivka has long been a Russian target. Cutting it off would worsen the resupply of troops in the Bakhmut-Horlivka sector. The potential loss of Pokrovsk poses an operational threat to logistics in the region, from Vuhledar to Horlivka
6/ Another concern is the political one: Pokrovsk is just over 20 kilometers from the Dnipro Oblast border. Given Russia's re-entry into Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, there's little reason to think Putin will stop at Donetsk and Luhansk borders.
7/ Since July, the pace of Russian advancement in this area has quickened, allowing them to bypass most of the defensive lines Ukraine rapidly built after Avdiivka’s fall. This is visible on the map by OSINT group @Black_BirdGroup, which used satellite imagery to map defenses
8/ Satellite imagery of seized UA positions shows signs of artillery shelling, though less extensive than in Ocheretyne. This likely indicates that Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk area retreated multiple times due to insufficient forces and resources for an organized defense
9/ While concerns about the lack of fortifications behind Avdiivka are valid, the major issue is the shortage of manpower and units to defend them. Regardless of how well-constructed the defenses are, if they are staffed at only 10-20% of capacity, they likely will be lost
10/ Typically, both Ukraine and Russia redeploy forces to stabilize critical areas by moving units from quieter sectors. Ukraine’s redeployment to Kharkiv, and then Sumy for the Kursk operation has reduced the available units for stabilization efforts.
11/ Does this mean that the loss of Pokrovsk is imminent? No, but the likelihood is increasing due to the balance of forces. Despite Ukrainian efforts to draw Russian forces away with the Kursk incursion, Russian leadership is hesitant to redeploy significant forces from Pokrovsk
12/ Ukraine has options to stabilize the line, including deploying new brigades, repositioning forces from Kursk and Kharkiv, or reallocating battalions from more stable fronts. However, time is against the defenders, and there is a risk of a serious operational catastrophe.
13/ The full analysis with detailed insights and nuances from Frontelligence Insight will be available soon on the @EuromaidanPress website and our own site. Follow our account to stay updated, and please like and share the opening message to help increase visibility.
14/ The full version of the article with better graphics and more details is available here:
If we focus on the bigger picture today, the overall situation is not that bad. We went from Russia’s 2022 demands: military downsizing, government changes, the secession of multiple regions, and other demands: to a much shorter list of demands today:
2/ Notably, Ukraine has also stepped back from its maximalist demands for a de facto return to its 1991 borders and the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Clearly, its stance against direct negotiations has been abandoned as well.
3/ Whether this will work or not is beyond the scope of this message, but interestingly, if you read some of the more-or-less “semi-independent” Russian “Z” channels, not just those that repeat state propaganda, you can see that this realization is starting to take hold
So far, Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated strategic goals in this war:
Demilitarization – failed.
Regime change in Kyiv – failed.
Full control over Donbas – failed.
Preventing NATO enlargement – failed.
🧵Short thread:
2/ Demilitarization of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military is now larger, better armed, and far more experienced than before the war. It is more technologically advanced and capable than ever before.
3/ Russia failed to remove Zelenskyy or his government. Kyiv remains fully under Ukrainian control. The chances of a pro-Russian party winning the next election are slim to none
1/ As I noted from the outset, based on the limited information then available, there was no “operational breakthrough”. The penetration was tactical, involving roughly a battalion-sized force. Still, it is too soon for celebration
2/ Initially, the situation was especially risky, as Russian units managed to break east of Dobropillia. I would not describe this as a DRG (sabotage group) operation or a simple raid, since neither term accurately reflects the size of the force or its mission in the context
3/ It is positive that Ukrainian forces contained the threat and prevented it from developing into an operational breakthrough. However, the scale of reinforcements required was significant. According to Deep State, the following units were involved in the reinforcement effort:
Missing Targeting Pods, Inflated Bills: An Exclusive Investigation into the Su-57 Procurement Problems by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵Thread:
1/ Newly obtained classified documents, show that Russia purchased its 5-generation Su-57 fighters for more than 3 billion rubles each;
2/ Data provided by Analytical Company "Dallas" (@dallasparkua) shows that in 2021 & 2022, Su-57 fighter jets were delivered without targeting pods, leaving them short of their advertised capabilities. At the time, the cost of a single Su-57 was roughly $42.1 million in USD terms
3/ The documents show that in 2021, a year before the war, the Russian Defense Ministry formally accepted Su-57 aircraft without the 101KS-N, an electro-optical targeting subsystem. This was allowed under Additional Agreement No. 8.
Debates over losses are always heated, but hard data cuts through the noise. Frontelligence Insight analyzed Russian documents released by the I Want to Live project, giving insight on soldiers of the 8th Army who went missing in action. 🧵Thread:
2/ From January 2024 to June 2025, 6,921 soldiers and officers of the 8th Army were reported missing in action. Part of the Southern Military District, the 8th Army has primarily operated in Donetsk Oblast, with elements recently deployed at Pokrovsk to reinforce the 58th Army.
3/ Looking at the timeline, losses in 2025 have significantly peaked compared with 2024. The number of monthly MIA cases more than doubled and remained consistent throughout 2025, reflecting the period of active offensive operations, particularly in Donetsk.
Commented to the FT on pressure to cede territories:
“The constitution limits his power: he has no legal right to alter Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Even more constraining is pressure from society and, crucially, the military, which opposes giving up unoccupied territory"
“President Zelenskyy is caught between a rock and a hard place,” the article concludes with my comment.
Given the opportunity, I also want to add that if peace is to be negotiated, we cannot start with non-starter demands, which our President won't be able to accept
Diplomacy is the art of compromise and seeking constructive solutions. Ukraine has been constructive, avoiding maximalist demands, but if Moscow imposes such demands, the Trump administration should recognize that Ukraine is not the party which obstructs his vision and peace