As Russian forces close in on Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub in Ukraine's Donbas region, concerns about its potential loss are mounting. There is uncertainty about why Pokrovsk is more significant than other recently lost towns. This thread aims to clarify this and other aspects:
2/ Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, Avdiivka was vital for Ukrainian troops, serving as a fortress, protecting key logistical routes in Donetsk Oblast, and a potential foothold for deoccupying Donetsk. Since 2022, Russia has invested heavily in capturing it
3/ Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of ~60,000, lies west of Avdiivka at a key railroad crossroads. It has become a key distribution hub, supporting Ukrainian forces along a broad frontline from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond. The railways are highlighted in red
4/ Currently, only two places in the Donbas serve this vital function - Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk
The significance of Pokrovsk extends beyond its rail connections - it is also located at a key road juncture, serving a similar role in the transportation and distribution of supplies
5/ The road linking Pokrovsk to Kostyantynivka has long been a Russian target. Cutting it off would worsen the resupply of troops in the Bakhmut-Horlivka sector. The potential loss of Pokrovsk poses an operational threat to logistics in the region, from Vuhledar to Horlivka
6/ Another concern is the political one: Pokrovsk is just over 20 kilometers from the Dnipro Oblast border. Given Russia's re-entry into Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, there's little reason to think Putin will stop at Donetsk and Luhansk borders.
7/ Since July, the pace of Russian advancement in this area has quickened, allowing them to bypass most of the defensive lines Ukraine rapidly built after Avdiivka’s fall. This is visible on the map by OSINT group @Black_BirdGroup, which used satellite imagery to map defenses
8/ Satellite imagery of seized UA positions shows signs of artillery shelling, though less extensive than in Ocheretyne. This likely indicates that Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk area retreated multiple times due to insufficient forces and resources for an organized defense
9/ While concerns about the lack of fortifications behind Avdiivka are valid, the major issue is the shortage of manpower and units to defend them. Regardless of how well-constructed the defenses are, if they are staffed at only 10-20% of capacity, they likely will be lost
10/ Typically, both Ukraine and Russia redeploy forces to stabilize critical areas by moving units from quieter sectors. Ukraine’s redeployment to Kharkiv, and then Sumy for the Kursk operation has reduced the available units for stabilization efforts.
11/ Does this mean that the loss of Pokrovsk is imminent? No, but the likelihood is increasing due to the balance of forces. Despite Ukrainian efforts to draw Russian forces away with the Kursk incursion, Russian leadership is hesitant to redeploy significant forces from Pokrovsk
12/ Ukraine has options to stabilize the line, including deploying new brigades, repositioning forces from Kursk and Kharkiv, or reallocating battalions from more stable fronts. However, time is against the defenders, and there is a risk of a serious operational catastrophe.
13/ The full analysis with detailed insights and nuances from Frontelligence Insight will be available soon on the @EuromaidanPress website and our own site. Follow our account to stay updated, and please like and share the opening message to help increase visibility.
14/ The full version of the article with better graphics and more details is available here:
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories
One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help:
2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:
3/ We’re also looking for volunteers to assess the damage, particularly those with expertise in damage surveys, industrial building damage assessments, and the oil and gas industry: especially in evaluating potential refinery damage. Feel free to contact us at
frontel@proton.me
As we move into the second month of the year, Frontelligence Insight has prepared an early assessment report covering recent developments on the frontlines and within both Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Below are some key highlights from the report. 1/ 🧵Thread:
2/ The frontline dynamics for Ukraine remain challenging, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk. While leadership is working to address organizational and recruitment issues, it will take time for these changes to be implemented and impact the battlefield.
3/ Russian forces are facing high losses, with tens of thousands of AWOL cases and a significant depletion of armored vehicles, which are being replaced by civilian transport. Nevertheless, they continue advancing in areas where Ukrainian defenses are stretched with few people
In collaboration with @casusbellii, our team Frontelligence Insight investigated a large Russian convoy: over 100 vehicles, including tanks, trucks, IFVs, artillery, and other equipment, that rolled into Bamako, Mali. We've assessed its composition and origins. 🧵Thread:
2/ On January 17, 2025, local media Cap Mali+, streamed a more than 30-minute video of a column of vehicles passing through unnamed Malian streets. The convoy included over 100 vehicles, with roughly half consisting of trucks and the other half made up of combat vehicles
3/ The location of the footage was geolocated to the southwestern outskirts of Bamako, near coordinates 12.545009, -8.120543. The convoy was moving toward the center of the Malian capital.
You may not have heard of tantalum, but there’s a good chance it’s in the phone or computer you're using to read this. It’s also a key part in Russia’s military electronics, and its shortage, driven by sanctions, is causing disruptions. Frontelligence Insight's latest assessment:
2/ Russia relies on tantalum to produce tantalum powders for capacitors used in control, navigation, and signal processing systems. While Russia has tantalum deposits, they are limited, and it lacks advanced processing facilities to process a raw tantalum
3/ Historically, tantalum processing has been conducted at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan, a facility built during the Soviet era. When sanctions were implemented, Kazakhstan joined them, cutting off Russia’s primary supply of processed tantalum.
1/ Why is Ukraine losing ground? There are many explanations, ranging from a lack of aid to a lack of political will to win. The reality, however, is far more complex. This thread offers a brief excerpt from my recent analysis, with the full link provided at the end.
🧵Thread:
2/ Many struggles that the Ukrainian military faces stem from before 2022 and have scaled significantly by 2025. A mobilized force, where teachers, farmers, and IT workers replaced the professional core, turned what began as 'growing pains' into systemic flaws
3/ A damning report on Ukraine’s 155th Anne of Kyiv Brigade grotesquely exposed systematic issues. Despite training in France and sufficient funding and equipment, the unit faced high AWOL rates and fragmentation across frontline units. The issues that lead to it are systematic