10 years ago today RUs treacherously violated agreement on green corridor for 🇺🇦 troops which tried to leave Ilovaisk (Donetsk region). Columns of UA troops have been targeted by RU paratroopers. 366 warriors died, 128 became POWs, 158 were MIA.
We will never forget.
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Everything that might happen next in UA-RU war is direct consequence of UA Defense Forces had been left with depleted supply of ammo&equipment since October 2023 and as the result being strained with need to fight at unsustainable rate.
Ukraine was not able to attrit RU formations as much as possible since RU switched to offensive mode since mid autumn 2023 at all directions despite defensive mode prevalence in this war. UA troops did their best to arrest RU advance.
But they might have done much better in terms of RU loses if provided properly in October 2023-April 2024.
Unfortunately both people inside&outside of UA mostly concentrate on specific personalities analysing war dynamics instead of giving a thought to objective conditions. By this people miss really important things and how they shape limits of possible. Thread 🧵
The major problem for UA mil strategy that in 2023 campaign (unlike in 2022 campaign) political goals, military capabilities and combat performance have not been in balance. Moreover there was a tension between political&military dimension. Let’s see this contrast in detail.
In 2022 UA campaign there was kind of perfect match between political goals, mil capabilities&combat performance. Politically strat defense with counterattacks was just fine. And for this UA had proper capabilities&combat performance. Front dynamics in 2022 reflected this match.
A quick thread on idea raised privately by some US officials that should UA be more forceful in penetration phase early in South offensive it might have lost more but in the end accomplished a breakthrough of RU tactical depth quicker instead of being bogged in tactical depth.
But first some important facts to consider this issue.
1 Trent Maul, director of analysis at DIA, admitted in The Economist interview that “US officials failed to appreciate the depth of Russia’s defences”.
2 UA summer Southern offensive was wargamed in early March 2023 at Wiesbaden. All war games are done based on prior intelligence assessments/forecasts.
Недавно пан @anthony__cba попросив скласти список того, що перечитав із книжок по воєнним і стратегічним питанням. Даю перелік книг, які прочитав із жовтня 2018 до 24.02.22 року.
3Александр Свечин “Клаузевіц”.
4Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes “Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy”
5Андрей Кокошин “Армия и политика. Эволюция советской военно-политической и военно-стратегической мысли (1918—1991)”
6Георгий Иссерсон “Эволюция оперативного искусства”
7Александр Свечин “Стратегия”
8Александр Свечин “Эволюция военного искусства”.
9John Andreas Olsen, Martin van Creveld “The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present”.
US-UA relations after 1991 can be described as UA desire to attain US security guarantees given RU threat while US were mainly ready to build partnership in field of security with UA avoiding risks of direct confrontation with RU.
So current tussle over Vilnius NATO summit wordings related to UA is nothing new except circumstances which progressively deteriorate given past restraint to idea of UA NATO membership.
P.S. UA for the first time raised issue of US security guarantees like ones of NATO in course of nuc disarmament of 1992-94.
@viddavaj Там трохи цікавіше чим запамʼятав. Вибачаюся. Дійсно США тисли щоб ніяких ракет більше 300 км якщо виробляти плануємо відповідно до політики 1993 року. Але дід Горбулін відстояв право якщо що створювати то до дальності 500 км. Держдеп сказав ок, бо розуміли що ніц не втягнемо.