Lacy Hunt mentioned the “long tentacles” of payrolls revisions on other upstream economic indicators.
Some of them I identified are: personal income (lower), which also means saving rate (lower), GDI (lower). Ultimately, GDP (lower).
There is this myth that GDI always get revised toward GDP. It is a myth, because turns out that GDI leads GDP in turning points of the economy (per BEA and Fed research). And GDP tends to get revised toward GDI in lead up to and during recessions…though obvious only several years later.
The discrepancy is GDP and GDI also turns out to be predictive of unemployment rate in the lead up to cyclical peaks.
Finally, why does GDI have these superior features over GDP at cyclical turning points?
You guess it…it is likely firm birth and death again!
GDI picks up the firm and death because it uses QCEW as source data…while GDP probably has non sampling data bias during these period.
This Fed paper by Jeremy Newaik has the most thorough treatment of the GDI and GDP differential that I’ve read. The former being superior during 2006-2008.
Bottomline: why do I have to spend my Friday night writing about this rather reading a nice book? I’d rather not. But people on this app put too much signal on GDP, particularly in today’s economic environment. Research would say to put more weight on GDI in turning points.
How the GDI and GDP gap has predictive properties on unemployment.
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Some thoughts on the idea that a new Trump admin will try to “devalue” the dollar. (I put quotes around because that is a wrong usage of the word)
Dollar “devaluation” was a recurrent policy proposal in the first Trump administration, but the idea never took flight because, as I observed:
1) the economic context does not show a big misalignment in the currencies.
2) UST Secretary Manuchin was a closet traditionalist and ultimately was subsumed by the Treasury policy inertia of strong dollar mantra ( though there has been rethink in recent years)
3) there is no buyin from other G7 countries
But, I can *imagine* a scenario where all three of these factors could change a couple years down the line, building more support for a Plaza Accord II (1/n)
On factor 1) the dollar appreciated against AFR currencies by 60% in the 5 years ahead of Plaza accord.
As of now it has appreciated by 16% since 21’. Supposed that the Fed hold rates constant or hike next year, while other G7 countries are cutting. Supposed US growth stay robust because of immigration surge and past fiscal stimulus. And supposed Trump did impose its 60% + 10% tariff. I can see it is not impossible for the dollar to be up another 30% in two years. (2/n)
On 2) it matters who the next UST Secretary here. James Baker was it back in 1985. You need someone of that force of personality and aligned inclination with the President to reverse longstanding policy inertia.
Lighthizer would be such a character. John Paulson, or any other types of wall street or academic background, would follow more of Manuchin’s path. (3/n)
How would the Fed view today’s CPI surprise? First, consider how they view the Jan and Feb surprise:
According to FOMC minutes, “Some” participants didn’t discount the strong inflation readings in January and February, though “a few” said residual seasonality contributed to those hot readings. (1/3)
Those who had a hand in preparing would suggest that “a few” is two degrees less than “some.” That means the doves were outnumbered in March. (2/3)
If that was already the case before today’s cpi surprise, today’s report surely even tip the scale toward less confidence about inflation coming down. 3/3
Why I’m skeptical that the nonfarm payroll neutral pace is now well in the 200ks: that assumes the nonfarm payroll is able to well capture the migrants. Looking at the composition of the 3mil nonfarm payrolls added last year, almost 70% are in sectors that are high skills. (1/3)
Don’t think the 2.4 mil “other” immigrants are becoming teachers, in health care, or taking government jobs…
This argument does not preclude the idea that going forward, as these migrants are absorbed you can get a higher nonfarm month neutral. Just don’t think it was the reason in 2023. (3/3)
Jobless claims are very low, whatever seasonal factors one uses. Our latest on @theterminal assesses what the low level means. Spoiler: less unemployed people are applying for claims, meaning that the low level doesn't mean it what it used to mean. (1/4) blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories/S…
We highlight two reasons why unemployed aren't apply for claims: 1) eligibility is at all time low pre-recession. and 2) UI benefits not catching up with inflation, opportunity cost of collecting benefits higher than ever before.
We estimate that the average wage coverage gap is bigger than ever, abut $1400/week. Why collect benefits when you can earn way more as gig worker or freelancer and actually be able to pay your bills? The lower the coverage of UI, the lower the recipiency rate, at state level.
A 🧵 to add to the debate on whether this time is different when it comes to recession. In a piece with Bill Dudley today, we looked into reasons why or why not recession rules will hold in this cycle. First, U-1, U-2, U-3, Uflows say recession trigger is either near or here. 1/5
All those rules are highly accurate. Since wwii, unemployment from trough to peak either rise by less than 0.5ppt, or more than 1.9 ppt (recessions). No intermediate values. Plausible argument for why this time is different next (2/5)
This time is different because the increase is due to labor supply? Flaw of this argument is that even in past recessions, entrants into labor force also accounts for at least half if not more of the unemployment inflows. Slowdown in job finding rate is key, not layoffs ( 3/5)