As Russian forces close in on Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub in Ukraine's Donbas region, concerns about its potential loss are mounting. There is uncertainty about why Pokrovsk is more significant than other recently lost towns. This thread aims to clarify this and other aspects:
2/ Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, Avdiivka was vital for Ukrainian troops, serving as a fortress, protecting key logistical routes in Donetsk Oblast, and a potential foothold for deoccupying Donetsk. Since 2022, Russia has invested heavily in capturing it
3/ Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of ~60,000, lies west of Avdiivka at a key railroad crossroads. It has become a key distribution hub, supporting Ukrainian forces along a broad frontline from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond. The railways are highlighted in red
4/ Currently, only two places in the Donbas serve this vital function - Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk
The significance of Pokrovsk extends beyond its rail connections - it is also located at a key road juncture, serving a similar role in the transportation and distribution of supplies
5/ The road linking Pokrovsk to Kostyantynivka has long been a Russian target. Cutting it off would worsen the resupply of troops in the Bakhmut-Horlivka sector. The potential loss of Pokrovsk poses an operational threat to logistics in the region, from Vuhledar to Horlivka
6/ Another concern is the political one: Pokrovsk is just over 20 kilometers from the Dnipro Oblast border. Given Russia's re-entry into Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, there's little reason to think Putin will stop at Donetsk and Luhansk borders.
7/ Since July, the pace of Russian advancement in this area has quickened, allowing them to bypass most of the defensive lines Ukraine rapidly built after Avdiivka’s fall. This is visible on the map by OSINT group @Black_BirdGroup, which used satellite imagery to map defenses
8/ Satellite imagery of seized UA positions shows signs of artillery shelling, though less extensive than in Ocheretyne. This likely indicates that Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk area retreated multiple times due to insufficient forces and resources for an organized defense
9/ While concerns about the lack of fortifications behind Avdiivka are valid, the major issue is the shortage of manpower and units to defend them. Regardless of how well-constructed the defenses are, if they are staffed at only 10-20% of capacity, they likely will be lost
10/ Typically, both Ukraine and Russia redeploy forces to stabilize critical areas by moving units from quieter sectors. Ukraine’s redeployment to Kharkiv, and then Sumy for the Kursk operation has reduced the available units for stabilization efforts.
11/ Does this mean that the loss of Pokrovsk is imminent? No, but the likelihood is increasing due to the balance of forces. Despite Ukrainian efforts to draw Russian forces away with the Kursk incursion, Russian leadership is hesitant to redeploy significant forces from Pokrovsk
12/ Ukraine has options to stabilize the line, including deploying new brigades, repositioning forces from Kursk and Kharkiv, or reallocating battalions from more stable fronts. However, time is against the defenders, and there is a risk of a serious operational catastrophe.
13/ The full analysis with detailed insights and nuances from Frontelligence Insight will be available soon on the @EuromaidanPress website and our own site. Follow our account to stay updated, and please like and share the opening message to help increase visibility.
14/ The full version of the article with better graphics and more details is available here:
Gallup, the famous analytics firm known for its public opinion polls, recently released a study titled "Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War." The data might sound controversial, with many citing the headline without delving deeper into the survey. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the latest survey, conducted in August and October 2024, an average of 52% of Ukrainians now favor a swift, negotiated resolution to the war. This a notable increase from 2023, when only 27% expressed this sentiment, reflecting a 25% increase in just one year
3/ At first glance, it might seem as though Ukrainians are giving up. However, the phrase "negotiated end to the war" is ambiguous: many, including myself, want peace and negotiations, but without capitulation. This nuance becomes clearer in the follow-up question of the poll.
The announcement permitting Ukraine to strike inside Russia with ATACMS came just yesterday, but evidence suggests Russia has been fortifying the Kursk military airbase since early October. Analysis from Frontelligence Insight🧵:
2/ Satellite imagery shows new aircraft revetments being built, expanding the airfield's capacity for jets. Both the new and existing revetments are being reinforced with what appears to be concrete blocks for added protection.
3/ The changes are clearly visible when compared to imagery of the same airfield spot from 2022. These newly built revetments offer limited protection, primarily against shrapnel and shockwaves, aiming to minimize damage from missile or drone strikes in the vicinity
Early reports suggest that Ukraine's use of ATACMS missiles may come with specific geographic limitations.
This nuance might significantly influence the outcomes of their use. Here’s a breakdown of what we can expect, given that the information about limitations is correct🧵:
2/ As reported before by our team Frontelligence Insight, Russian forces have moved many key air assets beyond ATACMS range, leaving mainly helicopters and close-support jets at the Kursk airfield within striking distance, reducing high-value targets
3/ Russia has a vast network of makeshift ammo depots, command posts, rail stations, and other tactical sites in Kursk oblast. However, their sheer number far outstrips the limited missiles available to Ukraine.
The second part of Frontelligence Insight's investigation, based on leaked emails and documents provided by @CyberResUa, reveals new details about Russia's 2022 struggles to produce critical Su-57 components due to reliance on Western parts. 🧵Thread with investigation details:
2/ In the first part of our investigation, we examined the correspondence between Almaz-Antei's affiliate "Red Banner" and Joint Stock Company "Mikropribor" discussing how a critical component, the MPPU-50, put state contracts for Su-57 production at risk
3/ As we discovered, the MPPU-50 module is used in the L-band antenna system (N036L-1-01) for the radar complex of the Sh-121 weapon control system on Su-57. The leaked documents reveal a decision to expand production to additional facilities to fulfill the contract.
One point of tension between Zelensky and the Biden admins was the issue of allowing ATACMS strikes inside Russia. Frontelligence Insight conducted geospatial analysis and spoke with former U.S. officials and experts from leading US think tanks. Summary of our report🧵:
2/ When a Pentagon spokesperson suggested that Russia had moved assets capable of KAB strikes from airfields within ATACMS range, the statement was correct. Our research confirms that Russia relocated Su-34/35 jets from bases like Voronezh Air Base.
3/ At the same time, our analysis of satellite imagery from September 28 reveals that at least 14 combat and transport helicopters, along with eight Su-25 close-air-support jets, were stationed at the Kursk airport when the images were captured.
Ukraine is likely approaching the final stages of the active phase of the war. I suggest taking a look at my assessment, which draws on General Budanov’s overlooked speech at the Yalta Conference, along with insights from other reports and assessments
🧵Thread:
2/ Any war of attrition tests endurance, economics, diplomacy, and the ability to replace losses. As the war continues, these issues intensify, pushing one side closer to a tipping point. Production and the capacity to replace losses are tangible factors that can be projected
3/ One notable point from Budanov’s speech was Russia’s plan to produce 149 T-90M tanks in 2024.
Russia has been heavily relying on refurbishing older tank models from its Soviet-era stockpiles. Most of its current tank fleet on the battlefield is no longer in production.