10 years ago today RUs treacherously violated agreement on green corridor for 🇺🇦 troops which tried to leave Ilovaisk (Donetsk region). Columns of UA troops have been targeted by RU paratroopers. 366 warriors died, 128 became POWs, 158 were MIA.
We will never forget.
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UA-US relations in 33 years have had diverse stories - some of which were not so pleasant. There have been cases when behind US govt smiles&lofty rhetoric UA was strong armed&had to operate within severe constraints. But still we managed to build productive relations. Thread 🧵
But yesterday event at White House proved to be smth negatively new. Ukraine is not heard literally while Ukraine’s national interests are totally disregarded. Though mutual recognition&respect to national interests are the basis for productive bilateral relations.
DJTrump&Co made clear that they are deaf to key Ukrainian concerns - namely that UA security&sovereignty shall be guaranteed within any settlement for it to be durable&sustainable. As no security means no development which in turn means no future for country.
All recent statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio regarding UA-RU war are based on the misguided assumption that with this war dynamics situation is ripe for compromises and durable settlement. References to stalemate are best proof of this misguided idea. Thread 🧵
But war&strategic dynamics is far cry from situation when both sides are so exhausted to be ready for compromise deal given no one ability to advance further quickly and in major scale. Quite the opposite - RU operates on the assumption that it can improve its bargaining power.
With exception of UA Kursk offensive RU has possessed overall battlefield initiative since Oct 2023. In 2024 despite staggering loses RU managed to occupy 3,6K square km of UA territory exploiting UA C2&personnel problems, gap in US aid&by some tactical&technological adjustments.
Everything that might happen next in UA-RU war is direct consequence of UA Defense Forces had been left with depleted supply of ammo&equipment since October 2023 and as the result being strained with need to fight at unsustainable rate.
Ukraine was not able to attrit RU formations as much as possible since RU switched to offensive mode since mid autumn 2023 at all directions despite defensive mode prevalence in this war. UA troops did their best to arrest RU advance.
But they might have done much better in terms of RU loses if provided properly in October 2023-April 2024.
Unfortunately both people inside&outside of UA mostly concentrate on specific personalities analysing war dynamics instead of giving a thought to objective conditions. By this people miss really important things and how they shape limits of possible. Thread 🧵
The major problem for UA mil strategy that in 2023 campaign (unlike in 2022 campaign) political goals, military capabilities and combat performance have not been in balance. Moreover there was a tension between political&military dimension. Let’s see this contrast in detail.
In 2022 UA campaign there was kind of perfect match between political goals, mil capabilities&combat performance. Politically strat defense with counterattacks was just fine. And for this UA had proper capabilities&combat performance. Front dynamics in 2022 reflected this match.
A quick thread on idea raised privately by some US officials that should UA be more forceful in penetration phase early in South offensive it might have lost more but in the end accomplished a breakthrough of RU tactical depth quicker instead of being bogged in tactical depth.
But first some important facts to consider this issue.
1 Trent Maul, director of analysis at DIA, admitted in The Economist interview that “US officials failed to appreciate the depth of Russia’s defences”.
2 UA summer Southern offensive was wargamed in early March 2023 at Wiesbaden. All war games are done based on prior intelligence assessments/forecasts.
Недавно пан @anthony__cba попросив скласти список того, що перечитав із книжок по воєнним і стратегічним питанням. Даю перелік книг, які прочитав із жовтня 2018 до 24.02.22 року.
3Александр Свечин “Клаузевіц”.
4Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes “Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy”
5Андрей Кокошин “Армия и политика. Эволюция советской военно-политической и военно-стратегической мысли (1918—1991)”
6Георгий Иссерсон “Эволюция оперативного искусства”
7Александр Свечин “Стратегия”
8Александр Свечин “Эволюция военного искусства”.
9John Andreas Olsen, Martin van Creveld “The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present”.