This is going to be my third 🧵on the AFU's Palyanitsa one way attack (OWA) Drone and the latest information on its cluster munitions payload per the briefing from the "Reporting from Ukraine" YouTube channel.
Palyanitsa Payload/Success Analysis🧵
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Palyanitsa Payload/Success Analysis🧵
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In the first Palyanitsa thread I did a cost effectiveness analysis at a $300K price point for "American procurement realistic" numbers.
The actual Ukrainian price point of a Palyanitsa is $40K.
That's 75 for the price of one JASSM.
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The actual Ukrainian price point of a Palyanitsa is $40K.
That's 75 for the price of one JASSM.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1827489481689043383
The jet powered Palyanitsa has a speed of ~300 knots indicated.
This makes it a very difficult target for machine guns or 23mm autocannon's but still too cheap for most missiles to down.
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This makes it a very difficult target for machine guns or 23mm autocannon's but still too cheap for most missiles to down.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1827830330385960970
Tom Cooper, AKA Sarcastosaurus @xxtomcooperxx on Substack gives a lot of on Russian airpower infrastructure and its identification friend or foe set up that is relevant for Palyanitsa.
Starting with the lack of hardened aircraft shelters⬇️
4/xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-…
Starting with the lack of hardened aircraft shelters⬇️
4/xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-…
Cooper goes into the post-1967 aircraft shelter programs of the NATO & Warsaw Pact to protect their planes from 500 kg bomb direct hits.
The Soviet shelter threat analysis was based on this analysis:
"In the USSR, the Soviet Air Force was constructing such shelters at its bases in East Germany,
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The Soviet shelter threat analysis was based on this analysis:
"In the USSR, the Soviet Air Force was constructing such shelters at its bases in East Germany,
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...in Czechoslovakia, and Poland, plus on some of air bases in western Ukraine: essentially, places that could be reached by such of NATO’s tactical fighter-bombers like General Dynamics F-111 or MRCA Tornado.
However, roughly, ‘east of Kyiv’… there was no such practice."
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However, roughly, ‘east of Kyiv’… there was no such practice."
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"...when the USSR fell apart, the ex-Soviet-cum-Russian Air Force had to withdraw to air bases the mass of which had no hardened aircraft facilities whatsoever.
….and then nobody cared about this issue for 30 years…"
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….and then nobody cared about this issue for 30 years…"
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Russia started to pretend to care in 2018 when insurgents of Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham (HTS) began deploying mini-UAVs to target the Russia-controlled Khmeimim airbase & the Tartus naval base in Syria.
The hanger pictured right was built in reaction to those attacks had concrete walls and metal proof against such drones.
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The hanger pictured right was built in reaction to those attacks had concrete walls and metal proof against such drones.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1508224251823861762
Cooper goes into the fact that the effort inside Russia to do the same was a funding source for new Dacha's and not building shelters that could survive a Palyanitsa cluster munition attack.
Basically, all VKS air bases are meat on the platter for the Palyanits like this.⬇️
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Basically, all VKS air bases are meat on the platter for the Palyanits like this.⬇️
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The other very interesting thing Cooper lays out is how the West & particularly the USAF & USN exploited Soviet identification Friend or Foe from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to the end of the Cold War.
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For those who do not know what identification friend or foe (IFF) is, it is an electronic device that response to radio signals and sends back a signal or "Squawk."
Sometime called "Secondary Radar" IFF has been around as long as radar itself...
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Sometime called "Secondary Radar" IFF has been around as long as radar itself...
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1499491488979423239
...and exploiting its signals has been a cornerstone of air combat ever since its introduction.
Despite vociferous, misguided and lethal to low thousands of US Navy sailors resistance to that reality by Adm. Ernest King in WW2.
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Despite vociferous, misguided and lethal to low thousands of US Navy sailors resistance to that reality by Adm. Ernest King in WW2.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1270849082156879878
Cooper also goes into the issue of Russian VKS versus Russian Army air defense IFF issues regarding the 128K encrypted IFF being subject to the usual interservice 'friendly fire' stupidity.
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What is helping the Palyanitsa with Russian IFF more than anything is the repeated capture of Russian air defense missile complexes for technical analysis by the AFU.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1499491477239566336
The PSU has been inside the Russian IFF system since early in the war.
I have no doubt something like the Combat Tree AN/APX-80 enemy IFF-interrogator has been fielded on both PSU jets and surface to air missile sites.
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I have no doubt something like the Combat Tree AN/APX-80 enemy IFF-interrogator has been fielded on both PSU jets and surface to air missile sites.
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https://x.com/TrentTelenko/status/1499491499360362501
A commenter on my Chicagoboyz post about that IFF loss identified the fact that Ukraine may have the ability to hack ADA networks to paint an enemy IFF codes on VKS jets to cause friendly fire.
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A Russian claim that one of their A-50 jets was lost to friendly fire takes on a whole new meaning if you think about that mass IFF compromise.
Palyanitsa swarms are certainly using these VKS IFF compromises to strike VKS air bases.
17/17 End
Palyanitsa swarms are certainly using these VKS IFF compromises to strike VKS air bases.
17/17 End
@threadreaderapp unroll please
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